State v. Boldon

Decision Date29 January 2021
Docket NumberNo. 19-1159,19-1159
Citation954 N.W.2d 62
Parties STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Da'Quon BOLDON, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, Mary K. Conroy (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Tyler Buller (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Brian Williams, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

McDONALD, Justice.

Da'Quon Boldon pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of Iowa Code section 724.26(1) (2018), interference with official acts while armed with a firearm, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.1(1)(f ), and carrying weapons, in violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1). In this direct appeal, Boldon asserts two challenges to his sentence: (1) the prosecutor breached the parties’ plea agreement when the prosecutor failed to recommend the bargained-for sentence; and (2) the district court improperly considered Boldon's juvenile offense history as an aggravating factor at sentencing. In addition to those issues, Boldon contests the applicability and constitutionality of new legislation that changes a defendant's right to direct appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea and that redirects the presentation of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel from direct appeal to postconviction relief. See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, §§ 28, 31 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 814.6(1)(a )(3), 814.7 (2020)).

I.

Boldon was charged in two separate cases, which were subsequently consolidated, with possession of a firearm by a felon, interference with official acts while armed with a firearm, and carrying weapons. The minutes of testimony show officers initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle. As the vehicle began to stop, the passenger door opened and two males, including Boldon, exited the car and ran. One of the pursuing officers observed Boldon had a large object in his hand. The officer saw Boldon extend his arm and throw what the officer believed to be a gun. After a short chase, the officer apprehended Boldon. After apprehending Boldon, the officer shined a flashlight in the area where he saw Boldon throw the large object. On the ground there was a handgun.

Boldon pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement on March 25, 2019. The plea agreement provided Boldon would plead guilty to all three counts but be free to argue for any sentence. The State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences but be free to argue for incarceration. The parties agreed all fines would be suspended. During the plea colloquy, Boldon confirmed his understanding of the plea agreement. The district court asked Boldon if he understood the sentences could be "stacked together" for a total term of incarceration not to exceed twelve years, and Boldon stated he understood. The district court asked Boldon whether he understood that it would be up to the sentencing court to determine Boldon's sentence, and Boldon stated he understood.

The district court accepted Boldon's guilty pleas and set the matter for sentencing on May 30. Boldon's counsel moved to continue sentencing due to a scheduling conflict, and the district court granted the motion. Boldon's sentencing was continued twice more. Boldon was ultimately sentenced on July 1.

Between the time of Boldon's guilty plea and the time of sentencing, the general assembly passed and the Governor signed an omnibus crime bill. See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140. The new law went into effect on the day of Boldon's sentencing. There are two specific provisions of that legislation implicated in this appeal.

First, the omnibus crime bill changed a defendant's right to direct appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea. Iowa Code section 814.6 now provides:

1. Right of appeal is granted the defendant from:
a. A final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases:
(1) A simple misdemeanor conviction.
(2) An ordinance violation.
(3) A conviction where the defendant has pled guilty. This subparagraph does not apply to a guilty plea for a class "A" felony or in a case where the defendant establishes good cause.

Prior to this change, a defendant had the right to appeal following any conviction except in cases of simple misdemeanor and ordinance violations. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a ) (2018).

Second, the omnibus crime bill required all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel be decided in the first instance in postconviction-relief proceedings and not on direct appeal. Iowa Code section 814.7 (2020) now provides:

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.

Prior to this change, a defendant could raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, see Iowa Code § 814.7(2) (2018), and appellate courts had the authority to decide the claim or preserve the claim for postconviction-relief proceedings, see id. § 814.7(3).

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor made the following sentencing recommendation:

In counts one of both case numbers FECR226296 and FECR226943, the State's recommending a $750 suspended fine plus surcharge and court costs and five years in prison.
On count two of FECR226943, the carrying weapons, the State's recommending a $625 suspended fine plus surcharge and court costs and two years in prison. The State is recommending that the counts run concurrently with each other.
The State is recommending a prison sentence on several factors.

The prosecutor then identified factors militating in favor of a prison sentence. These factors included the facts and circumstances of the offense; the defendant's failure to maintain employment; the defendant's continued drug use while on pretrial supervision, as evidenced by nine positive urinalysis tests; the defendant's failure to attend the required classes while on pretrial supervision; and the defendant's "horrible record in juvenile court as far as adjudications."

Boldon's counsel argued for a deferred judgment. He argued for leniency due to the defendant's age:

There's no hiding the fact that Mr. Boldon has a poor history as a juvenile and this current offense occurred as he was a juvenile as well. He was 17 years old. He's currently 18. His birthday is in November.
I'm sure the Court's aware, and frankly, the justice system is aware that juveniles simply do not operate the same way that adults do. They're more impetuous. They don't understand the risks associated with activities nor the consequences of those things. They are immature and impetuous, and Mr. Boldon certainly has demonstrated that in his past.

Defense counsel argued Boldon should be given the opportunity to mature without a felony conviction on his record.

The district court denied Boldon's request for a deferred judgment, concluding a term of incarceration was more appropriate. The district court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total term of incarceration not to exceed twelve years. The district court noted Boldon's extensive criminal history. It noted Boldon was adjudicated delinquent for drugs when he was fourteen. The district court noted Boldon was given many opportunities to walk the "straight and narrow" but instead escalated his criminal conduct. As an example, the district court noted Boldon committed first-degree burglary arising out of a crime in which Boldon and others broke into someone's house and shot the homeowner's dog.

The district court stated:

While back in the juvenile system you violated your probation eight different ways from Sunday, multiple violations, and again placement in the detention facilities. These multiple crimes, multiple firearms offenses, multiple violent offenses, a prison sentence is appropriate. And for the purposes of the record, and to be abundantly clear, a consecutive sentence is appropriate.

The district court continued:

Again, I did outline in great detail my reasons for it, but to be clear, I do believe this sentence is appropriate for those reasons. Namely, the nature of this offense, the circumstances of this offense, your relatively young age in comparison to this extensive criminal history with firearms, and given the amount of efforts put forth thus far regarding your chances of -- for reform, in my opinion, are nearly nil.
II.

Boldon advances several reasons why sections 814.6(1)(a )(3) and 814.7 (2020) do not preclude appellate review and relief in this case. First, he claims the new laws are wholly inapplicable here because his right to appeal vested when the court accepted his guilty pleas prior to the effective date of the new laws. Second, he argues the new laws violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. Third, he argues the new laws violate his right to equal protection. Fourth, he argues the new laws violate his right to due process. Fifth, he contends the new laws violate his right to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Sixth, even if the new laws are applicable here, Boldon contends he has established good cause to appeal as a matter of right and has asserted a meritorious claim warranting relief. We choose not to address Boldon's numerous constitutional claims because we can resolve this appeal without doing so. See Simmons v. State Pub. Def. , 791 N.W.2d 69, 73–74 (Iowa 2010) ("Ordinarily, we look to statutory issues first in order to avoid unnecessary constitutional questions."). We address each of the nonconstitutional claims below.

A.

Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a )(3) provides a defendant may appeal as a matter of right from a conviction entered upon a guilty plea only when the conviction is for a class "A" felony or the defendant establishes good cause.

...

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