State v. Boyd

Decision Date13 July 1981
Docket NumberNo. 15026,15026
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of West Virginia v. Clarence E. BOYD.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The right to a bifurcated trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Syllabus point 7, State v. Daggett, W.Va., 280 S.E.2d 545 (1981); Syllabus point 3, State v. Bragg, W.Va., 235 S.E.2d 466 (1977).

2. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing bifurcation where the defendant does not present a substantial defense both on the merits and on the issue of insanity.

3. When deciding whether a defendant's motion for bifurcation should be granted, the trial court must first examine both the defendant's insanity defense and his defense on the merits to determine whether they are bona fide defenses supported by the facts and the law. If either defense is found lacking, bifurcation should be refused. If, however, both defenses are substantial, the court must then determine the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant which may result if both defenses are presented at a unitary trial.

4. In determining whether an out-of-court identification of a defendant is so tainted as to require suppression of an in-court identification a court must look to the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the identification was reliable, even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive, with due regard given to such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Syl. pt. 1, State v. Rickman, W.Va., 278 S.E.2d 880 (1981); Syl. pt. 1, State v. Kennedy, W.Va., 249 S.E.2d 188 (1978), citing Syl. pt. 3, State v. Casdorph, W.Va., 230 S.E.2d 476 (1976).

5. Confessions elicited by law enforcement personnel from criminal suspects who because of mental condition cannot knowledgeably and intelligently waive their rights are inadmissible. Syllabus point 1, State v. Hamrick, W.Va., 236 S.E.2d 247 (1977).

6. An instruction which attempts to explain under what circumstances a criminal defendant who has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution subsequent to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity may be discharged from the mental institution must include an adequate and accurate explanation of the law relating to commitment and discharge of involuntary patients at state mental institutions.

Steven M. Askin, Askin & Burke, Martinsburg, for appellant.

Chauncey H. Browning, Atty. Gen., S. Clark Woodroe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellee.

McGRAW, Justice:

Clarence E. Boyd appeals from his conviction of robbery by force and violence in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. The appellant has made numerous assignments of error some of which are without merit and therefore, will not be addressed. 1 The appellant's major assignments of error are: 1) that he was improperly denied a bifurcated trial; 2) that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for a change of venue; 3) that testimony relating to the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime should have been excluded; 4) that the State failed to meet its burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt; 5) that it was error for the trial court to permit a confession to be admitted into evidence; and 6) that the trial court inadequately and improperly instructed the jury on the disposition of an accused who is found not guilty by reason of insanity. Because we agree with the latter two assignments of error, we reverse.

On November 26, 1976 a man entered a booth located at the entrance of a parking lot at the Charles Town racetrack in Jefferson County, and demanded that the attendant, Bonnie Randolph, give him the money she had collected that day from customers using the parking lot. Ms. Randolph refused and a struggle ensued. A racetrack patron, Mr. Syvilia Hyman, who was entering the parking lot in his car at the time, stopped at the booth to pay the parking fee. Hearing noises of a struggle from inside the booth, Mr. Hyman blew the horn of his car, got out of the vehicle, and approached the booth. The thief, hearing the horn, grabbed the metal money box which was sitting beside the door and exited the booth where he found himself confronted by Mr. Hyman. Apparently surprised by Mr. Hyman's presence, the thief stopped for a few seconds, and then ran away from the parking area. Ms. Randolph came out of the booth seconds later stating that a robbery had occurred. Mr. Hyman immediately returned to his car, drove to the racetrack clubhouse and informed racetrack security of the robbery.

Approximately ten minutes later, Ms. Randolph was taken to the racetrack security office where she gave a general description of her assailant to the chief of security. The chief of security then showed her some photographs of persons, who, Ms. Randolph was informed, had been barred from the racetrack. From these photographs Ms. Randolph identified a picture of the appellant, Clarence Boyd, as the man who robbed her.

Approximately half an hour to an hour later Ms. Randolph was shown the same set of photographs by two state police officers who had arrived to investigate the robbery. She again selected the photograph of the appellant as the man who robbed her. Mr. Hyman was also shown an array of photographs by the state police at this time, and he also selected the photograph of the appellant as the man he saw leaving the booth after the robbery. There is some dispute concerning the number of photographs shown to Ms. Randolph and Mr. Hyman. Ms. Randolph testified at trial that she was shown at least five photographs. Mr. Hyman testified that he was shown seven to nine photographs that evening. The investigating state police officer testified that he displayed only four photographs to both witnesses.

The appellant was indicted on a charge of robbery by force and violence in January of 1977. He surrendered to state police officers at the Jefferson County jail in February, 1978. One of the troopers present when the appellant surrendered testified that he read the appellant his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and then asked the appellant if he understood his rights. The appellant acknowledged that he did.

The trooper testified that he then handed the appellant a waiver of rights form and requested the appellant to read the first two lines of the form aloud and explain them in his own words. The trooper then directed the appellant to read the remainder of the form silently. When he had finished reading, the appellant signed the waiver of rights form.

The trooper then questioned the appellant concerning the 1976 robbery at the racetrack. As a result of the questioning, the appellant made an oral statement, which was transcribed by the officer, admitting that he was the perpetrator of the robbery. At trial, the state trooper could not remember whether he had read the transcribed statement aloud to the appellant while the appellant followed along, or whether the appellant had read the statement aloud himself. Whichever occurred, the appellant then signed the statement. The appellant spent the night in the Jefferson County jail and was brought before a magistrate the next day for arraignment.

Sometime after he was arraigned and incarcerated, the court ordered a reading level test, an intelligence test, and a psychological evaluation to be performed on the appellant by Mr. Nars Roberts, a psychologist employed by the Eastern Panhandle Mental Health Center. At the same time a psychiatric evaluation of the appellant was conducted by Dr. Hiram Sizemore, a psychiatrist affiliated with the mental health center. These reports were filed with the court, and on September 22, 1978, a motion for commitment was filed by counsel for appellant. Pursuant to this motion, the court ordered that the appellant be admitted to Weston State Hospital for a twenty-day observation period to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. This observation period was later extended at the request of doctors at Weston.

On November 30, 1978 a hearing was held at which the court found the appellant incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to be re-committed to Weston for a period not to exceed six months. After several continuances, a hearing was held on October 1, 1979 upon the issue of whether the appellant was competent to stand trial or criminally responsible for his actions. The court concluded that the appellant was competent to stand trial, and that whether the appellant was criminally responsible was a matter for the jury to decide.

On January 18, 1980 the appellant's motion for a change of venue was denied, and on January 22, 1980, trial began. At the beginning of trial, appellant made a motion for a bifurcated trial. This motion was also denied. At the conclusion of trial, the appellant was convicted of robbery as charged in the indictment, and was sentenced to fifteen years in the state penitentiary at Moundsville.

I

The appellant contends that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for a bifurcated trial. The appellant moved for a bifurcated trial in order to sever his insanity defense from his defense on the merits, reasoning that a unitary trial at which both defenses were presented would be unfair because the insanity defense would imply guilt on the merits. While the appellant concedes that the right to a bifurcated trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, State v. Daggett, W.Va., 280 S.E.2d 545 (1981); State v. Bragg, W.Va., 235 S.E.2d 466 (1977), he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in this case.

In State v. Bragg, W.Va., 235 S.E.2d 466 ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
42 cases
  • State v. Zaccagnini, 15726
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • September 29, 1983
    ...is whether the prejudice against the accused is so great that he cannot get a fair trial. State v. Gangwer, supra; State v. Boyd, 167 W.Va. 385, 280 S.E.2d 669 (1981); State v. Peacher, supra; State v. Pratt, 161 W.Va. 530, 244 S.E.2d 227 The defense counsel attempted to demonstrate that th......
  • State v. Davis, 16433
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • March 25, 1986
    ...v. Watson, 173 W.Va. at 563, 318 S.E.2d at 613; Syl. pt. 3, State v. Bennett, 172 W.Va. 123, 304 S.E.2d 28 (1983); State v. Boyd, 167 W.Va. 385, 280 S.E.2d 669, 680 (1981); Syl. pt. 5, State v. Slie, 158 W.Va. 672, 213 S.E.2d 109 (1975); Syl. pt. 1, State v. Stollings, 158 W.Va. 585, 212 S.......
  • State v. Williams, 15746
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • June 27, 1983
    ...and of itself, sufficient to require a change of venue, nor is mere proof that prejudice exists against the accused. State v. Boyd, 167 W.Va. 385, 280 S.E.2d 669 (1981); State v. Pratt, 161 W.Va. 530, 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978). See also, State v. Hamric, 151 W.Va. 1, 151 S.E.2d 252 (1966). Rath......
  • State v. Cook, 16183
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • July 15, 1985
    ...Adkins, 170 W.Va. 46, 289 S.E.2d 720 (1982); Syl. pt. 1, State v. Kelley, 168 W.Va. 698, 285 S.E.2d 457 (1981); Syl. pt. 5, State v. Boyd, 167 W.Va. 385, 280 S.E.2d 669 (1981); Syl. pt. 5, State v. Daggett, 167 W.Va. 411, 280 S.E.2d 545 (1981). Furthermore, with respect to the burden of pro......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT