State v. Braden

• Decision Date: 16 October 2019
• Docket Number: Nos. 2017-1579,2017-1609,s. 2017-1579
• Citation: 145 N.E.3d 235,158 Ohio St.3d 462,2019 Ohio 4204
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BRADEN, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

158 Ohio St.3d 462

145 N.E.3d 235

2019 Ohio 4204

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.BRADEN, Appellant.

Nos. 2017-1579

2017-1609

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 5, 2019

Decided October 16, 2019

Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Kathryn L. Sandford, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

French, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, David L. Braden, has asked this court to reconsider our decision in State v. Braden , 158 Ohio St.3d 452, 2018-Ohio-5079, 145 N.E.3d 226 (" Braden I "). Appellee, the state of Ohio, opposes that request.

{¶ 2} Effective March 22, 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2947.23(C), which provides that a trial court "retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution * * * at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter." 2012 Sub.H.B. No. 247. Here, we consider whether the statute applies to offenders, like Braden, who were sentenced before R.C. 2947.23(C) became effective. In Braden I , we held that the General Assembly did not expressly make R.C. 2947.23(C) retroactive and that with respect to costs imposed before the enactment of R.C. 2947.23(C), an offender must have sought waiver of the costs at sentencing, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider its own final order, and res judicata bars any collateral attack on that order. Id. at ¶ 3, 20-21, 23-24.

{¶ 3} Braden contends that we obviously misconstrued R.C. 2947.23(C)'s plain language. He also contends that Braden I is inconsistent with our decision in State v. Thompson , 147 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-2769, 59 N.E.3d 1264, in which we considered a similar statute. This court agrees and grants Braden's motion for reconsideration. We now hold that neither R.C. 2947.23(C) nor this court's precedent precludes trial courts from waiving, suspending or modifying court costs imposed before the effective date of R.C. 2947.23(C). Accordingly, we vacate our decision in Braden I , answer the certified-conflict question in the affirmative, reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the substance of Braden's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to waive his court costs.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 4} In 1999, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Braden to death following his convictions for two counts of aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications.

State v. Braden , 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 2-3, 33. Pertinent here, the trial court also ordered Braden to pay court costs. Id. at ¶ 33.

{¶ 5} In 2003, we affirmed Braden's convictions and death sentences. Id. at ¶ 163. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Braden v. Ohio , 540 U.S. 865, 124 S.Ct. 182, 157 L.Ed.2d 119 (2003). The trial court denied postconviction relief, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed. 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-954, 2003-Ohio-2949, 2003 WL 21321457. We denied Braden's request for review. 100 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2003-Ohio-5396, 797 N.E.2d 511.

{¶ 6} In November 2016, Braden asserted his indigence and filed a motion asking the trial court to waive his court costs. Alternatively, he asked the trial court to order the prison to keep at least $400 in his prison account or allow him to enter a payment plan of $3 a month. The state opposed the motion, and the trial court summarily denied it.

{¶ 7} The Tenth District affirmed, holding that when a judgment of conviction became final before the effective date of R.C. 2947.23(C), the trial court could not "retain jurisdiction" to waive costs, because it did not have the authority to do so at sentencing. 2017-Ohio-7903, 2017 WL 4317413, ¶ 7-8. Because Braden's convictions and sentence, including the order to pay costs, became final well before the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2947.23(C), res judicata barred Braden's waiver request. Id. at ¶ 8.

{¶ 8} This court accepted Braden's discretionary appeal on the following proposition of law: "A trial court has jurisdiction, pursuant to the current version of R.C. 2947.23(C), to waive, modify or suspend court costs for those cases in which the defendant's conviction and sentence became final prior to the enactment of R.C. 2947.23(C)." See 151 Ohio St.3d 1526, 2018-Ohio-557, 91 N.E.3d 758. We also recognized that the Tenth District's judgment conflicts with judgments of the Second and Eighth District Courts of Appeals, and we agreed to answer the following certified-conflict question: " ‘Does a trial court have jurisdiction, pursuant to the current version of R.C. 2947.23(C), to waive, modify or suspend court costs for those cases in which the defendant's conviction and sentence became final prior to the enactment of * * * R.C. 2947.23(C) ?’ " 151 Ohio St.3d 1523, 2018-Ohio-557, 91 N.E.3d 756, quoting the court of appeals' November 2, 2017 entry.

BRADEN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS GRANTED

{¶ 9} A party to a case may ask this court to reconsider a decision on the merits. S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02(B)(4). We will grant a motion for reconsideration to correct a decision that, upon reflection, we deem to have been made in error.

State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council , 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 662 N.E.2d 339 (1995). But we will not grant reconsideration when a movant merely reargues the case. Dublin City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision , 139 Ohio St.3d 212, 2014-Ohio-1940, 11 N.E.3d 222, ¶ 9 ; S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02(B). This court holds that Braden has not merely reargued his case and that Braden I was decided in error.

{¶ 10} Braden argues, in part, that our decision in Braden I is inconsistent with our recent decision in Thompson , 147 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-2769, 59 N.E.3d 1264. In Thompson , we considered former R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) (now codified elsewhere in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) ), which gives a trial court the authority to correct errors in its award of jail-time credit and contains language very similar to R.C. 2947.23(C). Former R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) stated:

The sentencing court retains continuing jurisdiction to correct any error not previously raised at sentencing in making a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section. The offender may, at any time after sentencing , file a motion in the sentencing court to correct any error made in making a determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section, and the court may in its discretion grant or deny that motion.

(Emphasis added.) 2012 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 337; see Thompson at ¶ 5.

{¶ 11} The proposition of law we considered in Thompson asserted that a trial court's order denying a postconviction motion for jail-time credit is a final, appealable order. Thompson at ¶ 3. The court of appeals had held that the trial court's order was not appealable. Our primary holding was that such an order is appealable because it is a final order that affects a substantial right in a special proceeding. Id. at ¶ 13. But inherent in our decision was the conclusion that Thompson's convictions became final in 2011—before the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) in 2012, see id. at ¶ 1, 12.

{¶ 12} In Thompson , the state argued that because Thompson was sentenced in 2011, he could not benefit from a new statute that the General Assembly did not intend to apply retroactively. We effectively rejected that argument when we held that Thompson could avail himself of the new law:

Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), an offender can file a motion to correct an error in determining jail-time credit "at any time after sentencing" and the sentencing court has authority to correct any error in determining jail-time credit that was "not previously raised at sentencing." Given that this statute was enacted in 2012 and that it created a right that was not otherwise available to an offender who lacked the right to appeal, we conclude that the trial court's determination of a motion filed under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) constitutes a special proceeding.

Id. at ¶ 12.

{¶ 13} Although there are subtle differences between the statutory language considered here and that in Thompson , the relevant language concerning the trial court's jurisdiction is substantially the same. The statute at issue in Thompson , former R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), specifically provided that at any time after sentencing, the offender may file a motion to correct his jail-time credit and the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to consider it. The statute at issue here, R.C. 2947.23(C), provides that a sentencing court retains jurisdiction to waive court costs at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter.

{¶ 14} There are no material differences between R.C. 2947.23(C) and former R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) regarding the trial court's continuing jurisdiction to act. In Thompson , we allowed the proceedings to go forward. We do the same here—not just to maintain consistency with our consideration of the issue in Thompson . We do so also because as explained below, holding that the trial court in Thompson or the trial court here did not have the authority to consider the defendants' motions would defy the plain language of the statutes permitting the motions.

{¶ 15} Braden argues in his motion for reconsideration that our decision in Braden I is inconsistent with our recent decision in Thompson , and we agree. Although the dissenting opinion in Braden I presented that analysis, 158 Ohio St.3d 452, 2018-Ohio-5079, 145 N.E.3d 226, at ¶ 39-43, there is no indication in the majority opinion that the majority fully considered and rejected it.

{¶ 16} Braden also argues that Braden I was wrongly decided because we misconstrued the plain language of R.C. 2947.23(C) and retroactive application of it is unnecessary. For the reasons explained below, we agree. R.C. 2947.23(C) plainly allows trial courts to waive,...