State v. Blazas
| Decision Date | 26 August 2013 |
| Citation | 74 A.3d 991,432 N.J.Super. 326 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Daniel BLAZAS, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Bruce J. Kaplan, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Joie D. Piderit, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges GRAVES, ESPINOSA and GUADAGNO.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense” guaranteed by the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions is denied when the prosecution substantially interferes with a defendant's ability to secure witness testimony. In this case, the government conduct alleged did not result in the denial of witness testimony but, rather, in the denial of access to the witness for interview by the defense. Such allegations, if true, would be proof of substantial interference with defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right of access to witnesses. We therefore hold that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. In addition, after concluding that defendant had satisfactorily represented himself at a Wade1 hearing, the trial judge granted his motion to proceed pro se without adequately advising him of the consequences of his decision. Because we conclude that a reversal of defendant's convictions is required, we recite those facts necessary to give context to the issues.
Defendant was convicted of offenses arising from the robbery of a convenience store. At the time of the robbery on December 12, 2007, Prafulcha Patel was the only employee working at the store. A man entered the store, purchased a pack of Marlboro Red cigarettes with a $10 bill, and then demanded money from the cash register. After Patel refused, the man demanded money from the lottery register and showed a gun that was hidden in his hooded sweatshirt. The man took $1330 and left the store. Patel then called the police.
On the following day, Patel identified a photograph of defendant from a photographic array shown to him at the Sayreville Police Station. Patel also identified defendant at trial.
On December 14, 2007, defendant's ex-fiancée, Jennifer McHugh, gave a statement to the police regarding a telephone call she received from defendant on the night of the robbery. McHugh said defendant told her he had done a “caper” at the “Indian store.” Later that day, defendant was arrested.
Defendant was indicted and charged with first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1 (count one); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (a handgun), N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b) (count two); second-degree possession of a weapon (a handgun) for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4(a) (count three); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(b)(4) (count four); and third-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20–3 (count five). In a separate indictment, defendant was charged with second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–7(b).
Defendant filed several pretrial motions, three of which are relevant to the appeal. The first two motions concern defendant's request to represent himself.
In September 2008, defendant sought to have new counsel assigned to represent him because he was dissatisfied with his attorney's motion practice. During the course of the argument, the judge stated,
Obviously if you want to represent yourself and raise these things you can. I would certainly ask you to really think seriously about that, before doing it.... [I]t's a complex matter and you may look at things differently than most lawyers would, and then [sic] a judge would.
The judge asked defendant about his education and whether defendant would be able to understand the proceedings if he proceeded pro se. Defendant responded that he graduated from high school and attended two years of college. Defendant said,
[I]t's not something that I want to do. But like ... I said I'm fighting for my life right here. There's a chance I'm never coming home from prison again. And with the animosity I feel towards this man, I can't be left in the room with [him].
The judge denied defendant's motion for new counsel, but advised him that if he wished to proceed pro se, he would need to file another motion and “go through a whole series of questions[.]” The judge also advised defendant that, even if he did proceed pro se, defense counsel would be ordered to be present at all proceedings to provide standby assistance. The court then reviewed the charges and concluded that defendant would face “20, 50, 60 years plus” if he was convicted at trial.
In January 2009, the court heard defendant's motion to proceed pro se. Defendant stated he was “ready to proceed pro se.” The court questioned defendant about his “plan” and what he perceived he would have to do to get ready for trial:
Defendant explained that he knew the case better than anyone and had studied the process. The court asked defense counsel for his opinion about defendant's understanding of the Wade issue and whether he was capable and competent to represent himself in the Wade hearing. Defense counsel agreed that defendant was able to do so. The court then addressed defendant:
....
COURT: All right. I will permit you, sir. You seem to have a general understanding of what's going on. I cannot tell you that your perception of the law is accurate. But you're articulate in your presentation. You certainly understand the facts of the case and the allegations of the State better than anybody I would suspect. I accept Counsel's representation that he believes you understand what's going on and are capable of proceeding pro se. I do not believe it would be a wise decision, but it is not for me to decide. It's my decision whether or not you're competent and capable of doing it.
At the conclusion of the Wade hearing, after the court denied defendant's motion, defendant asked the court if it had made a determination as to whether he could continue to proceed pro se. This colloquy followed:
At defendant's request, the judge agreed to call the jail “and tell them that [defendant is] in fact proceeding pro se.”
The third motion relevant to this appeal concerned defendant's allegations that the State substantially interfered with his ability to interview witnesses. At a status conference in May 2009, the court discussed with defendant and counsel defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment based upon prosecutorial misconduct or, in the alternative, to bar McHugh from testifying against him. Defendant contended that the State had improperly interfered with his right to prepare a defense and supported his argument with two reports prepared by a defense investigator, Justin Kurland.
Kurland stated that, after he placed a telephone call to McHugh on April 2, 2009, he received a call from Detective Anderson. Anderson “proceeded to tell [Kurland] that he was not permitted to call Ms. McHugh and that he instructed Ms. McHugh not to speak with the investigator.” According to the report, Anderson advised Kurland that “Ms. McHugh was a [S]tate witness and that any questions regarding Ms. McHugh had to go through the Assistant Prosecutor.”
Kurland prepared a second report, also dated April 2, 2009, regarding his telephone call to Captain Stukowsky of the Sayreville Police Department. Kurland stated Stukowsky told him that the Assistant Prosecutor advised against giving a “go ahead” for interviews with five patrolmen as he “did not feel that it would necessarily be beneficial for the prosecution.” Two of those patrolmen, Poetsch and Mader, later testified at trial.
Defendant argued that the State's actions were akin to witness tampering. After reading the reports, the judge stated,
The law does not require a witness to speak to anybody. Doesn't even actually require a witness to speak to the State.... But the law does require that the parties not instruct their potential witnesses that they shouldn't speak to investigators from ... adversaries.
I don't know what the conversation was.... But that report clearly seems to indicate that Detective Anderson operated on the assumption and belief that he had a right to instruct potential witnesses not to speak to defense investigators. That is simply wrong. He has a right to say you don't have to, has a right to say your choice, but he cannot say don't. And I'd like Detective Anderson in here tomorrow.
The prosecutor objected, stating the judge was “taking the word ......
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