State v. Blevins, 12-0438

• Decision Date: 24 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12-0438,12-0438
• Parties: State of West Virginia, Plaintiff, Respondent v. Jesse Aaron Blevins, Defendant, Petitioner
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

State of West Virginia, Plaintiff, Respondent

v.Jesse Aaron Blevins, Defendant, Petitioner

No. 12-0438

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUED: June 24, 2013

(Cabell County 10-F-253)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Jesse Aaron Blevins, by counsel A. Courtenay Craig and John A. Proctor, appeals the Circuit Court of Cabell County's sentencing order entered on March 21, 2012, after he was found guilty of one count of voluntary manslaughter and one count of concealment of a dead body. Respondent State of West Virginia, by counsel Benjamin Yancey III, has filed a response.

This Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On July 27, 2009, petitioner, his ex-girlfriend Elizabeth Cotton, and their minor child attended a party at the home of David Frye. Later that evening, Frye returned all three to petitioner's father's home, where petitioner was staying. After putting their son to bed, petitioner and Cotton began to argue over his alleged infidelity.¹ He later claimed she attacked him with her fists and he struck back. He then claimed she grabbed a knife from her purse and attempted to stab him. Petitioner states that he retreated to the bathroom but Cotton followed him, so he pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed Cotton in the neck, killing her. Petitioner then cleaned up the crime scene, wrapped Cotton's body in trash bags and hid her body under the house. Petitioner threw the knife in the sewer, then took his son to his mother's home.

The next evening petitioner told Frye that he killed Cotton and buried her under the house. Petitioner then asked Frye to help him dispose of the body. Instead, Frye called the police and told them about petitioner's confession. Officers took Frye to identify the home wherepetitioner was residing. Officers announced themselves and knocked on the door. When petitioner came to the door, he was asked by the police to exit the home. Petitioner was then questioned and Cotton's body was found under the home. As soon as petitioner indicated Cotton was dead, the questioning ceased. Petitioner claims that he was not free to leave, and was not given Miranda rights prior to being asked where Cotton was. Moreover, the body was found prior to a search warrant being obtained.

Petitioner was indicted on September 19, 2009, on one count of murder and one count of concealment of a deceased human body. Petitioner later filed a motion to suppress his initial statements to the police, and the motion was denied. The prosecutor's office filed a "nolle prosequi" motion which was granted on August 10, 2010. Petitioner was re-indicted on both counts and all previous motions and rulings were transferred to the new case.

On October 21, 2011, a Rule 404(b) hearing was held on the State's four notices regarding its intent to introduce 404(b) evidence. This evidence included numerous acts of violence by petitioner against Cotton from October of 2007 through November of 2008; an injury inflicted by petitioner upon Cotton on April 26, 2008; a specific altercation wherein petitioner punched holes in Cotton's wall, urinated on her floor, spat on her, and hit her several times on December 2, 2007; an April 9, 2008, incident wherein petitioner struck Cotton, slashed her tires and broke her windshield; a verbal altercation on June 29, 2008; a February of 2009 incident wherein petitioner injured Cotton's lip and blackened her eye; a March of 2009 incident wherein petitioner threatened Cotton's life and threatened to take their son; and a May of 2009 incident wherein petitioner physically abused and raped Cotton. The court preliminarily ruled that the acts of violence and threats toward Cotton could be introduced. However, prior to the trial, most of the evidence was disallowed based on hearsay and prejudice. Trial began on January 18, 2012. Petitioner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and concealment of a deceased human body. He was sentenced to fifteen years on the first charge, and one to five years on the second, to run consecutively.

Petitioner first argues that the circuit court erred when it failed to suppress: (a) petitioner's initial statement to the police; (b) evidence taken as a result of the illegal search of his father's residence; and, (c) his subsequent confession, all of which were said to be fruit of the poisonous tree. Petitioner argues that he was effectively under arrest when approximately fifteen police officers descended on his father's home, and that he was questioned about Cotton's whereabouts without being given proper Miranda warnings.

This Court has noted as follows:

"When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court should construe all facts in the light most favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing party below. Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, particular deference is given to the findings of the circuit court because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, the circuit court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error." Syllabus point 1, State v. Lacy, 196 W.Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996).

Syl. Pt. 13, State v. White, 228 W.Va. 530, 722 S.E.2d 566 (2011). Moreover,

By employing a two-tier standard, we first review a circuit court's findings of fact when ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under the clearly erroneous standard. Second, we review de novo questions of law and the circuit court's ultimate conclusion as to the constitutionality of the law enforcement action. Under the clearly erroneous standard, a circuit court's decision ordinarily will be affirmed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence; based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law; or, in light of the entire record, this Court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. See State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886, 891 (1994). When we review the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

State v. Lilly, 194 W.Va. 595, 600, 461 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1995). Upon consideration of the above standard of review, this Court finds no error in the circuit court's denial of petitioner's motion to suppress his statements, the search, and his confession. As the State notes, the Court must first determine if petitioner was subjected to a custodial interrogation, and then must determine if there were exigent circumstances for the interrogation. This Court has stated that "the determination of whether a person was subjected to custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda requires a consideration of the totality of the circumstances." Damron v. Haines, 223 W.Va. 135, 141, 672 S.E.2d 271, 277 (2008). Moreover, "the Miranda safeguards were never intended to apply to the typical 'on-the-scene' investigation." Id. Miranda warnings "are not required where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather only where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation." Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Damron.

"The factors to be considered by the trial court in making a determination of whether a custodial interrogation environment exists, while not all-inclusive, include: the location and length of questioning; the nature of the questioning as it relates to the suspected offense; the number of police officers present; the use or absence of force or physical restraint by the police officers; the suspect's verbal and nonverbal responses to the police officers; and the length of time between the questioning and formal arrest." Syllabus Point 2, State v. Middleton, 220 W.Va. 89, 640 S.E.2d 152 (2006).

Syl. Pt. 4, Damron. Additionally, "'[o]ther factors relevant to the determination of whether a custodial interrogation occurred include 'the nature of the interrogator, the nature and condition of the suspect, the time and length of the questioning, the nature of the questioning-accusatory or investigatory, [and] the focus of the investigation at the time of questioning[.]' Moore v. Ballone, 488 F.Supp. 798, 805 (E.D.Va.1980)." Damron, 223 W.Va. at 141, 672 S.E.2d at 277. At the time petitioner gave his initial statement to the police, there was an ongoing emergency based on the statement that there was a dead body under the house and that petitioner intended to throw the body into the Ohio River. Because of these exigent circumstances, petitioner was asked a few short questions concerning the whereabouts of the victim. These questions were purely investigatory rather than accusatory and were not designed to incriminate petitioner. Even if petitioner had been in custody, these questions did not amount to an interrogation.

At the time police entered petitioner's father's home after they were told that Cotton was dead, they did not know with certainty whether Cotton was dead or alive, whether her body remained there, whether petitioner was in the process of destroying evidence, or whether petitioner's son was in the house. All of these exigent circumstances permitted entry without a warrant.

"An officer, with authority to conserve the peace, may, without a warrant, arrest any person who he, upon probable cause, believes has committed or is committing a felony, though it afterwards appears that no felony was actually perpetrated." Syllabus Point 2 State v. Duvernoy, 156 W.Va. 578, 195 S.E.2d 631 (1973).

Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Drake, 170 W.Va. 169, 291 S.E.2d 484 (1982). Moreover, "[p]robable cause to make an arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the...