State v. Bonacci-Koski

Decision Date10 February 2020
Docket NumberA19-0125
PartiesState of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jesse Lee Bonacci-Koski, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court

File No. 69VI-CR-17-910

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge

In this direct appeal from his judgment of conviction, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on several elements of two convictions for second-degree manslaughter while committing child neglect and child endangerment. Appellant also argues that the district court erred when it (1) denied his request for a jury instruction on intervening, superseding cause; (2) denied his challenge to strike a juror for cause; and (3) formally convicted him on both charges of second-degree manslaughter. Because sufficient evidence supports appellant's convictions, and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury or in denying appellant's challenge for cause, we affirm in part. But because the district court improperly entered a formal conviction on both second-degree manslaughter offenses, we reverse in part and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

On August 1, 2017, appellant Jesse Bonacci-Koski agreed to watch his 11-month-old nephew, B.K., while B.K.'s parents went on an overnight trip. Early the next morning, a fire started in the home.1 Responding firefighters found B.K.'s body in his crib in an upstairs bedroom. Appellant and the family's dog were not inside the home. In later statements, appellant admitted that, while returning to the home, he heard sirens, saw the fire, and decided to flee without informing anyone that B.K. was inside. Law enforcementlater encountered appellant walking out of a highway ditch after he had stolen and crashed a motor vehicle. They observed that appellant was high on a controlled substance.

Following an investigation, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with these offenses: one count of second-degree manslaughter based on the commission of child neglect or endangerment in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.205(5) (2016); one count of second-degree manslaughter based on culpable negligence in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1) (2016); one count of motor vehicle theft in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016); and one count of fifth-degree controlled substance possession in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2 (2016). Before jury selection, the district court granted the state's motion to amend the complaint over appellant's objection. As a result, the state dismissed the second-degree manslaughter offense for culpable negligence and added a charge of second-degree manslaughter based on child endangerment.

During voir dire, appellant's trial counsel asked jurors whether they would find it difficult to set aside their sympathies because the case involved a young child's death. In response, Juror K.K. stated, "I have doubts in my mind because I think that I would definitely have some emotion and feelings and I don't know that I would be good at setting it aside." Appellant's counsel and Juror K.K. then had this exchange:

APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: Okay. So are you concerned that your emotions might affect your ability to follow the law?
JUROR K.K.: I'm concerned that my emotions might not make me objective to all of the facts and evidence that you guys have. I just really don't.
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: So it would be hard for you to keep an open mind?
JUROR K.K.: It would.
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: Do you think if the judge instructed you that you had to set your sympathies aside, do you think that you would do it or do you think it would be too hard?
JUROR K.K.: I have pretty strong feelings and [am] a really emotional person and so I don't know that I would be able to set them aside. If the judge told me I had to, well, he's telling me I have to, I'd have to figure it out, how to, somehow. But it would take a lot inside of me to think and figure out how am I going to, you know, think outside of the box.
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: If the judge tells you that you have to, and I know that you would try - -
JUROR K.K.: Mm-hmm. Yes.
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: I mean, that's what you are telling me - -
JUROR K.K.: Yes.
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: - - is that you would try.
JUROR K.K.: I would.
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: But do you think you could?
JUROR K.K.: Do I ultimately think I could? Probably not.

Appellant's counsel moved to excuse Juror K.K. for cause.

The prosecutor and Juror K.K. then had this exchange:

PROSECUTOR: [Juror K.K.], you just said to [appellant's counsel's] questions that if the judge told you [that] you had to, you would find a way to do that.
JUROR K.K.: Because he told me I had to and that's what I'm supposed to do.
PROSECUTOR: Right. So you can follow the Court's instructions?
JUROR K.K.: Well, I would have to figure out how to. It might take time. It might - - I know it would be difficult for me to.
PROSECUTOR: Sure. Understandably this is - - you know, there's some tough facts, tough case, lots of emotions on all parts. Certainly I don't think anyone underestimates that. But when given the instruction that you are to listen and evaluate the evidence and the testimony, and the Court says, "This is what you are to do," can you follow that instruction?
JUROR K.K.: I would do my best that I could.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Do you think you can - - if the Court says, "[Juror K.K.], you have to fairly and impartially examine this evidence," is that fair to ask of you? Can you do it?
JUROR K.K.: (No response.)
PROSECUTOR: There's no right or wrong answer.
JUROR K.K.: It will be very difficult.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. But I'm not hearing from you that it's impossible.
JUROR K.K.: Well, nothing's impossible.
PROSECUTOR: Sure. You would give it your good college try so to speak, right?
JUROR K.K.: If I had went to college, sure.
PROSECUTOR: Sure. Good high school try. You'd give it a good shot. You would do everything in your power to comply with the Court's instruction?
JUROR K.K.: Well, yes, because I don't want to - - that's what I am supposed to do.
PROSECUTOR: Sure.
JUROR K.K.: So I don't want to - - you know.
PROSECUTOR: Sure. And I can tell you are taking this role as a juror very seriously, because it is a serious, serious position, right? And it's a heavy burden that you are asked to carry to sit and listen to all of this, right?
JUROR K.K.: Correct.
PROSECUTOR: Tough spot to be in. You've never done it before?
JUROR K.K.: Nope.
PROSECUTOR: So certainly, [Juror K.K.], you can't predict, once things get rolling, how things are going to go for you?
JUROR K.K.: Correct.
PROSECUTOR: But you are going to listen and respect the Court's instruction?
JUROR K.K.: Yes, I would.

(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor objected to the challenge for cause. The district court denied appellant's challenge.

The parties stipulated that the fire originated in the home's kitchen and that no evidence suggested that appellant started the fire. At trial, K.S., the child's mother, testified for the state. K.S. stated that appellant agreed to watch B.K. overnight. When describingB.K.'s physical capabilities, K.S. explained that, before his death, B.K. could not walk or crawl without adult assistance. K.S. testified that she had no reason to believe that appellant could not care for B.K. overnight. After receiving a call from her mother about their house being on fire, K.S. and her fiancé returned home. Upon arrival, they learned from first responders that B.K. had died.

A neighbor's testimony put the timeline for the fire between 6:40 a.m. and 7:40 a.m. This neighbor reported the fire to 911 dispatch around 7:40 a.m. In this call, the neighbor described seeing smoke coming from an upstairs window. Firefighters responded eight to ten minutes after the neighbor's call. While checking the home for occupants, responding firefighters discovered B.K. in his crib in an upstairs bedroom, but observed that he was not breathing or moving.

Testimony from the assistant medical examiner who performed B.K.'s autopsy revealed that B.K. had soot covering his legs, face, arms, eyes, torso, upper and lower airways, esophagus, and stomach. B.K. also had soot covering the clothing he had been wearing. Based on these observations, the assistant medical examiner opined that B.K. was alive at the time of the fire. The assistant medical examiner ruled that "inhalation of products of combustion" caused B.K.'s death, noting that he had an abnormally high 22% carbon monoxide level in his blood.

Multiple law enforcement officials involved in the investigation also testified at appellant's trial. An investigator testified first about a jail call appellant made to his girlfriend. In this call, appellant admitted to leaving B.K. home alone while he walked to K.S.'s workplace to access Wi-Fi and send her a message asking when she and her fiancéwould return home. Appellant denied that he left the home to obtain drugs. But he admitted to walking back to the home, hearing sirens, seeing the house on fire, and running away, even though he "should have went back up there."2

The deputy who transported appellant after his arrest to the police station testified next that appellant made an unprovoked statement about fleeing the area after seeing fire trucks at the home. Finally, a police sergeant testified that appellant admitted he was "high," had been awake for six straight days, was "guilty of neglecting [B.K.]," and had left B.K. alone for two hours while he...

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