State v. Board of Education of Russell County

• Decision Date: 15 April 1926
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 272
• Citation: 214 Ala. 620,108 So. 588
• Parties: STATE ex rel. KING et al. v. COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RUSSELL COUNTY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

108 So. 588

214 Ala. 620

STATE ex rel. KING et al. v. COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RUSSELL COUNTY.

4 Div. 272

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 15, 1926

Rehearing Denied May 20, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Russell County; J.S. Williams, Judge.

Petition of the State, on the relation of Eugene L. King and others for mandamus directed to the County Board of Education of Russell County. From a judgment for respondent, relators appeal. Affirmed.

Roy L Smith, of Phenix City, and F.M. De Graffenried, of Seale, for appellants.

B. De G. Waddell, of Seale, and Rushton, Crenshaw & Rushton, of Montgomery, for appellee.

GARDNER J.

Phenix City is a municipality of this state of more than 2,000 inhabitants, situated partly in Lee, and partly in Russell counties. The board of education of Russell county apportioned out of the public school funds to Phenix City for the public schools thereof situated in Russell county the sum of $10,449.54 for the school year 1925-26. The representatives of said city and its board of education requested of the county board a reapportionment of the funds to the end that the amount to be apportioned for said city be increased to not less than $13,000; the insistence being that the public schools of said city could not be operated for as lengthy a term as other public schools of the county, unless the apportionment was so increased and a discrimination thereby result. The request was denied. Subsequently this petition for mandamus was filed by the city and its board of education to compel a reapportionment of the public school funds by the county board, and specifically to require that a sum not less than $13,000 be apportioned to Phenix City.

Demurrer to the petition was sustained, and demurrer to the answer overruled, and relief denied, from which judgment relators prosecute this appeal.

In section 256 of the Constitution of 1901, it is provided that:

"The public school fund shall be apportioned to the several counties in proportion to the number of school children of school age therein, and shall be so apportioned to the schools in the districts or townships in the counties as to provide, as nearly as practicable, school terms of equal duration in such school districts or townships,"

--and section 207 of the School Code is to the effect that the county boards of education apportion the public school funds "awarded to their respective counties to the several schools and cities of two thousand or more inhabitants according to the last or any succeeding federal census, in their counties so as to provide, as nearly as practicable school terms of equal duration exclusive of any local funds provided by the school district."

The general administration and supervision of the public schools and of the educational interests of each county (with exceptions not here necessary to specify) is vested in the county board of education (section 77, School Code), and numerous provisions of our statutes disclose the very broad latitude of authority granted to such board. Such boards are vested with a very broad discretion. Christian v. Jones, 211 Ala. 161, 100 So. 99, 32 A.L.R. 1340.

The qualifying words "as nearly as practicable," found in the provisions of our Constitution and statute, quoted above, to the effect that these boards apportion the public school funds so as to provide, as nearly as practicable school terms of equal duration, disclose a further intention that in such apportionment the board is to continue to exercise a wide discretion. The county board is presumed to be acquainted with the local needs and expenses incident to the administration of the county schools. A term of equal duration for each of the public schools is the goal to be attained, if practicable. But the words "as nearly as practicable" disclose that exaction in that respect may not always be attainable from a practical standpoint, and therefore much must be left to the wise discretion of the board in the conscientious discharge of its delicate and responsible duties, a discretion which is judicial in its nature. Very clearly, it was not the purpose of the lawmakers that the discretion of the court be substituted for that of the county boards. Taylor v. Kolb, 100 Ala. 603, 13 So. 779; Green v. State, 73 Ala. 26; State v. Curtis, 210 Ala. 1, 97 So. 291; Armstrong v. O'Neal, 176...