State v. Board of Zoning Adjustments of Kansas City, WD56340

• Decision Date: 03 August 1999
• Docket Number: WD56340
• Citation: State v. Board of Zoning Adjustments of Kansas City (Mo. App. 1999)
• Parties: State of Missouri, ex rel: James S. Teefey and Agri-Lawn, Inc., Respondent, v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, Missouri, et al., Appellant, Lew and Nicky Bunch, Defendant. WD56340 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date: 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

State of Missouri, ex rel: James S. Teefey and Agri-Lawn, Inc., Respondent v Board of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, Missouri, et al., Appellant, Lew and Nicky Bunch, Defendant

WD56340

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

Handdown Date: 08/03/99

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. David W. Shinn

Counsel for Appellant: William C. Partin

Counsel for Respondent: Patricia Renee Jensen

Opinion Summary: The Board of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, Missouri (BZA), appeals the circuit court judgment that reversed its affirmance of a Codes Administration Department citation against James Teefey and Agri-Lawn, Inc. (Respondents) for operating a sanitary landfill on their property. The BZA contends that the circuit court erred in reversing its decision because the decision was authorized by law and was supported by competent and substantial evidence.

Division III holds: The definitions of sanitary landfill and solid waste processing facility in the Kansas City, Missouri, zoning ordinances, involve the disposal or processing of solid waste. The definition of a solid waste processing facility includes a yard waste compost facility. Yard waste is considered solid waste under the ordinances.

The Kansas City, Missouri, zoning ordinances, which include yard waste within the definition of solid waste, do not permit the commingling of yard waste and solid waste as prohibited by the Missouri Solid Waste Disposal Act. The ordinances do not conflict with the Act.

Howard, P.J., and Smart, J., concur.

Robert G. Ulrich, Judge

Opinion modified by Court's own motion on October 5, 1999. This substitution does not constitute a new opinion.

The Board of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, Missouri (BZA), appeals the judgment of the circuit court reversing its affirmance of a Codes Administration Department citation against James Teefey and Agri-Lawn, Inc. (Respondents) for operating a sanitary landfill on their property. The BZA contends that the circuit court erred in reversing its decision because the decision was authorized by law and was supported by competent and substantial evidence. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions.

James Teefey owns 36 acres of property located at 1515 East 131st Street in Kansas City. The property is zoned district RA (agriculture). Mr. Teefey's home as well as his landscape and nursery business, Agri-Lawn, Inc., is located on this property. Agri-Lawn grows various trees, shrubs, and plants on the property for sale and provides landscaping and lawncare services.

In response to a complaint filed by a neighbor regarding dumping on Respondents' property and the resulting noise, pollution and odors, the Codes Administration Department of Kansas City, Missouri, inspected Respondents' property on February 21, 1996. The inspection revealed that Respondents "dump grass clippings [and] twigs for compost" on the property. Pursuant to the inspection, the Codes Administration Department issued a notice of violation of zoning ordinances to Respondents on April 4, 1996. The citation charged, "This property is being used for sanitary landfill in a district zoned RA. Such uses are first allowed within a MR zoning district." The citation listed the date of violation as February 21, 1996.¹

Respondents appealed the citation to the BZA on April 19, 1996. Hearings were held on Respondents' appeal on May 28 and August 23, 1996. On August 29, 1996, the BZA upheld the decision of the Codes Administration Department that the Respondents' property was being used as a sanitary landfill in district RA in violation of zoning ordinances. Thereafter, Respondents filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court for review of the BZA's decision. On March 13, 1997, the circuit court found that insufficient evidence existed to support the BZA's determination that Respondents maintained a sanitary landfill on their property on February 21, 1996, and remanded the case to the BZA for further evidentiary hearings on the issue.

A third hearing was held before the BZA on September 12, 1997. At the hearing, Mr. Teefey testified that grass clippings, leaves, twigs, and small shrubs are deposited in a compost pile on the property for recycling. The waste is produced from the property itself and is brought onto the property from residential or commercial customers' properties. Mr. Teefey admitted that although he periodically turns or moves the pile, he doesn't "wet" it or add chemicals to it.² Mr. Teefey also admitted that he does not haul the waste from his customers' properties to a specified dump, but instead dumps it on his own property to avoid dumping fees. Following the hearing on remand, the BZA again upheld the decision of the Codes Administration Department that Respondents were operating a sanitary landfill on their property in violation of zoning ordinances.

Respondents filed a petition for writ of certiorari for review of the BZA's decision on September 17, 1997. After reviewing the transcripts and evidence in the case, the circuit court found that the BZA's affirmance of the Codes Administration Department citation was not supported by competent and substantial evidence on the record. Specifically, the court determined that "little, if any evidence" was presented that Respondents operated a sanitary landfill on their property on February 21, 1996. The court, therefore, reversed the decision of the BZA affirming the Codes Administration Department citation. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the BZA claims that the circuit court erred in reversing its decision affirming the Codes Administration Department citation against Respondents because its decision was authorized by law and was supported by competent and substantial evidence. Specifically, the BZA contends that the grass, leaves, and twigs found on Respondents' property on February 21, 1996, constituted "solid waste" within the definition of a sanitary landfill in the zoning ordinances. Respondents contend, on the other hand, that the BZA's decision was unlawful in that the materials found in the compost pile on their property constituted "yard waste," which is separate and distinct from "solid waste" under the zoning ordinances and Missouri statutes.

An appellate court reviews the findings and conclusions of the BZA and not the judgment of the trial court. State ex rel. Columbus Park Community Council v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, 864 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993). The scope of review is limited to determination of whether the BZA's action was supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record and whether the action was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, or in excess of the BZA's jurisdiction. Hutchens v. St. Louis County, 848 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). In determining whether substantial evidence existed to support the BZA's decision, an appellate court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the decision. Columbus Park, 864 S.W.2d at 440. In reviewing the legality of the decision, the reviewing court should hold the decision to be illegal and void if the BZA exceeds the authority granted to it. Id. A question of law is a matter for the independent judgment of the reviewing court. Id.

In construing city ordinances, an appellate court applies the same general rules of construction as are applicable to state statutes. Matthews v. City of Jennings, 978 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998). The cardinal rule for construing ordinances is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the enacting legislative body. City of Sugar Creek v. Reese, 969 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). An appellate court must give words in an ordinance their plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the entire act and its purposes while seeking to avoid unjust, absurd, unreasonable, confiscatory, or oppressive results. Law v. City of Maryville, 933 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996). Where a phrase or term is specifically defined by ordinance, such particular definition is binding on the court and must be given effect. Matthews, 978 S.W.2d at 15.

The purpose of district MR (materials reprocessing district) under the Kansas City, Missouri, zoning ordinances is "to identify and appropriately locate uses which involve the recovery and reclamation of materials and the processing or reprocessing of waste and other similar uses which may affect adjoining properties." Kansas City, Mo., Code of Ordinances, section 80-203(a)(1) (1994). Two uses permitted in a MR district include a sanitary landfill and a solid waste processing facility. Sections 80-203(c)(6) and (7). Section 80-203(c)(6) defines the term "sanitary landfill" as "an area of land used for disposing of solid waste." Section 80-203(c)(6). The term "solid waste" is defined as:

garbage, refuse or other discarded materials, including but not limited to solid or semisolid waste materials resulting from industrial, commercial, agricultural, governmental...