State v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 19 September 2017
• Docket Number: (AC 38542).
• Citation: 169 A.3d 842,176 Conn.App. 437
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Terrence Lamont BOYD

176 Conn.App. 437

169 A.3d 842

STATE of Connecticut

v.Terrence Lamont BOYD

(AC 38542).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 22, 2017

Officially released September 19, 2017

Richard H. Stannard III, with whom, on the brief, was Justin R. Clark, for the appellant (defendant).

Linda Currie–Zeffiro, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr., state's attorney, Norwalk, and Katherine Donoghue, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Keller, Mullins and Norcott, Js.

NORCOTT, J.

The defendant, Terrence Lamont Boyd, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a–182 (a) (1)¹ and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a–167a (a).² The jury found the defendant not guilty of two counts of threatening in the second degree, each in violation of General Statutes § 53a–62 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him of disorderly conduct and (2) the trial court erred when it provided incomplete or incorrect jury instructions. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 11 p.m. on June 27, 2014, Bridgette Powell arrived with Alisabeth Rojas at the Moose Lodge (bar) in South Norwalk. The defendant arrived at the bar separately. Rojas, an employee of the bar, was attending as a patron that night. Although Rojas did not previously know the defendant, Powell had known him for a long time. While at the bar, Powell and Rojas consumed alcoholic drinks.

At approximately 2 a.m. on June 28, 2014, when the patrons were leaving the bar, Melvyn Mayberry, a bouncer working that night, saw Rojas tell the defendant that it was time to leave the bar. The defendant responded that he was not going to leave. After Mayberry informed the defendant that he needed to leave, he agreed and, escorted by Mayberry, began to exit the bar. Mayberry saw the defendant and Rojas begin to argue immediately outside the bar, and inserted himself between the two. He heard the defendant say "the bitch ain't gonna cut me." At that point, all of the parties were at the top of the stairs on the landing outside the bar. Mayberry escorted Powell, Rojas, and the defendant down the stairs and into the alley, toward their respective cars, while still maintaining a physical barrier between the defendant and Rojas, with Rojas walking slightly ahead.

Meanwhile, Garrett Kruger, a uniformed Norwalk police officer, was in his patrol cruiser across the street when he saw Powell, Rojas, and the defendant exiting the bar and "screaming and yelling at each other." Based on his observations, the defendant "appeared to be the aggressor." Kruger drove his cruiser into the alley where Powell, Rojas, and the defendant were fighting and radioed for backup. He then exited his cruiser and loudly told Powell, Rojas, and the defendant to "leave the area and disperse" and to "stop yelling at each other." They followed Kruger's command to disperse and began to walk further down the alley toward their cars, but they did not cease yelling at one another. As a result, Kruger followed them on foot down the alleyway from a distance of approximately fifteen feet. Kruger saw the defendant "screaming at the two females," accompanied by aggressive arm movements, "as if he was almost talking with his hands in an angry tone of voice."

After Kruger, Mayberry, Powell, Rojas, and the defendant exited the alley into the small parking lot where the patrons' cars were located, the defendant came within three feet of Rojas as she turned her back to open the passenger side door of Powell's car. Kruger and Mayberry saw the defendant swing his fist at Rojas' head while her back was to him and as she was bending down to open the car door. Kruger was within four feet of the defendant and Rojas when he saw the "defendant [take] an aggressive stance toward [Rojas] and [ball] up his fists, [come] all the way back and [begin] to throw a punch." Rojas ducked when she peripherally saw the movement and felt "threatened." As a result, Rojas lost her balance, stumbled, and fell to one knee.³

Immediately after Rojas fell, Mayberry grabbed the defendant in a "bear hug," and Kruger simultaneously grabbed the defendant, using "[m]ild physical force" to place the defendant's forearms and hands against the alley wall. During this struggle, Kruger identified himself as a police officer and told the defendant multiple times to "calm down" and to "relax," but the defendant kept screaming at Kruger to "go fuck [himself]" and "what the fuck are you arresting me for?" Instead of complying with Kruger's commands, the defendant balled his fists and tensed up his back before attempting to spin to face Kruger. Kruger then used the defendant's body momentum to take him to the ground.

Ramon Tejada, another uniformed Norwalk police officer, ran down the alley to assist at this moment. While the defendant was on the ground, he was actively resisting arrest by refusing the officers' requests to give them both of his hands, which were then underneath his body. Kruger, who was on the defendant's left side, managed to pull out the defendant's left arm and to place a handcuff on his left wrist. Kruger and Tejada, who was on the defendant's right side, repeatedly commanded the defendant to pull out his right arm so that they could secure the other handcuff, but the defendant failed to comply with those commands and, at one point, said that "he was not going to let go." Together, Tejada and Kruger eventually were able to secure the defendant with handcuffs. While they were walking with the defendant toward the front of the alley to the cruisers, the defendant stated: "Why am I getting arrested? I didn't fucking do shit. She stabbed me. Why am I the one getting arrested?" The defendant refused to allow the officers to check for injury, but Kruger shone a flashlight along the defendant's body to check for any tears or rips to his clothing and for any stab wounds

. Neither officer saw any indication of a wound on the defendant's body. The defendant did not have blood on him, was not limping, and did not complain of being in pain at any point. Because the officers did not see any indication of a stab wound, they placed him in the back of Tejada's cruiser instead of calling the Norwalk paramedic team.

After securing the defendant in Tejada's cruiser, both officers walked back to Rojas and searched her person and purse for any sharp object that may have been used to stab the defendant. Nothing was located, and there was no indication of blood on her person or belongings.

On July 7, 2015, the defendant was charged in the operative information with disorderly conduct, interfering with an officer, and two counts of threatening in the second degree. After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of disorderly conduct and interfering with an officer, and not guilty of the two counts of threatening in the second degree. On August 27, 2015, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of fifteen months imprisonment. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him of disorderly conduct. He specifically contends that his testimony at trial established that his actions on the day of the incident did not meet the elements of the court's instruction to the jury on disorderly conduct because he "merely rais[ed] his hand up or [put] it out as [Rojas] came [toward] him and ... she ran into it and fell as a result of the push." The state responds that it presented ample evidence from which the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's actions satisfied the elements of disorderly conduct. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. Contrary to the testimony of the other witnesses, who observed the defendant aggressively swing at the back of Rojas' head, the defendant testified that he, in an effort to "protect" himself, "pushed her" away from him.

"The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ...

"We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. ...

"Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. ... It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. ... In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence. ... The [finder of fact] may...