State v. Blydenburgh

• Decision Date: 25 October 1905
• Parties: STATE v. BLYDENBURGH.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

104 N.W. 1015

STATE

v.BLYDENBURGH.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 25, 1905.

Appeal from District Court, Hardin County; J. H. Richard, Judge.

The indictment in this case charged the defendant with the crime of murder in the first degree. He was convicted of the crime as charged, and from the judgment entered, he appeals. Affirmed.

Deemer and Weaver, JJ., dissenting.Huff & Huff, Nagle & Nagle, and J. H. Scales, for appellant.

Chas. W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., and Lawrence De Graff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BISHOP, J.

1. Errors occurring in connection with the admission of evidence upon the trial are complained of by the appellant, and we have been at pains to examine the record as to each thereof to which our attention has been called in argument. It is to be observed that the trial was one of extreme length, and it would be strange if a critical inspection of the record in such a case did not disclose some tracings of error. We think it must be said, however, that while some of the rulings made in the instant case are not free from error, yet on the whole nothing appears that would justify us in disturbing the judgment.

2. It is the charge made in the indictment that the crime was committed by means of arsenical poison unlawfully administered to Jennie Blydenburgh by the defendant, her husband, and from which her death resulted. The record discloses that in respect of proof of the corpus delicti and of the guilt of the defendant the state relied upon evidence circumstantial in character. The defendant requested that the jury be instructed as follows: “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, each fact in the chain of circumstances necessary to be established to prove the guilt of the accused must be proven by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,” etc. And again, in a further request, that “each circumstance essential to the conclusion of the defendant's guilt should be fully established in the same manner and to the same extent as if the whole issue rested upon it. You must be satisfied that each link in the chain of circumstances essential to the conclusion sought to be established by the state has been fully proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and to your entire satisfaction, or you must acquit.” These requests were refused, and based thereon error is contended for. Directing attention to the subject-matter of the first of such requests, our examination of the record leads us to say that it is not necessary to a disposition of the case that we enter upon any discussion of the question sought to be thus raised. And the reasons will be made manifest from what follows. In the initial paragraph of the charge as given the court instructed the jury that “the burden rests upon the state of establishing the charge made by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,” etc. And again in the third paragraph it was said that the presumption of innocence continues “until the evidence satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.” The meaning of the expression “reasonable doubt” was then defined, and counsel for appellant make no question as to either the propriety of giving such instruction or the correctness thereof as given. In a succeeding instruction the jury was told that “in order to warrant a conviction under circumstantial evidence alone, the facts proved must not only be consistent with the guilt of the defendant, but they must also be inconsistent with any rational theory or hypothesis of his innocence. Circumstantial evidence is just as legal and just as effective as any other evidence, provided the circumstances established are of such a character and force as to satisfy the minds of the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Now in the seventh paragraph of the charge the court called the attention of the jury to the specific matters of fact essential to the ultimate fact of guilt, and hence necessary to be established, and this was followed by separate paragraphs, in which each of the constituent fact elements of the crime charged were in turn separately considered, and in respect of each thereof the court told the jury that the separate fact so presently under consideration must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant could be convicted. Whatever may be said, therefore, as to the rule of the request, it must be apparent that the appellant is in no position to complain. In respect of the second request presented, the same was properly refused for that thereby it was asked that the jury be told that each necessary fact must be proven “to your entire satisfaction.” No requirement of the rule goes thus far. The burden is not upon the state to prove guilt beyond all doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient.

3. In the fifth instruction given by the court on its own motion, direct and circumstantial evidence were abstractly defined, and the jury was told that a conviction might be had upon evidence of either class; also, that the two in combination might be relied upon to furnish the requisite proof. It was then said that if the facts and circumstances proven are sufficient to satisfy the minds of the jury of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt a verdict of guilt would be authorized. Then follows the language quoted by us in the preceding paragraph of this opinion having reference to the efficiency of circumstantial evidence. In respect of this instruction, it was the argument at the bar that, inasmuch as the evidence in the case was all circumstantial, it was error to even make reference to the subject of direct evidence. Conceding that the ultimate facts essential to guilt were as to each thereof sought to be established wholly by circumstantial evidence, still we are of opinion that out of the giving of the instruction no prejudice could have arisen such as to require a new trial. This is especially true when the instruction is read in connection with all the others given therewith. At best, the attempt to define direct and circumstantial evidence was prefatory in character, and the jury was advised that a conviction might be had upon either alone or upon both in conjunction. Now, conceding, further, as we may, that it was unnecessary to make reference to the subject of direct evidence, we cannot believe that the minds of the jurors were thrown into any confusion, as the subsequent instructions not only pointed out the essential elements of the crime, but brought to the attention of the jurors the character of the evidence relied upon in proof of such elemental facts, so that it must have been apparent even to the dullest mind that a verdict of guilt, if such were found, must not only be predicated upon the circumstances of the case, but that the conclusion thus to be drawn from such circumstances must preclude any rational theory or hypothesis of the innocence of the defendant.

4. The argument in print filed on behalf of appellant is devoted almost exclusively to the proposition that the verdict was not warranted by the evidence. It is impossible that we review the facts in detail. We have given to the record that careful examination which the importance of the case demands, and we agree that there is disclosed sufficient evidence to warrant the verdict of guilt as rendered. The defendant and the deceased, after a very short acquaintance, were married in Ohio in October, 1902, and the death of the latter occurred in the following May. At the time of the marriage defendant was a widower, about 38 years of age, and having several children; the deceased was a maiden lady, and the senior of defendant by some 12 years. She had considerable property, among other things a farm near Eldora, this state, and they came to Eldora to live. There is evidence tending to prove that some time previous to her death, defendant purchased at a drug store a quantity of “Rough on Rats,” a poison consisting in large part of arsenic. On Sunday, May 24, 1903, Mrs. Blydenburgh went to church alone; the appellant remaining at home. While the fact is in dispute, there is evidence tending to prove that appellant prepared the dinner, and that the same was partaken of by the family, Mrs. Blydenburgh included. Soon thereafter she was seized with a violent illness. She died within a few days and was taken back to Ohio and there buried. Some time thereafter her body was exhumed, and an analysis of the organs disclosed the presence of arsenic in considerable quantity. The evidence for the state further tended to prove that the parties did not live happily; that trouble arose out of the matter of the disposition of her property--appellant desiring a transfer of a considerable portion thereof to him. It appears, also, that he had attempted to procure life insurance on her life for his benefit. The conduct of defendant during the sickness of his wife and in endeavoring to take her body away to Ohio the same night of her death were matters the jury had before them, and from these were warranted in drawing inferences unfavorable to him. This was also true as to some matters of subsequent conduct on his part and as to statements made by him. As to the cause of the death, there is much conflict in the evidence. It appears that the body was embalmed after death, and that the fluid used contained arsenic. There is evidence, however, tending to show that, while many of the organs of the body were not diseased, the lining of the stomach was broken down and the tissues destroyed; that such could have occurred only by the administration of poison during life; and that the condition was of itself sufficient to produce death. On the whole, we think the jury was warranted in finding that death was brought about by poisoning, and that the circumstances sufficiently pointed to the defendant as the person who administered the same, and accordingly that the verdict finding him guilty ought not to be interfered with. In...