State v. Bonskowski
| Decision Date | 09 March 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 40319,40319 |
| Citation | 180 Kan. 726,308 P.2d 168 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Anthony BONSKOWSKI, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The record in a criminal action, where the defendant was convicted on two counts, charging violations of the provisions of G.S.1949, 21-937, examined and held (1) that under the facts, conditions and circumstances set forth in the opinion the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of an absent witness given at the preliminary examination; (2) that the requirement of such section of the statute, that no conviction shall be had on the uncorroborated testimony of the woman, may be satisfied by evidentiary facts and circumstances; and (3) that the corroborative evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.
A.B. Fletcher, Jr., Junction City, argued the cause, and C. L. Hoover and Robert A. Schermerhorn, Junction City, were with him on the briefs, for appellant.
Phillip L. Harris, County Attorney, Junction City, a argued the cause, and John Anderson, Jr., Atty. Gen., was with him on the briefs, for appellee.
Defendant was charged, convicted and sentenced on two counts of persuading, inducing, enticing or procuring one Wanda Evelyn Long to go from one place to another within the State of Kansas for purposes of prostitution, contrary to the provisions of G.S.1949, 21-937. In this appeal he charges that the trial court erred (1) in admitting illegal testimony, prejudicial to his rights, over his objections and (2) that the verdict of the jury was contrary to law.
It is neither necessary nor required that we burden our reports with all the sordid facts involved in this criminal prosecution and we do not propose to do so. For present purposes it suffices to say that except for the requirement of G.S.1949, 21-937, providing that 'no conviction shall be had on the uncorroborated testimony of the woman', the record discloses the evidence of the female involved in this case is ample to sustain and uphold the verdict and judgment. Therefore without further elaboration on the factual picture we turn to issues raised by the appellant which relate solely to the admission and sufficiency of the corroborative evidence adduced by the State.
During the trial of the cause the State produced two witnesses to lay a foundation for the admission of testimony of Ronald T. Craig, a member of the armed forces, who is conceded to have been one of the triangle involved in the acts necessary to complete the involved offenses, taken at appellant's preliminary hearing before the judge of the county court of Geary County. The record discloses, and appellant admits, that at this hearing he and his attorney were present and that although he waived his preliminary examination the sworn testimony of Craig was perpetuated by the State at that time and included in the transcript of the proceeding by the official court reporter of the district court of Geary County. Under such circumstances we must assume appellant had full opportunity to meet this witness face to face and cross-examine him in connection with all matters to which he had testified.
The first of the two witnesses produced by the State, for purposes previously mentioned, was the Sheriff of Geary County who testified in substance that prior to the trial he had received a subpoena for Craig; that he knew he was a soldier and went to the Provost Marshal's office at Fort Riley and was there informed that Craig had gone to Europe; that there he had found an order transferring such individual for movement to USAR Europe, a true copy of which he procured and brought back with him; that he then returned the subpoena for Craig with the notation 'not found in Geary County.'
The second witness produced by the State was a Sergeant First Class, D. W. May, who testified that he was Chief Clerk of the Provost Marshal's Office; that he had made an investigation as to the whereabouts of Craig; that the military records at Fort Riley showed that such individual was shipped Gyroscope with his unit in October, 1955, that he obtained that information On Special Order that the Armh had at Fort Riley at the Post Locator, Special Order No. 240, Paragraph 7; and that so far as his knowledge went Craig was not within the jurisdiction of the State of Kansas.
Following the foregoing testimony the State offered, and over the objection of appellant the trial court admitted, testimony of Craig as given at the preliminary hearing. Appellant now contends, as he did in the court below, the introduction of that evidence was erroneous because no proper foundation had been laid for its admission by the State.
In the argument respecting the claim now under consideration no attempt is made to avoid or challenge the long established rules of this jurisdiction (1) that when the State has made every reasonable effort to procure the attendance of a witness, and is unable to do so, the testimony of such witness, given at the preliminary examination, may be introduced at the trial, State v. Chadwell, 94 Kan. 302, 146 P. 420; (2) that the requirements of Section 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of this State, providing that the accused shall be allowed to meet the witness face to face, have been complied with where a defendant has meet the absent witness face to face at his preliminary hearing, State v. Harmon, 70 Kan. 476, 78 P. 805; or (3) that when the trial court is satisfied from the evidence adduced by the State that it has made...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Fondren
...194 Kan. 555, 400 P.2d 695; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659, 391 P.2d 95; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375, 312 P.2d 832; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726, 308 P.2d 168; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240, 245 P.2d 1177. Also, see K.S.A. 60-459[g] ).' Finally, it should be noted that the finding o......
-
State v. Steward, 48010
...194 Kan. 555, 400 P.2d 695; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659, 391 P.2d 95; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375, 312 P.2d 832; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726, 308 P.2d 168; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240, 245 P.2d 1177. Also, see K.S.A. 60-459(g)).' (p. 338, 479 P.2d p. See, also, State v. Bey, 2......
-
State v. Bey, 47731
...194 Kan. 555, 400 P.2d 695; State v. Guthrie, 192 Akn. 659, 391 P.2d 95; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375, 312 P.2d 832; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726, 308 P.2d 168; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240, 245 P.2d 1177. Also, see K.S.A. 60-459(g)).' (206 Kan. p. 338, 479 P.2d p. (See also State v......
-
State v. Guthrie
...the transcript of a preliminary hearing has been read and introduced at the time of trial. The following was said in State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726, 308 P.2d 168: 'In the argument respecting the claim now under consideration no attempt is made to avoid or challenge the long established r......