State v. Boren, 57164

• Decision Date: 18 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 57164,57164
• Citation: 224 N.W.2d 14
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Dale Ernest BOREN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 14

224 N.W.2d 14

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Dale Ernest BOREN, Appellant.

No. 57164.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 18, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1975.

Robert C. Gross, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Thomas Mann, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and William G. Faches, County Atty., for appellee.

Heard by MOORE, C.J., and LeGRAND, REES, HARRIS, and McCORMICK, JJ.

McCORMICK, Justice.

Defendant appeals his conviction by jury and sentence for incest in violation of Code § 704.1. The State accused defendant Dale Ernest Boren of incest with his 16 year old daughter Linda based upon an incident alleged to have occurred between September 1 and September 15, 1973. Defendant's main contentions are that the trial court erred in receiving his written statement into evidence and in finding sufficient evidence of the specific act of incest for jury consideration. We affirm.

I. Linda Boren turned herself in at the Cedar Rapids police station the evening of October 6, 1973, as a runaway. She told detective Robert B. Manchester she had been beaten many times by her father and he had maintained an incestuous relationship with her since she was eight years old.

Manchester called Linda's parents to the police station. They arrived shortly after midnight. Linda's mother told Manchester she had suspected defendant of having intercourse with Linda several years before. Defendant was interrogated by Manchester and detective Douglas R. Fuller. He was fully advised of his relevant constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Manchester testified he advised defendant of his daughter's allegations.

At first, according to Manchester and Fuller, defendant denied Linda's accusations. Fully testified that after further questioning defendant admitted that two or three years before he 'had a few beers and might have had intercourse with Linda.' Manchester said he then posed a question to defendant: 'I asked him what he would say if I told him that his daughter had been given a polygraph test or a lie detector test and that test had shown everything she said to us was the truth.' The officers testified defendant acknowledged that what his daughter said was true and gave a detailed statement which was later put in writing and signed by him at about 1:30 a.m. October 7, 1973.

Defendant admitted making oral and written admission but said they were untrue and were made because accusations by the officers made him feel 'like giving up on everything.' He testified the officers confronted him with details and he simply acknowledged they were true.

In the statement defendant said he had sexual intercourse 50 to 60 times with Linda, the first time when she was eight years old and the last about a month before the date of his interrogation.

Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence of his oral and written statements was based on a contention that Manchester tricked him into giving them by his question suggesting Linda had passed a lie detector test. He alleged his statements were thus not voluntary. After evidentiary hearing his motion was overruled. At trial defendant objection to the State's offer of defendant's written statement on the same ground, and his objection was overruled. He assigns that ruling as error.

The applicable principles are fully reviewed in State v. Cooper, 217 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1974). There we summarized the rule where there is evidence of deception as follows:

'Deception of any nature by representatives of the state cannot be condoned. However, we conclude deception standing alone does not render a waiver of constitutional rights involuntary as a matter of law unless the deceiving acts amount to a deprivation of due process. Nevertheless, deception becomes a factor to be considered in reviewing the totality of the circumstances in making the determination as to the voluntariness of the waiver even though the act does not per se produce exclusion.' Id. at 597.

In examining the totality of circumstances shown by the record to determine the voluntariness of defendant's statements, we make our own independent evaluation of the evidence. 'When constitutional safeguards are involved, we are obliged to make our own evaluation of the totality of the circumstances under which rulings on those rights were made.' State v. Thomas, 205 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1973). That is, when a constitutional issue is presented, the evidence relevant to that issue is reviewed de novo. State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1972); see State v. Winfrey, 221 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 1974); State v. Cooper, supra, 217 N.W.2d at 598; State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Iowa 1973).

There is no suggestion from the evidence in this case that defendant was under any physical or mental disability at the time he was interrogated. He was alert and rational. He was fully aware of his legal rights, and he knowingly and intelligently relinquished them. We do not believe Manchester's alleged 'trick question' constituted coercion. It was a means of challenging defendant's veracity rather than a device calculated to overbear his will or impair his capacity for self-determination. In all the circumstances we believe his statements were the product of 'an essentially free and unconstrained choice.' Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1057 (1961).

We hold defendant's admissions were voluntary. The trial court did not err in admitting the written statement into evidence.

II. In ruling on a pretrial motion for bill of particulars the trial court required the State...