State v. Board of Com'rs of Humboldt County

• Decision Date: 21 May 1892
• Docket Number: 1,352.
• Citation: 29 P. 974,21 Nev. 235
• Parties: STATE ex rel. DUNN v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF HUMBOLDT COUNTY.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

29 P. 974

STATE ex rel. DUNN v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF HUMBOLDT COUNTY.

21 Nev. 235

No. 1, 352.

Supreme Court of Nevada

May 21, 1892

Syllabus by the Judge.

1. All presumptions are in favor of the validity of an act of the legislature. The courts will only declare them unconstitutional in cases of clear and unquestioned violation of the fundamental law.

2. An act does not embrace more than one subject because, while fixing the salaries and compensation of the officers of a county, it also provides for the consolidation of the offices of superintendent of schools and district attorney, and provides that the latter officer shall, for the salary provided, also discharge the duties formerly appertaining to the superintendent's office.

3. The act of March 9, 1891, (St. 1891, p. 30,) embraces but one subject and matter properly connected therewith.

4. Where a portion of a statute is complete in itself, and capable of being executed wholly independent of that which may be rejected, and there is no reason to suppose that the legislature would not have passed the act except as whole held, that courts will affirm the validity of such independent part, without considering whether the other is or is not unconstitutional.

Original application by L. F. Dunn for a writ of mandamus requiring the board of commissioners of Humboldt county to allow the relator's salary as clerk at the rate of $200 per month. The board refused to act upon the claim, for the reason that the law of March 9, 1891, had taken all jurisdiction in the matter away from them, and directed that it should be paid by a warrant drawn by the auditor upon the salary fund for only the sum of $100 per month. Writ denied.

M. S Bonnifield and J. A. Plummer, for relator.

E. S Farrington, amicus curiæe, for respondents.

BIGELOW J.

The relator, as clerk of Humboldt county, was, prior to 1892, entitled to a salary of $2,400 per annum, to be allowed by the board of commissioners of that county. This was, however, by the act of March 9, 1891, (St. 1891, P. 30,) reduced to $1,200 per annum, to be paid by a warrant drawn by the auditor upon the salary fund. He claims that this act is unconstitutional, and this is the question involved in this action.

1. The first ground upon which this claim is made is that both the act and its title embrace more than one subject, to wit, the subject of salaries and the subject of consolidating offices. The title of the act is "An act fixing the salaries and compensation of the officers of Humboldt county, and consolidating certain offices in said county, and to repeal all acts in relation thereto." Section 1 fixes the salary of the sheriff of that county; sections 2 and 3, the salaries of other officers; and in section 2 it is further provided that the district attorney shall act as ex officio superintendent of schools. Section 4 provides that the office of superintendent shall be consolidated with the office of district attorney. Section 17, art. 4, of the constitution directs that "each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." As frequently stated by the courts, the object of this provision was twofold: First, to prevent the uniting in one act of several independent and disconnected matters, good, bad, and indifferent, many of which could not be carried upon their own merits, but by uniting them together in the same bill, thereby obtaining the support of all interested in each measure, enough strength could be mustered to push it through; secondly, to prevent fraud and surprise upon both the members of the legislature and the people, as under the old system it was often found that some of the most vicious acts had been smuggled through the legislature under innocent titles, that gave no hint of their real nature, and of which all except those directly interested were ignorant. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; School-Dist. v. Hall, 113 U.S. 135, 5 S.Ct. 371. The evil can be well understood from what is said in Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 425, where SHARSWOOD, J., speaking for the court, used this language: "The people did not mean by the amendment of 1864 to require that the title should be a full index to all the contents of the law, but by declaring that each bill shall be confined to one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title, to prohibit the vicious practice of rolling together what were termed 'omni-bus bills,' including sometimes more than a hundred sections on entirely different subjects, with the title of the enactment of the first section, 'and for other purposes."'

This then, being the mischief against which this clause of the constitution is directed, it should be so construed as to correct the evil, but at the same time not to needlessly thwart honest efforts at legislation. There is scarcely any subject of legislation that cannot be divided and subdivided into various heads, each of which might be made the basis of a separate act, and in which the connection between them may be made a matter of controversy. The reports show that seldom, indeed, has the validity of a law come seriously in question without its being claimed that it was in conflict with this clause of the constitution. This proves how necessary it is to adopt liberal rules of construction in order to sustain laws not coming within the spirit and meaning of the constitutional prohibition. If the provisions of a statute all relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, have a natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title, it is permissible to unite them in the same act. Iron Works v. Brown, 13 Bush, 685; Philips v. Bridge Co., 2 Metc. (Ky.) 222. In State v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524, (Gil. 395,) it is said: "The insertion in a law of matters which may not be verbally indicated by the title, if suggested by it, or connected with, or proper to the more full accomplishment of, the object so indicated, is held to be in accordance with its spirit." All presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, and it will be held valid until the mind of the court is clearly convinced to the contrary. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322; Railroad Co. v. Morris, 65 Ala. 193. In cases of doubt, every possible presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the...