State v. Bolton

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ALEXANDER, J.
• Citation: State v. Bolton, 352 Conn. 477, 337 A.3d 1114 (Conn. 2025)
• Docket Number: SC 20856
• Decision Date: 22 July 2025
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. John BOLTON
• topic: Criminal Law,Ongoing or Prospective Litigation,Civil Procedure

337 A.3d 1114

352 Conn. 477

STATE of Connecticut

v.John BOLTON

(SC 20856)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 14, 2025

Officially Released July 22, 2025

Shanna P. Hugle, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Rajan M. Doering and Michael H. Coudert, certified legal interns, with whom were Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Danielle O’Connell, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.

ALEXANDER, J.

The principal issue in this appeal requires us to consider how a trial court should exercise its discretion when addressing, pursuant to Practice Book § 42-31, a juror’s equivocation during a jury poll. The defendant, John Bolton, raises three claims on appeal from the judgment of conviction of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-217 (a) (1). First, he claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial following its decision to stop polling the jury when a juror reported her disagreement with the verdict. Second, he claims that the trial court’s response to the juror’s equivocation resulted in a coerced verdict. Third, he claims that the trial court failed to comply with Practice Book § 42-31 when it stopped polling the jury. We disagree with each of the defendant’s claims and affirm the judgment of conviction.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On January 8, 2019, the defendant shot and killed the victim, Carl Spence, in Hartford, after an argument over illegal narcotics sales. The state charged the defendant with murder and criminal possession of a firearm.

The defendant elected a jury trial. After five days of evidence, the jury began its deliberations late in the afternoon of March 1, 2023. At 12:41 p.m. on March 2, after approximately four and one-half hours of deliberation over two days, the jury informed the trial court that it had reached a verdict. The jury returned to the courtroom, and the foreperson announced that the jury had found the defendant guilty of murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The court clerk asked the jury to confirm the verdict, and, collectively, the jurors responded in the affirmative. Defense counsel requested that the jury be polled. During the jury poll, the first five jurors stood and individually affirmed the verdict. When the sixth juror, S.C.,¹ was asked to stand, she rose but did not speak. The court clerk asked S.C. whether she found the defendant guilty or not guilty of murder. S.C. initially did not respond but then asked: “I can’t change my mind, right?” The trial court responded: “[Y]ou’re having a question? So, you’re not prepared to say ‘guilty’ at this point?” S.C. replied: “No.” The court then sent the jury back to the jury room without further instruction, telling the jurors that it needed “to take up a question with the lawyers.”

After the jury exited the courtroom, the court stated: “[S]o, at this point, I think, it was clear that one of the jurors has thoughts about saying publicly ‘guilty’ in court at this point. So, unless I hear different from the lawyers, my thinking would be to instruct the jury to continue deliberating the case.” Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that S.C. would now face “undue pressure” in deliberations. The court took that motion “under advisement” and called a brief recess to make sure it was “not missing anything.” Approximately ten minutes later, upon reconvening, the court conveyed the clerk’s re-poi’t that S.C. did not want to return to the jury room with the other jurors and that she had been provided with her own room. After conferring with the parties further, the court noted that the jury was “not deliberating right now” and that it intended to release the jury for lunch and to have it resume deliberations afterward. Defense counsel then suggested that the court speak with S.C. separately but withdrew that request immediately. Defense counsel agreed with the court’s reluctance to speak separately with S.C. and that the jurors “need to communicate … with notes.”

The jurors then reentered the courtroom. The court explained the polling procedure and observed that one of the jurors had indicated that she could not answer the clerk’s question. The court continued: “[B]efore I send you to lunch … the threshold question … I need to resolve is—is that juror having … second thoughts about her decision on [guilt] or innocence or is it a matter of not being able to say something publicly? In other words, say the word ‘guilty’ in public or is it a question about the verdict itself that you don’t want to … end your deliberation on that issue—on that question of guilt or innocence?” S.C. responded: “Both.”

The trial court then stated, “at this point, it’s clear we do not have a unanimous verdict in this case,” and informed the jurors that they would continue their deliberations after a one hour lunch break. The court instructed the jurors to refer to the written copy of the jury instructions that they had previously received, a portion of which related to the deliberation process.² After the jury exited, defense counsel again moved for a mistrial because S.C. had said that her problem was with the guilty verdict itself, and not merely with the act of announcing the verdict in open court. The court denied the motion, explaining: “I think it’s clear we’ve got a situation [in which] eleven people have returned a verdict of guilty.³ One person is [having] second thoughts and wants to continue deliberating. That’s the process…. [S]o, we’ll let the process play out, and we’ll see what the afternoon brings.”

Following the lunch break, the jury deliberated for approximately two more hours. At 4:30 p.m., the jury sent a note to the court asking whether a guilty vote would need to be stated out loud or if it could be written down and given to the court clerk. The court had the jury reenter the courtroom, explained that each juror would have to answer out loud, and sent the jurors back to the jury room to determine whether they wanted to continue deliberating until the end of the day or to resume the following morning. At 4:50 p.m., the jury sent a note indicating that it had reached a verdict. The jury returned to the courtroom and delivered a verdict of guilty on both counts. The defendant again asked for a jury poll, and, in that second poll, all twelve jurors, including S.C. individually, affirmed that their vote was guilty on both counts. The court accepted and recorded the verdict. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of thirty years of imprisonment. This direct appeal followed. See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).

I

The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial. The defendant contends that the totality of the circumstances did not support the court’s decision and that returning the jury to deliberate substantially and irreparably prejudiced his case because S.C. was coerced into returning a guilty verdict. We disagree.

[1–7] “[Although] the remedy of a mistrial is permitted under the rules of practice,⁴ it is not favored. [A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial … and the whole proceedings are vitiated…. If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided…. On appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not to declare a mistrial. The trial judge is the arbiter of the many circumstances [that] may arise during the trial in which his function is to [ensure] a fair and just outcome…. The trial court is better positioned than we are to evaluate in the first instance whether a certain occurrence is prejudicial to the defendant and, if so, what remedy is necessary to cure that prejudice…. The decision whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 702, 911 A.2d 1055 (2006); see also State v. Henderson, 348 Conn. 648, 666-67, 309 A.3d 1208 (2024). It is the defendant’s burden to establish the prejudice necessary to warrant a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Gore, 342 Conn. 129, 169, 269 A.3d 1 (2022).

[8, 9] “The purpose of a jury poll is to test the uncoerced unanimity of the verdict by requiring each juror to answer for himself, thus creating individual responsibility, eliminating any uncertainty as to the verdict announced by the foreman.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Gambino, 951 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 1991), cert, denied sub nom. D’Amico v. United States, 504 U.S. 918, 112 S. Ct. 1962, 118 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1992); see also United States v. Singer, 345 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233 (D. Conn. 2004), affd, 241 Fed. Appx. 727 (2d Cir. 2007). “[T]he right to poll the jury, although not constitutional, is nonetheless a substantial right … that enables the court to ascertain with certainty that a unanimous verdict has in fact been recorded and that no juror has been coerced or induced to agree to a verdict to which he [or she] has not fully assented.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pare, 253 Conn. 611, 631-32, 755 A.2d 180 (2000).

Jury polling in criminal trials is governed by Practice Book § 42-31, which provides: “After a verdict has been returned and before the jury has been discharged, the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon the judicial authority’s own motion. The poll shall be conducted by the clerk of the court by asking each juror individually...