State v. Boyd

• Citation: 127 P.3d 998
• Decision Date: 10 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 91,980.,91,980.
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Chasity L. BOYD, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

127 P.3d 998

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Chasity L. BOYD, Appellant.

No. 91,980.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

February 10, 2006.

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Syllabus by the Court

1. The decision whether to grant a defendant's motion for severance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Judicial discretion will vary depending upon the character of the question presented for determination. Generally, the trial court's decision is protected if reasonable persons could differ upon the propriety of the decision as long as the discretionary decision is made within and takes into account the applicable legal standards. An abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court's decision goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations or legal standards.

2. When a decision is made regarding joinder or severance, even if it is determined that there was an abuse of discretion, the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice requiring reversal.

3. Although no statute authorizes consolidation when two or more defendants are charged in separate complaints, case law recognizes the inherent authority of the trial judge to order consolidation. The test for joinder of two or more cases for trial is the same as that for charging two or more defendants in the same complaint, information, or indictment.

4. Several defendants may be joined together in one trial, even if they were not in fact charged together in one complaint, in the following circumstances: (1) when each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense included; (2) when each of the defendants is charged with conspiracy and some of the defendants are also charged with one or more offense alleged to be in furtherance of the conspiracy; or (3) when in the absence of a conspiracy it is alleged the several offenses charged were part of a common scheme or were so closely connected in time, place, and occasion that proof of one charge would require proof of the others.

5. Even though the requirements of joinder are technically satisfied, the court should not join two defendants in one trial if either defendant will be prejudiced by joinder. Separate trials should be conducted upon a showing of actual prejudice stemming from a joint trial and, in such a circumstance, the trial court should not join the complaints or, if the complaints have been joined, should sever the cases for trial.

6. The usual factors to be considered in determining whether a joint trial is sufficiently prejudicial to mandate severance (or nonjoinder) are: (1) the defendants have antagonistic defenses; (2) important evidence in favor of one of the defendants which would be admissible on a separate trial would not be allowed on a joint trial; (3) evidence incompetent as to one defendant and introducible against another would work prejudicially to the former with the jury; (4) the confession by one defendant, if introduced and proved, would be calculated to prejudice the jury against the others; and (5) one of the defendants who could give evidence for all or some of the other defendants would become a competent and compellable witness on the separate trials of such other defendants.

7. Antagonistic defenses occur when each defendant is attempting to convict the other or where the defenses conflict to the point of being mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. Disputes over which defendant is the most culpable, inconsistent trial strategies, and presentation of evidence by one defendant which is inconsistent with the evidence presented by another defendant do not make the defenses antagonistic.

8. A defendant is not denied the constitutional right to confrontation where a child-victim witness testifies via closed-circuit television pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3434, provided the trial court (1) hears evidence and determines use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify; (2) finds that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant; and (3) finds that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.

9. The sufficiency of proof of unavailability of a witness is a question for the trial court within its discretion, and its ruling will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown.

10. If rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights are violated, a constitutional harmless error analysis applies. To find the error harmless, this court must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.

11. Application of the constitutional harmless error doctrine in the context of a Confrontation Clause violation requires an inquiry as to whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Factors to be considered include the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.

12. A trial court is required to instruct on lesser included offenses of felony murder only when the evidence of the underlying felony is weak, inconclusive, or conflicting. The rule does not pertain to evidence about who committed the underlying felony; the rule pertains to evidence that the underlying felony was committed.

13. When the primary offense is other than felony murder, if the defendant requests a lesser included offense instruction, the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding all lesser included crimes that are established by the evidence, regardless of whether the evidence is weak or inconclusive. An instruction on a lesser included offense is not required if the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant of the lesser included offense based on the evidence presented.

14. Endangering a child, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3608, is not a lesser degree of the crime of child abuse, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3609, pursuant to K.S.A.2004 Supp. 21-3107(2).

15. When examining admission or exclusion of evidence, the first question is relevance. Once relevance is established, evidentiary rules governing admission or exclusion of evidence may be applied either as a matter of law or in the exercise of the trial court's discretion, depending upon the contours of the rule in question.

16. The purpose of K.S.A. 60-455 is to forbid introduction of crimes or civil wrongs committed by a defendant in a criminal action or a party in a civil action for the purpose of showing disposition to commit a crime or civil wrong. In a criminal action, K.S.A. 60-455 applies only to the acts of the defendant.

Rick Kittel, assistant appellate defender, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Paul J. Morrison, district attorney, argued the cause, and Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion was delivered by LUCKERT, J.:

Chasity L. Boyd (Boyd) was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder and two counts of abuse of a child. Boyd appeals her convictions, arguing: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in not granting her motion to sever her trial from that of her codefendants; (2) the trial court erred in failing to give instructions on lesser included offenses; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of child abuse other than the acts charged in this case.

FACTS

On December 30, 2002, 9-year-old Brian Edgar's lifeless body was brought to the emergency room at KU Medical Center by his father, Neil Edgar. Rigor mortis had already set in, indicating Brian had been dead for several hours. Medical staff noticed that Brian had what appeared to be white tape residue on his face and the back of his head, bruises on his face, and suspicious injuries and scarring on his wrists and ankles.

When initially told of his son's death, Neil told doctors and, later, police that he was responsible for Brian's death. His first statement was that it was an accident resulting from his giving Brian a melatonin pill to help him sleep which must have caused him to stop breathing.

Police initiated an investigation. Neil consented to a search of a residence which he identified as the family's home. At that location, police discovered a sock with a piece of duct tape attached. When confronted with this evidence, Neil told police he had restrained Brian with belts around his arms and ankles, put a sock in Brian's mouth to keep him from "hollering" and put a small piece of duct tape over his mouth. Police were doubtful of Neil's story because they knew Brian's entire head had been taped, not just his mouth. Neil also stated that his wife knew about his restraining Brian but never participated in it.

The investigating officers determined that Brian was one of four children living in the Edgar home. Neil, who was a church pastor, and his wife, Christy Edgar, who was an evangelist and prophet for the church, had adopted three siblings in 1997: Christon, Martez, and Christina. The Edgars adopted Brian a few years later; he was biologically unrelated to the three other children. At the time of trial, Christon was 16 years old, Martez was 12 years old, and Christina was 9 years old. Police also learned that Boyd, who was...