State v. Boyajian
| Decision Date | 18 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-056 |
| Citation | 2022 VT 13 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | State of Vermont v. Brent A. Boyajian |
On Appeal from v. Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Criminal Division Robert A. Mello, J.
David Tartter, Deputy State's Attorney, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Matthew Valerio, Defender General, and Joshua S. O'Hara Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ., and Zonay, Supr. J., Specially Assigned
¶ 1. In this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether the superior court erred by denying the State's request to order a psychiatric evaluation of defendant Brent Boyajian before holding a competency hearing. The State contends that 13 V.S.A. § 4817(b) requires the court to order an evaluation before holding a competency hearing when the court has reason to believe that a defendant may be incompetent due to mental disease or defect, and an evaluation by a defense-retained expert does not satisfy this requirement. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2. We begin by recounting the relevant procedural history. In November 2019, the State charged defendant with burglary of an occupied dwelling, misdemeanor possession of stolen property, and simple assault of a protected professional. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence but asked the court to delay holding a hearing on the motion to allow defense counsel time to determine defendant's competency to stand trial, indicating that he planned to hire an expert.
¶ 3. At a status conference, defense counsel explained that defendant was raising the issue of competency because he had a significant traumatic brain injury and recently suffered an aneurysm. For this reason, counsel noted that defendant was being evaluated by a medical provider with a memory clinic that could perform neurological testing. Counsel explained that he was in the process of meeting with the experts to review their findings and asked the court for more time to decide whether to pursue the competency issue, which the court granted.
¶ 4. Defendant subsequently filed a formal notice raising the issue of competency. He also filed the report of the neuropsychological evaluation authored by defendant's experts: the clinician who conducted the evaluation and the licensed clinical psychologist who directed and supervised the evaluation. The experts' report concluded that "although [defendant] has many specific capacities necessary for adjudicative competence, his limitations in verbal memory and other aspects of cognitive processing are likely to create significant problems effectively communicating with counsel and assisting in his defense." The experts opined that defendant was therefore not competent to stand trial.
¶ 5. In response, the State filed a motion asking the court to order a psychiatric evaluation through the Vermont Department of Mental Health. See 13 V.S.A. § 4814(a) (). The State argued that because the statute contemplates evaluation by a psychiatrist, the court should not rely only on the defense's neuropsychological evaluation in determining competency. Defendant countered that § 4814 gives the court discretion to order a psychiatric evaluation and urged the court to order an additional examination only if it reviewed his experts' report and believed that competency was still at issue.
¶ 6. The superior court denied the State's request for an evaluation under § 4814. The court explained that if defendant's claim of incompetence was "based upon some alleged mental illness, the court would agree that the evaluation would have to be performed by a psychiatrist." However, because defendant was alleging incompetency due to neurocognitive impairment and neurodevelopmental abnormalities, the court reasoned that defendant's competency was "within the professional competence of a psychologist." The court concluded that it need not order a psychiatric evaluation and ordered that a competency hearing be scheduled.
¶ 7. The State moved for reconsideration, arguing that § 4814 does not require a defendant to claim incompetency from mental illness before a court orders a psychiatric evaluation. Additionally, the State argued that 13 V.S.A. § 4817(b), which provides for competency hearings, requires the court to order a psychiatric evaluation before holding a competency hearing when the court has reason to believe that the defendant may be incompetent due to a mental disease or defect. It posited that defendant's claim of incompetency was based on mental defect and therefore § 4817(b) required the court to order a psychiatric evaluation. The State further asserted that the court's decision not to order an evaluation did not sufficiently protect the State's interest in an adequate determination of competency.
¶ 8. The court denied the State's motion. The court maintained that it had discretion to order a psychiatric examination under § 4814(a). It further explained that § 4817(b) does not require a psychiatric evaluation in every instance where a competency determination must be made. Instead, it reasoned that § 4817(b) ensures that where a court orders a psychiatric evaluation in its discretion under § 4814, the competency hearing may not be held until the evaluation is complete and the psychiatrist's report has been filed. The court reiterated its conclusion that a psychiatric evaluation was not needed and that the matter would proceed to a competency hearing.
¶ 9. Subsequently, the State filed a motion for interlocutory appeal regarding whether 13 V.S.A. § 4817(b) required the court to order a psychiatric evaluation in accordance with § 4814(a) before holding the competency hearing, and whether defendant's claimed condition constituted a mental defect. Defendant opposed the motion. After a hearing, the court granted the State's motion for interlocutory appeal and cancelled the scheduled competency hearing.
¶ 10. We begin by addressing defendant's argument that the State lacks standing to bring this appeal because it has failed to allege an injury to its interest in an accurate competency determination. Concluding that the State has standing to pursue this appeal, we turn to the State's argument that the trial court violated 13 V.S.A. § 4817(b) by proceeding with a competency hearing without first ordering a psychiatric evaluation under § 4814(a) because the court had reason to believe defendant may be incompetent due to mental disease or defect. We conclude that the court had a duty to order an evaluation under these circumstances and that the defense-retained expert evaluation did not substitute for the neutral evaluation required by statute here.
¶ 11. Defendant argues that the State lacks standing to bring this appeal because it has not suffered an injury. See Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off. v. St. Albans City Police Dep't, 2012 VT 62, ¶ 11, 192 Vt. 188, 58 A.3d 207 (); see also Paige v. State, 2018 VT 136, ¶ 10, 209 Vt. 379, 205 A.3d 526 (). Defendant argues that the State failed to allege an injury to its interest in an accurate competency determination because it had not demonstrated why the defense's experts' report would lead to an inaccurate outcome. To the extent that the State seeks on appeal to undermine the conclusions of the defense's experts, defendant argues that those claims are not ripe because the court has yet to rule on competency. He further argues that because § 4817(b) does not require the court to order an evaluation before holding a competency hearing, the State cannot rely on the lack of this evaluation to show injury.
¶ 12. "An injury for standing purposes means the invasion of a legally protected interest, not a generalized harm to the public." Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 2012 VT 62, ¶ 14. When competence to stand trial is at issue, the State's interest is not in convicting a defendant of a crime, but in ensuring that an incompetent defendant's due process rights are not violated by being tried. See State v. Beaudoin, 2008 VT 133, ¶ 8, 185 Vt. 164, 970 A.2d 39 ("Trying an incompetent defendant deprives [the defendant] of [the] due process right to a fair trial." (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966)); 13 V.S.A. § 4817(a) (). Vermont law protects this due process right by providing a framework to resolve disputes over competency in 13 V.S.A. §§ 4814-4817, which includes provisions through which a court may order a psychiatric examination and hold a competency hearing. In State v. Sharrow, this Court analyzed this process in the context of the State's argument that it was entitled to hire its own expert to evaluate a defendant after the defendant had undergone a court-ordered competency evaluation under § 4814. 2017 VT 25, ¶ 4, 205 Vt. 300, 175 A.3d 504. In determining that the statute did not entitle the State to its own evaluation, we explained that the State's interests are protected by its ability to either endorse or challenge the conclusions of the court-ordered, neutral evaluation. Id. ¶ 11. We used the descriptor "neutral" to differentiate between a court-ordered evaluation under § 4814, "as opposed to an expert retained by either the State (prosecution) or the defendant." Id. ¶ 1 n.1.
¶ 13. Here, the State contends that the court impeded the...
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