State v. Bonds

• Decision Date: 10 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 48302-7,48302-7
• Citation: 653 P.2d 1024,98 Wn.2d 1
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Dudley Mark BONDS, a/k/a Dudley Mark Finlayson, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 1

98 Wn.2d 1

653 P.2d 1024

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Dudley Mark BONDS, a/k/a Dudley Mark Finlayson, Appellant.

No. 48302-7.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Nov. 10, 1982.

Yvonne Huggins-McLean, Mark Leemon, Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, Seattle, for appellant.

Arthur D. Curtis, Clark County Prosecutor, Curtis A. Shelton, Deputy Pros. Atty., Vancouver, for respondent.

PEARSON, Justice.

Defendant Dudley Mark Bonds appeals his convictions of first degree murder, first degree rape, and first degree burglary. His appeal presents several issues: First, whether defendant's confession, made after a warrantless arrest by Washington police officers in Oregon, should be suppressed. Second, whether his conviction of both first degree rape and first degree burglary violated the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy. Third, whether his rape conviction should be set aside because the elements of the offense were not fully specified in the information or jury instructions. Finally, whether the admission at trial of testimony of a psychiatrist who was appointed to assist defendant at his juvenile decline hearing violated defendant's attorney-client privilege and privilege against self-incrimination. We affirm the convictions.

The facts are not seriously disputed. The crimes were committed in the evening of November 14, 1978. At that time, defendant was 16 years old. He lived with his foster father and foster brothers in Vancouver, Washington. He was a senior at a Vancouver high school, and worked as a busboy at a restaurant in Portland, Oregon, just across the Columbia River. He also had a paper route.

On the evening of November 14, he left home to collect money from his paper route. Around 6 or 7 p.m., he arrived at the home of the victim, who was one of his customers. Defendant knew she was an elderly woman who lived alone. He believed she was wealthy. He broke a basement window, entered the basement, and searched for money. Finding nothing of value to him in the basement, he went upstairs, where he found a purse. He took $10 from the purse, and was returning it to where he found it when the victim noticed him. She recognized him and cried out that she would call his father and the police. The defendant knocked her down. He raped her. He struck her with a chair. Believing that he had killed her, he searched for the keys to her car. When the victim made a sound, and defendant realized he had not killed her, he struck her in the head with a pipe wrench. He wrapped the body in a blanket and placed it in the back of the victim's station wagon. At some time after the initial assault, he had put on a pair of gloves belonging to the victim so as not to leave fingerprints. He drove to a cemetery and left the body there. He drove to a railroad track and left the victim's car on the track. He then ran home and found the door locked. He slept in a trailer in the driveway.

In the early morning of November 15, the Vancouver police received a report of the car abandoned on the railroad tracks. A large quantity of blood was found in the back of the car. The police traced the car to the victim and investigated her residence. They found evidence of forcible entry through a basement window and signs of a violent struggle. Investigators at the residence learned from newspaper receipts that defendant was the victim's paperboy. On November 17, Detective Brown contacted the defendant's father and determined that defendant had not been at home on the evening of November 14. Detective Brown interviewed defendant, who claimed to have been at a beer party with fellow high school students that evening. On November 18, defendant's father informed the police that he had run away from home. The father signed a runaway report, and turned over to the police an apparently bloodstained coat belonging to defendant. The police learned that defendant was employed at a Portland restaurant and that his payday for work performed prior to his disappearance was November 21, 1978.

On the morning of November 21, two detectives from the Vancouver Police Department went to the restaurant in Portland. They were told that defendant had come to the restaurant earlier that morning to ask for his paycheck. He had been told to come back later, as the check had not been prepared. The police officers proceeded to a nearby shopping mall, where they located defendant. After he confirmed his identity, defendant was told that he had been reported by his father as a runaway and that the officers wanted him to return with them to Vancouver. The detectives did not tell defendant that he was a suspect in a homicide and burglary, that he was being arrested for these crimes, or that they intended interrogating him regarding these crimes upon returning him to the Vancouver police station. Defendant asked the officers what would happen if he refused to return with them to Vancouver. They said he would be turned over to the Multnomah County, Oregon, juvenile authorities, who would detain him in their custody. Defendant then told the detectives that he would return with them to Vancouver. As the detectives accompanied defendant from the shopping mall to their vehicle, they told him not to run from them, and one of the officers took him by the upper arm and led him to the car. The detectives then drove defendant to the Vancouver police station. They did not explain to him that he had a right to contest in an Oregon court his return to the state of Washington. The officers had no warrant for defendant's arrest and no attempt had been made to obtain a warrant.

At the police station, an officer telephoned defendant's father and requested that he come to the station. While awaiting the arrival of the father, a detective read defendant the Miranda rights. After the father arrived, the Miranda rights were read again to both defendant and his father. The defendant and his father said they understood all of the rights. After about 20 minutes of questioning, a tape recorder was obtained and a tape recorded statement was taken from the defendant. Defendant was again informed of his rights, and he and his father both signed a waiver of rights prior to giving the recorded statement. In the statement, defendant admitted the facts set out earlier in this opinion. The victim's body was found in the cemetery where defendant said he had left it.

Defendant was charged with five felonies arising out of the events which culminated in the victim's death. Because defendant was only 16 years old at the time of these events, a juvenile decline hearing pursuant to RCW 13.40.110(1)(a) and JuCR 8.1 was held to determine whether defendant would be tried as an adult. To assist defense counsel in preparation for this hearing, the court ordered the appointment of Dr. Guy Parvaresh, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Dean Harris, a psychologist. On January 9 and 10, 1979, the juvenile court heard testimony and argument and declined jurisdiction. Defendant was remanded to Clark County Superior Court, where he was charged with first degree murder, first degree rape, and first degree burglary. He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.

Prior to trial, a hearing was held pursuant to CrR 3.5 to determine the admissibility of the defendant's confession and other evidence obtained subsequent to defendant's arrest in Portland. The evidence was ruled admissible. Also prior to trial, defendant moved in limine against the State's using as a rebuttal witness Dr. Parvaresh, the psychiatrist appointed to assist the defense at the juvenile proceedings. The motion was denied.

At trial, defendant presented an insanity defense. A psychiatrist testified that defendant "went psychotic" and "lost contact with reality" at the moment the victim disturbed him in her house, and threatened to call the police and his father. A psychologist testified that when he attacked the victim, defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong as defined by the law. The State called two psychiatrists in rebuttal. Dr. Parvaresh testified that although defendant had a mental impairment, he was not mentally ill. Defendant was capable of forming the intent to kill and of distinguishing right from wrong. The State's other psychiatrist testified that defendant probably suffered a "psychotic or rage reaction" during the attack, but that he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong.

The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, first degree rape, and first degree burglary. He appealed to the Court of Appeals and we accepted certification.

Defendant first argues that his warrantless arrest in Oregon and his removal into Washington were illegal, and that the confession obtained subsequent to the arrest should not have been admitted at his trial. The trial court refused to exclude the confession because it decided that although both the arrest and the transfer of defendant across the Washington-Oregon border violated Oregon law, neither the arrest nor the transfer was unconstitutional. The trial court concluded that the exclusionary rule would not apply where the irregularities in the arrest did not violate the constitution or any other law applicable within the state of Washington. We agree.

The Vancouver police officers violated Oregon law in arresting defendant and removing him to Washington. First, Oregon statutes were violated by the arrest. The police officers were not Oregon peace officers (ORS 133.005(3)), or persons authorized by Oregon law to take juveniles into custody (ORS 419.569(1)). For purposes of Oregon law, they were only private citizens and could arrest only for offenses committed in their presence. (ORS 133.225.) The arrest of defendant was not for an offense committed in their presence and therefore violated Oregon statutes.

Second, the officers made no attempt to comply with Oregon extradition procedures, under the Interstate Compacts on Juveniles and...