State v. Boehm
| Citation | 346 P.3d 311,158 Idaho 294 |
| Decision Date | 25 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 41594.,41594. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Angela Marie BOEHM, Defendant–Appellant. |
John Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender; Jay W. Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Angela Marie Boehm was involved in a two-vehicle accident that resulted in her being cited for driving under the influence and driving without privileges. She later entered a conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence and driving without privileges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of certain pretrial motions in the magistrate division. Boehm then moved the magistrate to withdraw her guilty plea, which the magistrate denied, and Boehm appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed. Boehm now appeals from the district court's order affirming the magistrate's decisions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
A Coeur d'Alene Police Department officer was on patrol one night in January 2013 when he came upon a two-vehicle accident involving Boehm and another motorist. The officer observed that Boehm, who was standing outside her car, was on her cell phone and was slurring her words and swaying back and forth while speaking on the phone. When the officer attempted to speak with Boehm, she turned away from him. In addition, the officer smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from Boehm. After the officer directed Boehm to end her phone call, Boehm informed the officer that she had slid through a stop sign and that her car was struck by the other motorist. In response to a question from the officer, Boehm also informed the officer that she had one drink approximately three hours before the crash.
The officer had Boehm perform field sobriety tests, which she failed, and the officer took Boehm into custody. Boehm was then transported to the Kootenai County Public Safety Building for the purpose of conducting breath alcohol tests. There the officer observed Boehm for the required observation period, provided her with the administrative license suspension form, and read a second form to her. After informing the officer that she understood her rights and initialing a document, Boehm provided two breath test samples. The results of the breath tests were alcohol concentrations of 0.192 and 0.183. Subsequently, the officer also learned that Boehm's driver license was suspended in Washington. Boehm was then issued misdemeanor citations for driving under the influence and driving without privileges.
During the pretrial phase in the magistrate division, Boehm filed a motion to sever, a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the breath test results, and a motion to compel the city prosecutor to turn over certain documents. The magistrate denied the motion to sever and motion to compel, and "denied" the motion in limine, explaining that it would defer ruling on that motion until trial. Boehm then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the magistrate's decisions on the three motions. Prior to sentencing, the United States Supreme Court released Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), and Boehm filed a motion to withdraw her conditional guilty plea, asserting that McNeely had impacted Idaho's implied consent statute. The magistrate denied Boehm's motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
Boehm appealed to the district court, challenging the magistrate's denial of the three motions prior to the guilty plea and the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Following a hearing, the district court affirmed the magistrate's decisions. Boehm appeals from the district court's order affirming the magistrate's decisions.
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity, our standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions following therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id. Thus, we do not review the decision of the magistrate. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct.App.2014). Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or dismiss the decisions of the district court. Id.
Boehm contends that the district court erred by affirming the decisions of the magistrate. Specifically, Boehm argues (1) that joinder would have resulted in unfair prejudice at trial, and thus the magistrate should have granted the motion to sever; (2) that the prosecutor violated Boehm's right to due process and right to effective assistance of counsel by not seeking out evidence and by refusing to provide copies of certain documents to Boehm; (3) that the magistrate should have granted the motion in limine, because it involved a question of law; and (4) that McNeely changed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, specifically impacting Idaho's implied consent statute, and provided a just reason for withdrawing Boehm's plea. We address these issues in turn.
In the magistrate division, Boehm filed a motion to sever the driving under the influence charge from the driving without privileges charge. See Idaho Criminal Rule 14. In that motion, Boehm contended that there was a risk that the jury, if it found that Boehm had driven a vehicle without privileges, would find that she "would also be the type of person who would drive while intoxicated." See State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 868, 664 P.2d 772, 775 (1983) (). At the hearing, the magistrate denied the motion to sever, explaining that the joinder of the offenses would not prejudice the ability of the defense to defend either charge. In addition, the magistrate commented that the jury would be instructed to consider each count separately. The district court affirmed without explanation.
On appeal, Boehm reiterates her argument that there is a risk that the jury will believe that one crime is proof of the other, based upon the type of person Boehm is.1 The State argues that Boehm has not demonstrated prejudice from the joinder.
Although Boehm initially asserted that the magistrate and district court applied the incorrect standards of review, Boehm conceded in her reply brief that a motion to sever is committed to the trial court's discretion. State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 227, 307 P.3d 1247, 1253 (Ct.App.2013). Thus, we review the denial of a motion to sever for an abuse of discretion. Id. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 537, 817 P.2d 646, 651 (1991) ; State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). The inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice would have resulted from a joint trial. See Tankovich, 155 Idaho at 227, 307 P.3d at 1253.
In considering whether there is a risk that the jury may find the defendant is "a bad person and ... reach a guilty verdict on that basis," the Idaho Supreme Court has examined whether the evidence of each of the counts, if the counts had been tried separately, would have been admitted at the different trials. Abel, 104 Idaho at 868, 664 P.2d at 775 (). However, even if the separate evidence would not be admissible in the different trials, federal and state courts have not found an abuse of discretion in denying a motion to sever where the jury can " ‘compartmentalize the evidence’ so that evidence of one crime does not taint the jury's consideration of another crime." United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1479 (9th Cir.1986) ); accord United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 581 (9th Cir.2007) ; State v. Bythrow, 114 Wash.2d 713, 790 P.2d 154, 158 (1990) ; see also State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908–09, 55 P.3d 896, 901–02 (Ct.App.2002) ().
In this case, we presume that Boehm's breath test results would not have been admissible in the driving without privileges trial, if conducted separately. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the jury would have been able to compartmentalize the evidence supporting the driving without privileges charge (namely evidence proving that Boehm had knowledge that her driver's license was suspended in Washington), from the evidence supporting the driving under the influence charge (the breath tests results). This is due to the relative simplicity, but also distinct nature, of the issues. Moreover, the magistrate indicated that it would provide the jury with an instruction to consider the counts separately, and we presume that a...
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