State v. Braden

Decision Date19 December 2018
Docket NumberNos. 2017-1579,2017-1609,s. 2017-1579
Citation2018 Ohio 5079,158 Ohio St.3d 452,145 N.E.3d 226
Parties The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BRADEN, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Kathryn L. Sandford, Assistant Public Defender; and Steven M. Brown, Columbus, for appellant.

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Frank Romeo Zeleznikar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

Organ Cole, L.L.P., Erik J. Clark, and Carrie M. Lymanstall, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Community Corrections Association.

Yeura Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and Timothy E. Pierce, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Franklin County Public Defender.

Elizabeth Bonham, Caitlin Hill, Freda J. Levenson, and R. Orion Danjuma, urging reversal for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.

Kennedy, J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal and certified-conflict case, we consider the meaning of R.C. 2947.23(C), which provides that "[t]he court retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution, including any costs under section 2947.231 of the Revised Code, at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter." The Second and Eighth District Courts of Appeals have concluded that this statute authorizes trial courts to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of court costs imposed both before and after its effective date. State v. Powell , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24433, 2014-Ohio-3842, 2014 WL 4384146, ¶ 20 ; State v. Chase , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26238, 2015-Ohio-545, 2015 WL 627635 ; State v. Price , 2015-Ohio-4592, 46 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 9-10 (8th Dist.) ; State v. Bacote , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102991, 2015-Ohio-5268, 2015 WL 9238668. In contrast, the Tenth District Court of Appeals in this case held that R.C. 2947.23(C) permits trial courts to waive, modify, or suspend payment of only those court costs that were imposed after the statute's effective date. 2017-Ohio-7903, 2017 WL 4317413, ¶ 8.

{¶ 2} We agreed to resolve this split of authority and to answer the following certified question: " ‘Does a trial court have jurisdiction, pursuant to the current version of R.C. 2947.23(C), to waive, modify or suspend court costs for those cases in which the defendant's conviction and sentence became final prior to the enactment of * * * R.C. 2947.23(C) ?’ " 151 Ohio St.3d 1523, 2018-Ohio-557, 91 N.E.3d 756, quoting the court of appeals' November 2, 2017 entry.

{¶ 3} Before the enactment of R.C. 2947.23(C), a trial court lacked continuing jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution; the trial court could not retain jurisdiction that it had not yet been granted by this statute. We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and hold that R.C. 2947.23(C) does not authorize a trial court to waive, modify, or suspend the payment of court costs that were imposed prior to March 22, 2013, the effective date of R.C. 2947.23(C).

{¶ 4} Because the trial court in this case imposed court costs prior to the effective date of R.C. 2947.23(C), the Tenth District Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the statute does not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 5} In August 1998, appellant, David L. Braden, murdered his girlfriend and her father; a jury found him guilty of two counts of aggravated murder with death-penalty and firearm specifications, and it recommended a death sentence on each count. State v. Braden , 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 2-3, 33. At the sentencing hearing in May 1999, the trial court sentenced him to death on each count and three years in prison for each of the firearm specifications and imposed $50,000 in fines and court costs. Id. at ¶ 33. The sentencing entry did not mention costs, but the disposition sheet, which was signed by the judge and filed with the clerk, did.

{¶ 6} We affirmed Braden's convictions and sentence of death in 2003, id. at ¶ 163, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Braden v. Ohio , 540 U.S. 865, 124 S.Ct. 182, 157 L.Ed.2d 119 (2003). The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-954, 2003-Ohio-2949, 2003 WL 21321457, and the denial of a motion for a new trial, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-321, 2018-Ohio-1807, 2018 WL 2113598 ; we declined review in both instances, 100 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2003-Ohio-5396, 797 N.E.2d 511 ; 153 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2018-Ohio-3258, 104 N.E.3d 792. Braden's litigation seeking a writ of habeas corpus remains pending in federal court. Braden v. Jenkins , S.D.Ohio No. 2:04-cv-842, 2018 WL 1474418 (Mar. 22, 2018) ; see also In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation , S.D.Ohio No. 2:11-cv-1016.

{¶ 7} In November 2016, Braden, asserting his indigence, moved for an order waiving all fines and court costs imposed in his case or, alternatively, either ordering the prison to maintain at least $400 in his prison account or establishing a payment plan. The trial court denied the motion.

{¶ 8} The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred his postjudgment motion challenging the imposition of fines and court costs. 2017-Ohio-7903 at ¶ 7-8. The appellate court explained that R.C. 2947.23(C) does not apply to judgments that were final prior to its effective date. Id. at ¶ 8. And here, it noted, Braden's convictions and sentence had become final long before the statute's effective date. Id. The court of appeals recognized that the sentencing entry failed to mention costs but determined that that failure did not affect the validity of the costs because the trial court had orally informed Braden at sentencing of his obligation to pay the costs and had included them in the disposition sheet. Id. at ¶ 9. Finally, the appellate court concluded that Braden's challenge to the collection procedure used by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction or the warden had to be brought in a separate civil action. Id. at ¶ 10.

{¶ 9} This court accepted Braden's discretionary appeal to consider the following proposition of law: "A trial court has jurisdiction, pursuant to the current version of R.C. 2947.23(C), to waive, modify or suspend court costs for those cases in which the defendant's conviction and sentence became final prior to the enactment of R.C. 2947.23(C)." See 151 Ohio St.3d 1526, 2018-Ohio-557, 91 N.E.3d 758. We also recognized that the Tenth District Court of Appeals' judgment conflicts with decisions from the Second and Eighth District Courts of Appeals, and we agreed to answer the conflict question: " ‘Does a trial court have jurisdiction, pursuant to the current version of R.C. 2947.23(C), to waive, modify or suspend court costs for those cases in which the defendant's conviction and sentence became final prior to the enactment of * * * R.C. 2947.23(C) ?’ " 151 Ohio St.3d 1523, 2018-Ohio-557, 91 N.E.3d 756, quoting the court of appeals' November 2, 2017 entry.

Positions of the Parties

{¶ 10} Braden acknowledges that according to our caselaw, "absent statutory authority, the trial court could not suspend or waive payment of costs when the issue was not raised at the time of sentencing." But he argues that R.C. 2947.23(C) now provides that statutory authority and claims that the plain language of the statute permits a trial court to waive or suspend the collection of court costs regardless of when they were imposed. Braden also relies on the statute's legislative history, arguing that the General Assembly abrogated our caselaw precluding trial courts from waiving or suspending court costs, and he asserts that effectuating the statute's remedial purpose requires trial courts to apply it to cases that were final prior to its effective date.

{¶ 11} Appellee, the state of Ohio, contends that the plain language of R.C. 2947.23(C) prevents trial courts from applying it to cases in which the judgment became final before the statute's effective date. It notes that prior to the enactment of the statute, the entry of a final judgment extinguished a trial court's jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify an offender's obligation to pay court costs, and it acknowledges that pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(C), a trial court now "retains," or keeps, jurisdiction to revisit an offender's obligation to pay court costs. According to the state, "Given the plain meaning of the word ‘retains,’ the statute cannot restore the trial court's jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the defendant's obligation to pay court costs because a trial court cannot retain jurisdiction that it does not currently possess." (Emphasis sic.) It notes that legislative history is irrelevant to applying an unambiguous statute and that R.C. 2947.23(C) was not expressly made retroactive and therefore is presumed to apply prospectively only.

{¶ 12} Accordingly, the sole question presented for review is whether R.C. 2947.23(C) grants a trial court jurisdiction to waive, modify, or suspend the payment of court costs that were imposed prior to March 22, 2013, the effective date of the statute.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 13} Beginning with "An Act for the Punishment of Crimes" enacted in 1824, the General Assembly has required trial courts in criminal cases to include the costs of prosecution in the sentence and render a judgment for them against the defendant. R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) ; G.C. 13451-18, Am.S.B. No. 8, 113 Ohio Laws 123, 201; 22 Ohio Laws 158, 165, Section 35. The "costs of prosecution," or "costs," are " ‘the statutory fees to which officers, witnesses, jurors, and others are entitled for their services in an action or prosecu...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • State v. Braden
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • October 16, 2019
    ...French, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, David L. Braden, has asked this court to reconsider our decision in State v. Braden , 158 Ohio St.3d 452, 2018-Ohio-5079, 145 N.E.3d 226 (" Braden I "). Appellee, the state of Ohio, opposes that request.{¶ 2} Effective March 22, 2013, the General Assembly enacted......
  • State v. Bryant
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • February 4, 2020
    ...a statute allowing it to "retain" jurisdiction could not reach back to retroactively reacquire jurisdiction. State v. Braden , 158 Ohio St.3d 452, 2018-Ohio-5079, 145 N.E.3d 226, ¶ 21-22 (slip opinion); State v. Banks , 10th Dist. No. 17AP-210, 2017-Ohio-7135, 2017 WL 3394226, ¶ 10, fn. 2. ......
  • State v. Sibrian, Appellate Case No. 27964
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • December 18, 2020
    ...a trial court is required to impose court costs against all convicted defendants, even those who are indigent. See State v. Braden, 2018-Ohio-5079, [145] N.E.3d [226], ¶ 14, [vacated on other grounds, 158 Ohio St.3d 462, 2019-Ohio-4204, 145 N.E.3d 235]; State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580, 2......
  • State ex rel. Martin v. Russo
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • March 10, 2020
    ...judges did not retain jurisdiction to modify the 2010 cost orders, relying on this court's decision in State v. Braden , 158 Ohio St.3d 452, 2018-Ohio-5079, 145 N.E.3d 226, ¶ 24 (for sentences entered prior to March 23, 2013, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider its own final or......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT