State v. Bolton, 20205

• Decision Date: 07 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 20205,20205
• Citation: 266 S.C. 444,223 S.E.2d 863
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Lorenzo BOLTON, Appellant.

Page 863

223 S.E.2d 863

266 S.C. 444

The STATE, Respondent, v. Lorenzo BOLTON, Appellant.

No. 20205.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 7, 1976.

Roy T. Stuckey, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Joseph R. Barker, Columbia, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice.

Defendant Lorenzo Bolton was tried for the murder of Willie Mitchell, in the Richland County Court of General Sessions, and foudn guilty of manslaughter.

He has appealed his conviction, alleging error in three particulars, as follows:

1. Defendant has been denied his right to an effective appeal by the State's failure to preserve a record of the jury argument of the solicitor;

2. The trial judge applied Code §§ 1--65, 26--7.1 and 26--7.2, so as to deprive defendant of his constitutional right to adequately confront witnesses against him; and

3. The trial judge's instruction to the jury that the defendant has the burden of proving self-defense by the preponderance of the evidence, deprived defendant of due process of law.

Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude there is no reversible error and affirm the verdict of the lower court.

At trial, the State called to the witness stand two young women who had seen the shooting of Mitchell. They testified that Mitchell had parked his taxicab on Liberty Street, next to a public telephone booth, and was checking a tire when a dark-colored car pulled up alongside of him. Within a few seconds, a shot was heard. Mitchell was seen running across the street, clutching his chest, as the car drove off.

Defendant testified that Mitchell had hailed him to stop and that he did so only because Mitchell owed him $400 and he thought Mitchell was going to pay this debt. When he stopped, defendant claims Mitchell approached his car, accusing him of being a drug addict. Defendant claimed he saw a gun in Mitchell's hand and that he reached for his own gun and shot once.

A police investigator, testifying for the State, stated that no weapon was found on Mitchell or in the vicinity of the shooting.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict of manslaughter. Instead, he alleges the three errors set forth above, as materially prejudicing his right to due process and an effective review on appeal.

First, he asserts that the State has deprived him of an effective appeal because the jury arguments were not recorded and made available to him for the appeal.

Briefs on this issue were filed with this Court before our opinion number 20186 was filed March 10, 1976, in the case of State v. Williams, 223 S.E.2d 38. In that case, the same counsel, appearing herein, raised the same issue. In Williams, we refused to hold that arguments must be recorded in every case. We adhered to the method heretofore set forth in State v. Meehan, 160 S.C. 111, 158 S.E. 151 (1931), and in Crocker v. Weathers, 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335 (1962), whereby a defendant may challenge the argument of counsel and preserve the alleged error for review.

Failure of trial counsel to comply with Meehan and Crocker would indicate that they did not think that the argument was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant preservation of the record. Whether the procedural rule used in this State is analyzed in terms of due process or equal protection standards, it is obvious that it does not deny a defendant the right to a record of sufficient completeness to provide effective appellate review.

Counsel argues that § 15--1902, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962), which requires the court stenographer to 'take full stenographic notes of all proceedings including the rulings and charge of the court in every trial . . .' mandates that the argument of counsel be recorded. We do not so construe the statute and hold that the argument is without merit.

Next, defendant complains that the trial judge applied Code §§ 1--65, 26--7.1 and 26--7.2, so as to deprive him of his constitutional right to adequately confront witnesses against him.

The three sections essentially provide that...