State v. Blue

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before PETERS; PER CURIAM; BERDON
• Citation: State v. Blue, 230 Conn. 109, 644 A.2d 859 (Conn. 1994)
• Decision Date: 01 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. A,A
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Gregory BLUE. C. 12143.

Page 859

644 A.2d 859

230 Conn. 109

STATE of Connecticut v. Gregory BLUE.

No. A.C. 12143.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

July 1, 1994 ^*.

Neal Cone, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner (defendant).

David J. Sheldon, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for respondent (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is a petition for certification to appeal to this court from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment. The trial court, after accepting the defendant's plea of guilty, under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), to one count of robbery in the first degree, and after denying the defendant's motions to withdraw his guilty plea, sentenced the defendant to a period of eight years incarceration, execution suspended after five years, and three years probation.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant challenged the trial court's acceptance of his plea and its denial of his motion to withdraw the plea. The Appellate Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Blue, 33 Conn.App. 941, 638 A.2d 1098 (1994). The defendant now seeks further review of the trial court's acceptance of his plea and its denial of his motion to withdraw the plea. ¹ We have today ordered that certification be denied. State v. Blue, 230 Conn. 903, 644 A.2d 919 (1994).

Ordinarily, we do not explain the reasoning behind a denial of a petition for certification to appeal. In this case, however, we deem it appropriate to do so because the dissent mischaracterizes the trial court record and the law governing the trial court proceedings.

The issue raised by the petition for certification is whether the Appellate Court should have reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. That motion arguably incorporated by reference an issue raised by a motion to disqualify counsel in which the defendant had raised his alleged inability to participate intelligently, knowingly and willingly in the plea canvass because he was, at that time, taking psychotropic medication. As a matter of law, the defendant cannot prevail because of State v. Watson, 198 Conn. 598, 504 A.2d 497 (1986). As a matter of fact, the record reveals that the trial court engaged in a thorough plea canvass to which the defendant responded appropriately and in some detail. Further, the record of the proceedings at the time of the motion to withdraw the plea supports the trial court's determination that the defendant understood the plea canvass.

I

The record discloses the following facts and procedural history. On September 29, 1992, in the trial court, the defendant, represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty under the Alford doctrine to one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 53a-134. ² The plea bargain that the state disclosed to the court contemplated a sentence of incarceration of no more than eight years, with the defendant having the right to argue for less at the time of sentencing. Before accepting the defendant's plea, the court engaged in a lengthy canvass.

The transcript of the plea canvass discloses that the defendant answered many of the court's questions with responses that, although not eloquent, were appropriate and responsive to the questions posed to him. ³ The court found the plea to have been entered voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently, and with a full understanding of the charges and consequences. Significantly, insofar as the record discloses, neither person in the courtroom charged with responsibility for protection of the defendant's rights--the judge, who observed the defendant as he went through the canvass, or the defendant's attorney, who had spoken with the defendant before the entry of the plea and stood with him as he entered the plea--had any perception that, despite the presence in his system of medications, the defendant did not understand what he was doing. Indeed, this record is, at the least, susceptible of the inference that the medications helped, rather than hindered, the defendant in understanding the proceedings and their consequences for him. ⁴

On October 28, 1992, the defendant filed a pro se "Motion To Dismiss Counsel," dated October 22, 1992. ⁵ This motion raised four substantive grounds of dissatisfaction with counsel: (1) failing to advise him of a purported mandatory, nonsuspendable sentence under General Statutes § 53a-35a; (2) "ill-advis[ing] the defendant by having him plea[d] guilty under the influence of mind altering drugs"; (3) failing to inform the court of a request for a psychiatric evaluation and a "determination for CADAC"; ⁶ and (4) misinforming the defendant "about his felony record conviction."

The next court proceeding was on November 17, 1992. The defendant's attorney noted that he had just recently seen the defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his plea, and that the attorney was preparing a motion to withdraw the plea. The attorney also indicated that a psychiatrist had evaluated the defendant, and that the psychiatric report would be ready in approximately two weeks. The attorney made clear, however, that he had retained the psychiatrist for purposes of the sentencing, irrespective of the result on any motions to withdraw the defendant's plea. The attorney therefore requested that all proceedings, including sentencing if the motions were denied, be continued to December 9. The court continued the case to December 9, without ruling on the defendant's motion.

Before doing so, however, the court addressed the defendant directly about the matters raised in his pro se motion. The court asked the defendant whether he had a copy of the motion. The defendant responded, "Just a minute, sir." The court then directed the defendant to his claim that his attorney had not advised him regarding the mandatory minimum sentence required by § 53a-35a, and the defendant responded, "Yes. That's correct Your Honor." The defendant then acknowledged that "Me and my counsel discussed that this morning," and after his attorney explained that he would not be sentenced under that provision, the defendant indicated that he understood that.

The court also specifically addressed the defendant's claim for a an evaluation for CADAC. The defendant stated: "I had requested an evaluation for CADAC. Okay? ... Requested of my counsel.... From my counsel, I requested it. To have a CADAC evaluation." In the course of this colloquy, the court asked the defendant whether he had been evaluated for CADAC in a 1990 case. The defendant responded: "Someone came and ... I don't know exactly what it was, but someone came to see me.... I never remember using CADAC...." The court then directed the defendant's attorney to determine what had occurred in the 1990 proceeding.

With respect to the defendant's claim that his attorney had misinformed him regarding his felony conviction record, it became clear that certain information in the presentence investigation report was incorrect. This information was that the defendant had numerous prior convictions under ten different aliases. The court and the defendant engaged in a lengthy colloquy, in which the defendant, responding appropriately and at length to the court's inquiries, denied that he was the person named in those aliases. ⁷ The court stated that it would contact the probation department personally in order to clear up this confusion.

With respect to the defendant's claim that he had pleaded guilty under the influence of mind altering drugs, the defendant asserted that he had been coerced into pleading guilty by his attorney. When the court questioned why he had not indicated that fact during the canvass, the defendant stated: "Because, like I said, I was on drugs, okay?" The following colloquy then took place:

"The Court: Are you talking about the drugs that we discussed during the canvass on that day?

"The Defendant: Yes sir, yes.

"[Q.] You indicated to me very clearly in a transcript, which I read this morning, bears out that you indicated to me, in response to my questions, that you understood my questions.

"[A.] Well see ... but, I'm going to tell you, that sometime the drugs that I was on or the drugs that they give me have me submit or commit myself to saying things or doing things that I'm not aware of. And I was trying to....

"[Q.] All right. That's what you mean by number two, in your Motion to Dismiss Counsel, is that right? ... That's what you're talking about.

"[A.] Yes."

The defendant did not further pursue his motion to dismiss counsel. Instead, by motion dated December 8, 1992, and accompanied by a memorandum of law in support thereof, the defendant's attorney moved, on behalf of the defendant, to withdraw the defendant's plea. These motion papers did not rely on any claim that the defendant had been under the improper influence of drugs at the time of the plea. The sole basis for this motion was the claim that the court had been required by Practice Book §§ 711 and 721(1) to advise the defendant of the mandatory one year minimum sentence provided by General Statutes § 53a-35a. In the memorandum, the attorney stated that he had "carefully reviewed the transcript of the judicial canvass and is of the opinion that the Court never made the Defendant aware of the mandatory minimum sentence for Robbery 1st Degree."

The defendant's attorney filed his motion when the parties appeared in court the next day, December 9, 1992. The attorney stated: "I'm prepared to move forward on a motion to withdraw plea for my client. If I am unsuccessful, Your Honor, I'm prepared to move forward on sentencing today." The attorney then argued that the court's failure to advise the defendant during the plea canvass of a mandatory minimum sentence of one year under § 53a-35a rendered the plea invalid. The attorney also stated, however, that ...