State v. Bowers

• Decision Date: 29 June 2022
• Docket Number: Appellate Case No. 2019-001776,Opinion No. 28101
• Citation: 436 S.C. 640,875 S.E.2d 608
• Parties: The STATE, Petitioner, v. Joseph BOWERS, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

436 S.C. 640

875 S.E.2d 608

The STATE, Petitioner,

v.Joseph BOWERS, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001776

Opinion No. 28101

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard December 9, 2020

Filed June 29, 2022

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone III, of Bluffton, all for Petitioner.

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Respondent.

JUSTICE FEW :

Joseph Bowers was involved in a shootout in which multiple people fired their guns. Four people were shot, and two of them died. A jury convicted Bowers of voluntary manslaughter, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals reversed the convictions because the trial court should not have charged the doctrine of mutual combat to the jury. State v. Bowers , 428 S.C. 21, 34, 39, 832 S.E.2d 623, 630, 633 (2019). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address a narrow point: the State's contention the erroneous jury charge did not prejudice Bowers as to the ABHAN conviction. We affirm the court of appeals.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The facts and circumstances of this chaotic shootout are explained in detail in the opinion of the court of appeals. 428 S.C. at 25-28, 832 S.E.2d at 625-27. In essence, at least ten people shot at each other and at innocent bystanders in the parking lot of Midnight Soul Patrol on St. Helena Island in Beaufort County in the early morning hours of June 21, 2012. Approximately 75 people were present at the club when Michael Morgan began the shootout by firing a flare gun. When the shooting ended, four people had been shot, including Richard Green. Two of them later died, including Michael Morgan.

The State charged Bowers with two counts of murder, two counts of attempted murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. At trial, Bowers claimed he acted in self-defense. In an off-the-record conference, the State requested the trial court charge the jury on the doctrine of mutual combat to negate the self-defense claim. Over Bowers’ objection, the trial court agreed to give the mutual combat instruction. Before giving the instruction to the jury, the trial court stated to the attorneys, "[mutual combat] only applies ... to the murder as to Michael [Morgan] ...." The trial court then explained the doctrine of mutual combat to the jury and stated, "This law provides that if a defendant voluntarily participated in mutual combat ..., the killing of a victim would not be self-defense." The trial court did not explain to the jury whether or how a finding that Bowers engaged in mutual combat with Michael Morgan would affect his claim that he acted in self-defense in shooting other victims.

During its deliberations, the jury asked a question, "Does a determination of mutual combat require a finding of culpability in each of the charges?" After an off-the-record discussion with the attorneys, the trial court stated, "I'll recharge mutual combat ... and then tell them, as a matter of law ..., I don't think mutual combat can apply to the indictments for attempted murder." The trial court then answered the question by repeating to the jury its original instruction on mutual combat and stating, "There can only be one mutual combat defense in the indictments, that is the indictment with respect to Michael Morgan, because there are -- I find as a matter of law there is no evidence to support the other victims being armed at any point." The trial court continued its answer, "You would still, as to the other victims, since there's no mutual combat, you would have to consider whether or not the State has disproved self-defense ... because mutual combat would not be there to negate [self-defense] as to those particular indictments."

The jury convicted Bowers of the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter for killing Michael Morgan and ABHAN for shooting Green.¹ The jury also convicted Bowers of possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.

The court of appeals reversed, 428 S.C. at 25, 832 S.E.2d at 625, finding there was no evidence to support the trial court charging the jury on the doctrine of mutual combat, 428 S.C. at 34, 832 S.E.2d at 630.² The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. The State does not challenge the court of appeals’ analysis of the evidence or its ruling that the doctrine of mutual combat is not applicable. Rather, the State challenges whether the court of appeals’ ruling on that issue requires reversal of the ABHAN conviction. We hold it does.

II. Analysis

The State makes two arguments to support its contention the erroneous jury charge did not prejudice Bowers as to the ABHAN conviction. First, the State argues the trial court's initial jury instruction explaining mutual combat "could not have had any impact on [the attempted murder] charge based on the specific evidence presented." In other words, the State argues the jury would not have thought in the first place to apply the doctrine of mutual combat—based on the trial court's initial explanation—to the attempted murder charge involving Green. Second, the State contends the trial court's answer to the jury's question "corrected" any misunderstanding the jury may have had as to whether the doctrine of mutual combat could apply to the attempted murder charge involving Green.

A. The Law of Prejudice

To reverse a criminal conviction on the basis of an erroneous jury instruction, we must find the error was a prejudicial error. See State v. Stukes , 416 S.C. 493, 498, 787 S.E.2d 480, 482 (2016) (stating "the charge must be prejudicial to the appellant to warrant a new trial" (citing State v. Curry , 406 S.C. 364, 373, 752 S.E.2d 263, 267 (2013) )). Prejudicial error in a jury instruction is an error that contributed to the jury verdict. State v. Burdette , 427 S.C. 490, 496, 832 S.E.2d 575, 578 (2019). The question we address here is not whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of overwhelming evidence of guilt. See State v. Simmons , 423 S.C. 552, 566, 816 S.E.2d 566, 574 (2018) ("If a review of the entire record does not establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, then the conviction shall be reversed."). Rather, the question here is whether the erroneous jury charge affected the jury's deliberations on the charge involving Green and, thus, contributed to the ABHAN verdict. See State v. Tapp , 398 S.C. 376, 389, 728 S.E.2d 468, 475 (2012) (stating, "The key factor for determining whether a trial error constitutes reversible error is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Charping , 313 S.C. 147, 157, 437 S.E.2d 88, 94 (1993) )).³ If we have any reasonable doubt as to whether the erroneous charge contributed to the verdict, we must affirm the reversal of the conviction. Tapp , 398 S.C. at 389, 728 S.E.2d at 475.

To determine whether the erroneous jury charge contributed to the verdict here, we must attempt to determine how the jury understood the initial jury instruction and the trial court's answer to the jury's question. As the State argues in its brief, "the appropriate test involves determining what a reasonable juror would have understood the charge to mean." See Sheppard v. State , 357 S.C. 646, 664, 594 S.E.2d 462, 472 (2004) (stating "the test is what a reasonable juror would have understood the charge as meaning"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burdette , 427 S.C. 490, 503 n.3, 832 S.E.2d 575, 583 n.3 (2019) ; State v. Jackson , 297 S.C. 523, 527, 377 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1989) (same). Specifically, we must determine whether the jury would have interpreted the trial court's instruction on mutual combat—as originally given or as "corrected" by the trial court's answer to the jury's question—to mean that Bowers’ mutual combat with Michael Morgan did not foreclose his claim of self-defense as to the charge involving Green.

B. The Role of the Doctrine of Mutual Combat

We begin our analysis with a brief summary of the doctrine of mutual combat.

Mutual combat relates primarily to the law of self-defense. See State v. Young , 429 S.C. 155, 157 n.1, 838 S.E.2d 516, 517 n.1 (2020) (explaining "the mutual combat doctrine is most commonly used to negate self-defense"). This Court has explained self-defense by referring to four elements. See State v. Dickey , 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011) (listing the four elements that must be present for self-defense); State v. Bryant , 336 S.C. 340, 344-45, 520 S.E.2d 319, 321-22 (1999) (same); State v. Davis , 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984) (same); State v. Ross , 75 S.C. 533, 544, 55 S.E. 977, 981 (1906) (affirming a jury charge in which the four elements were explained). The doctrine of mutual combat relates to the first element, Taylor , 356 S.C. at 232, 589 S.E.2d at 3, which "we have traditionally described as, ‘The defendant [must be] without fault in bringing on the difficulty,’ " State v. Williams , 427 S.C. 246, 250, 830 S.E.2d 904, 906 (2019) (quoting Dickey , 394 S.C. at 499, 716 S.E.2d at 101 ).

Under the doctrine of mutual combat, if Bowers had engaged in mutual combat with Michael Morgan before they arrived at Midnight Soul Patrol, then Bowers would be deemed to be at fault in bringing on the difficulty, even though Bowers might not have started the shootout. See Taylor , 356 S.C. at 232, 589 S.E.2d at 3 (explaining "if a defendant is found to have been involved in mutual combat, the ‘no fault’ element of self-defense cannot be established"); 356 S.C. at 234, 589 S.E.2d at 4 (explaining "mutual combat acts as a bar to self-defense because it requires mutual agreement to fight on equal terms for purposes other than...