State v. Boudreau

• Decision Date: 06 November 1940
• Citation: 16 A.2d 262,111 Vt. 351
• Parties: STATE v. ALBERT BOUDREAU
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

16 A.2d 262

111 Vt. 351

STATE v. ALBERT BOUDREAU

Supreme Court of Vermont

November 6, 1940

October Term, 1940.

Prosecution for Burglary and Larceny.---1. View of evidence on Direction of Verdict.---2. Circumstantial Evidence.---3. Circumstantial Evidence must Exclude Innocence.---4. Suspicion not Evidence of Guilt.---5. Test of Motion for Directed Verdict.---6. "Fairly and Reasonably" as Tendency of Evidence.---7. Evidence Necessary to Bar Directed Verdict.---8. Mere Possession not Evidence of Guilt.---9. Possession Necessary to be Evidence of Guilt.---10. Access to Stolen Goods as Evidence of Guilt.---11. Conscious Possession not prima facie Evidence.---12. No Questions in Accurate Charge.---13. Impeaching Statements not Evidence of Facts Therein.---14. Testimony of Division of Goods not Evidence of Guilt.---15. Desire to Avoid Mix-up no Tendency to Convict.---16. Charac- ter of Evidence Warranting Verdict.---17. Evidence of Concealment not Evidence of Stealing.---18. Indefinite Threat for "Squealing."---19. Reward Offered to Get Out of "Mix-up."---20. Threat to Escape as Evidence.---21. Suspicion not Evidence.

1. In determining whether the trial court was correct in directing a verdict for a respondent the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the State.

2. When all the evidence of a respondent's guilt is circumstantial it is incumbent upon the State to produce evidence of circumstances which exclude every reasonable hypothesis excepting that the respondent is guilty.

3. When all the evidence of a respondent's guilt is circumstantial, it must be such as to exclude every reasonable theory consistent with the respondent's innocence.

4. Mere suspicion of a respondent's guilt, however strong, will not supply the place of evidence of guilt.

5. The tests laid down in passing upon a respondent's motion for a directed verdict are whether the State has introduced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show respondent's guilt, or, in other words, whether the jury on the evidence would have been justified in finding the respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

6. Although the expression "fairly and reasonably" is usually used to express necessary tendency of evidence to make a case for the jury, another form of expression is that there must be substantial evidence.

7. To bar the granting of a motion for a directed verdict the evidence must be of such quality and character as to justify a jury, acting reasonably, to predicate a verdict thereon in favor of the party having the burden of proof.

8. Mere possession of stolen goods is not sufficient to make evidence of guilt on the part of the possessor.

9. Possession of stolen goods must be personal and exclusive and to the knowledge of the possessor to become evidence of his guilt.

10. That stolen goods were found in a respondent's home is not evidence of his guilt of either burglary or larceny in obtaining the goods when two other persons living in his home had as free access as he did to the place where the goods were found.

11. Possession of stolen goods is not always prima facie evidence of guilt.

12. No point is raised for determination upon a charge conceded to be accurate.

13. Statements of witnesses who are not parties to a cause admitted for impeachment purposes only are not evidence of the facts therein stated.

14. Testimony of the quantity of goods stolen and their division as tending to show that a third person must have participated in the spoils and that the respondent drove an alleged accomplice a greater distance than necessary for him to take a train does not tend to connect the respondent with the alleged burglary or larceny.

15. A respondent stating that he had a family and did not want to be in a mix-up over stolen goods in response to an explanation by alleged accomplice as to why the respondent was originally framed but that he wasn't in the mix-up and would be cleared has no tendency to convict the respondent with any crime.

16. Such evidence lacks the necessary substance and is not of sufficient character, standing along, to warrant a jury acting reasonably, to predicate a verdict of guilty thereon.

17. When there was some evidence that the respondent had hidden or assisted in hiding a suitcase such evidence of concealment is not evidence of burglary or larceny when there is no evidence that the respondent knew the contents of a suit case which was not a stolen article.

18. Evidence of some indefinite threat for "squealing" which is not clearly tied up to either the respondent or one in privity with him lacks substance enough for consideration.

19. Evidence that respondent indicated a reward might be available for aid in getting him out of a "mix-up" but with no definite offer being made, is wholly lacking in the necessary substantial character to warrant its consideration.

20. An expression of willingness upon a certain condition to escape from jail but with no escape made or attempted is as equally consistent with innocence as guilt.

21. A suspicion, even a strong one, that the respondent is involved in the crime alleged will not supply the place of evidence.

INFORMATION for burglary and larceny. Plea of not guilty. Trial by Orleans County Court, March Term, 1940, Adams, J presiding. At close of the State's evidence the respondent moved for directed verdict of not guilty, which was granted. The State took exceptions.

Judgment affirmed.

Maxwell L. Baton, State's Attorney, for the State.

Hubert Wells and Hubert S. Pierce for the respondent.

Present: MOULTON, C. J., SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT and JEFFORDS, JJ.

OPINION

JEFFORDS

The respondent was charged with burglary and larceny. At the close of the State's evidence a motion was made for a directed verdict of not guilty on the ground that there was no evidence in the case to warrant a conviction on either charge. This motion was granted and the case is here on exceptions by the State.

The material facts as disclosed by the evidence are as follows The store of W. E. Brock, located in Troy, was broken into on the night of December 17, 1939, and merchandise and money was stolen. About two weeks later one Blanchard came to Sanville, a constable, and confessed to the crime and implicated one Lafreniere in its commission. Blanchard told the constable that part of the stolen goods were concealed at the house of the respondent and told the officer where they could be found. Sanville and Brock then went to the house of the respondent and finding him home asked if he had any objection to them looking over the place to see what they could find. He told them to go ahead and "look all you are amind to." The stolen goods were found in a hole off from a back chamber. The entrance to the space was concealed by sap buckets.

Blanchard was lodged in jail. Lafreniere was apprehended as his home in Rhode Island and brought back to this State and placed in jail with Blanchard. Both gave signed statements involving the respondent in the burglary and larceny and he was arrested and placed in confinement with the other two.

At the trial the first witness called was Brock who testified concerning the articles that were stolen and their value and as to the finding of a part of the same in a box which had been in his store on the night in question.

The next witness was Blanchard whose testimony in substance was that he had worked off and on for the respondent for several years prior to the burglary and was working for and staying at the respondent's home at the time of the same. That Lafreniere and he had talked several times about breaking into the Brock store. On the evening of December 17, respondent and his wife, Lafreniere and Blanchard drove in respondent's car to visit one Cantell. They returned to respondent's house at about 10:30 and all of them retired for the night. Blanchard and Lafreniere laid down on their bed for a short time then got up and went out of the house and took respondent's car which was pushed for a short distance so as not to awaken respondent. Blanchard then drove the car to a place near the store which they broke into about midnight and then returned to respondent's house and concealed their loot in the place where part of it was later found. He told about the equal division of the stolen goods between himself and Lafreniere and about the burning of some in the furnace at respondent's house one night when Lafreniere and he were there alone. He denied that the respondent had any part in the breaking.

Blanchard also testified that he gave himself up to the officer the day that he had taken respondent's car without permission and had broken it.

It appeared from his testimony that while in jail he had given to the state's attorney a written statement which implicated respondent in the burglary. This statement was introduced by the State for the limited purpose of impeaching Blanchard who testified that it had been given after a motor vehicle inspector had told him that the respondent had reported him (Blanchard) for stealing respondent's car. Blanchard on the stand denied that the parts in this statement implicating respondent were true and said that he had told the state's attorney to change it.

Lafreniere was called by the State and testified that he had been working for and living with respondent for about six months prior to December 17. His story about what happened on that night was in substantial agreement with Blanchard's and he exonerated the respondent from any connection with the affair. Lafreniere left for Rhode Island on a night train four days after the burglary taking his share of what remained of the loot with him. He hired respondent to drive him to Orleans to take the train and Blanchard went with them. H...