State v. Bowen
| Decision Date | 11 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | (CC 02CR0019; SC S50491). |
| Citation | 340 Or. 487,135 P.3d 272 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Gregory Allen BOWEN, Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Robin A. Jones, Senior Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Peter Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem.
Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and Carolyn Alexander and Steven R. Powers, Assistant Attorneys General, Salem.
DE MUNIZ, C.J.
This case is before the court on automatic and direct review of defendant's judgments of conviction and sentences of death, pursuant to ORS 138.012(1). Defendant was convicted on two counts of aggravated murder and 16 additional felony convictions. On review, defendant raises numerous assignments of error and asks this court to reverse and remand his case for a new trial or, alternatively, vacate his sentences of death and remand for resentencing. For the reasons set out below, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences of death, and remand for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction consistent with this opinion.
Because the jury found defendant guilty, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Thompson, 328 Or. 248, 250, 971 P.2d 879 (1999).
On December 25, 2001, defendant, along with his friend Mike Colby, left Crescent City in search of temporary work on the coast. After spending the night in Coos Bay, defendant and Colby traveled to Charleston hoping to find work on a fishing boat; they were also looking for drugs. At the time, defendant habitually used methamphetamine, as well as other illegal drugs. Unable to obtain either employment or drugs, defendant and Colby continued on to Newport and Warrenton.
On December 29, 2001, defendant and Colby traveled to Gold Beach, where they began experiencing problems with their vehicle. While in Gold Beach, defendant decided to visit his ex-girlfriend, Bridget Dalton. Upon arriving at Dalton's house, defendant told her that he wanted to pick up some extra clothes and give her money that he owed her. After entering the house, however, defendant and Dalton began to argue. During that argument, defendant struck Dalton in the face with his fist, knocking her to the floor. He then grabbed Dalton by her hair, pulling her up from the floor, and proceeded to hold a knife to her throat. Defendant then took Dalton into the bedroom and exchanged his knife for a black-powder pistol, which he used to repeatedly to beat Dalton. During that altercation, Dalton grabbed the barrel of the pistol and cut her hand on the gunsights. Shortly thereafter, someone knocked on Dalton's front door. Defendant told Dalton that, if she made a sound, he would shoot the person at the front door. After defendant left the bedroom to check the front door, Dalton escaped the house by jumping through a bedroom window. As Dalton ran to her neighbor's house, she yelled for someone to call the police. In response, defendant and Colby fled to a friend's house to listen to a police scanner.
While at the friend's house, defendant heard nothing on the police scanner regarding the incident with Dalton. Defendant and Colby then visited their heroin supplier, but discovered the supplier was not home. Defendant and Colby then traveled to the home of another of defendant's friends, Donald Christiansen (the victim). Upon arriving at the victim's house, Colby and defendant left their vehicle running and met the victim on his front porch. The victim allowed them inside, and all three men sat down at the kitchen table. While seated, defendant removed the black powder pistol from his pocket and placed it on the kitchen table. Defendant asked the victim if he had any money. The victim answered "no," which prompted defendant to inquire about a bowl of money sitting on the counter. The victim informed defendant that the bowl contained only coins.
The victim and defendant got up from the kitchen table and moved to the living room to talk. Defendant left the pistol on the kitchen table. Colby remained at the kitchen table until he heard their vehicle making strange noises outside. Defendant asked Colby to step outside and check on it. After checking on the vehicle, Colby remained outside to smoke a cigarette.
Defendant testified at trial that, after returning to the kitchen and while Colby was outside, he informed the victim about his earlier altercation with Dalton. Concerned about defendant's well-being, the victim offered to call the police and encouraged defendant to turn himself in. Defendant further testified that, as the victim prepared to call the police, defendant grabbed the gun and said, "If you call 911[,] I may as well just shoot myself and get it over with." According to defendant, the victim attempted to take the gun away from defendant and during the struggle, the gun accidentally went off. The bullet entered the victim's chest above his left nipple and traveled downward, deflected off a rib and pierced the victim's heart and liver.
After hearing the gunshot, Colby rushed back inside the victim's house. Colby saw the victim on the floor and heard defendant tell the victim that Colby asked, "Fuck, Buck, what happened?" In response, defendant looked at Colby and asked, "Are you all right with this?" Colby then went outside to the vehicle and waited. Soon thereafter, Colby watched as defendant came out of the victim's house carrying several guns and a box with a phone in it.1 After leaving the victim's home, defendant and Colby returned to Crescent City in search of heroin.
The following day, a neighbor discovered the victim's body and called the police. Shortly thereafter, a police officer arrived and determined that the victim was "obviously deceased" and that the scene revealed "obvious foul play." Several other police officers arrived. Those police officers took photographs, turned the body over, and cut open the victim's shirt with a pair of scissors. Upon further investigation, police officers discovered blood splatter low on the wall and framing of the doorway between the living room and kitchen, low-angle blood splatter on and under a cart just inside the kitchen, and blood smears on the kitchen floor and on a white telephone. The officers indicated that the home appeared "appropriately cluttered" and displayed no evidence of ransacking.
The state subsequently charged defendant in an 18-count indictment as a result of the crimes that occurred on the night of December 29, 2001. One group of crimes involved defendant's ex-girlfriend Dalton, and the second group of crimes involved the victim. Defendant pleaded guilty to all charges involving Dalton. As relevant to this court's review of the charges involving the victim, defendant was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder, one based on the theory that he intentionally and personally had caused the death of the victim during a robbery, and the other based on the theory that he intentionally and personally had caused the death of the victim during a burglary. A jury ultimately convicted defendant on both counts of aggravated murder.
Based on the aggravated murder verdicts, the trial court held a penalty-phase proceeding. On each count, the jury answered "yes" to the statutory questions submitted to it.2 At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of death on both aggravated murder convictions. This automatic review followed.
Defendant raises seven assignments of error that pertain to his pretrial motions. Three of those assignments raise facial challenges to the constitutionality of Oregon's death-penalty statute. This court previously has considered and rejected defendant's constitutional challenges to that statute. We discuss defendant's remaining assignments of error regarding his pretrial motions below.
Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's objections to photographs that the state introduced depicting evidence of his crimes against Dalton.
Before trial, the parties and the court discussed a series of photographs that the state sought to admit relating to defendant's assault of Dalton. Those photographs consisted of images of injuries to Dalton's face, head, hand, and legs, all taken prior to Dalton receiving medical treatment. Defendant argued that the photographs "that depict the actual scarring, the injuring, the bruising and so forth but don't depict the blood and gore will certainly serve the purposes of the State in relaying to the jury what took place on that day." Defendant argued further that "[a]nything else is prejudicial and is not relevant to any value [and] it's not probative of any issue in this case."
In response, the state argued that the photographs were relevant because they gave a complete picture of the events that had led to the victim's murder and because they placed defendant in an area that was relevant to the victim's death, both in location and in time. Ultimately, the court sustained defendant's objections to four of the photographs, but allowed the state to introduce the balance of the photographs. The court concluded that the photographs were relevant:
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