State v. Bradley

• Decision Date: 30 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. 39001,39001
• Citation: 209 N.E.2d 215,3 Ohio St.2d 38,32 O.O.2d 21
• Parties: , 32 O.O.2d 21 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BRADLEY, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 38

3 Ohio St.2d 38

209 N.E.2d 215, 32 O.O.2d 21

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BRADLEY, Appellant.

No. 39001.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 30, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

Whether an emotional demonstration in the courtroom during the course of a murder trial by a specator related to the victim improperly influences the jury against the accused; and whether a gift by the jury to the prosecuting attorneys, inspired by their repeated remarks to none of which the accused made objection, conceived in part during the trial but not connected with any part of the deliberations of the jury and presented after sentence of the accused and discharge of the jury, constitute misconduct so as to deprive the accused of a fair trial are questions of fact to be resolved by the trial court, whose determination thereon will not be disturbed on review in the absence of evidence contrary to that determination clearly and affirmatively appearing on the face of the record.

During a card game, defendant Bradley engaged in a dispute with one, Chambers, over a bet. Bradley slammed down his cards and left the game. Some 45 minutes later he returned with a shotgun, pulled back the hammer, pointed the weapon at Chambers and demanded, 'give me my money.' Chambers started toward Bradley who shot him in the abdomen when he was about a pace away. Chambers died shortly thereafter. Bradley was indicted for murder in the first degree.

At the trial, Bradley pleaded self defense and intoxication. The jury found him guilty of first degree murder without recommendation of mercy. As the assistant prosecuting attorney was concluding his final argument for the state, the victim's wife who had been seated in the courtroom, cried out and precipitated a disturbance of such violence that the judge temporarily recessed the trial. The parties are in dispute as to whether at the time of the outburst, the jury knew the identity of the woman. However, the record is clear that before the introduction of evidence she had been excluded from the court by the judge who was himself unaware of her identity when she became disorderly.

Defendant, who is the appellant here, contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial made immediately at the start of the commotion and before the recess and in failing to admonish the jury to disregard the incident until his general charge. Appellant contends further that he did not have a fair trial because of misconduct of the jury.

Shortly after the defendant was sentenced and the jury discharged, the jurors presented a sponge and card signed by all of them and inscribed 'compliments of the jury' to the assistant prosecuting attorneys who had tried the case for the state. This unusual incident which occurred in a hallway of the courthouse was conceived by one of the jurors before the close of the trial as a result of the prosecution's tediously repeated reference (over 20) throughout the entire proceedings to a sponge versus a rock thrown at a window as illustrative of the rule that one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts. None of these references were attacked by objection of the defendant and he can claim no error therefrom.

His motion for a new trial is grounded on the theory that the gift itself was evidence that the jurors had formed an opinion of his guilt prior to their deliberations and contrary to the instructions of the court.

The trial court overruled the motion for a new trial and the Court of Appeals, finding no error in the proceedings, affirmed the judgment of conviction.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., John T. Patton and Leo Spellacy, Cleveland, for appellee.

Starkoff, Yelsky & Eisen, Leonard Yelsky and Charles V. Carr, Cleveland, for appellant.

SCHNEIDER, Judge.

The principle governing our disposition of this appeal is that the trial judge had the occasion, which is given neither to us nor to the Court of Appeals, to gauge the totality of the impact upon the jury of the spectator's demonstration. Was the jury disturbed, alarmed, shocked, or deeply moved? Was the incident of such a nature as to have necessarily influenced the verdict of conviction? These questions necessarily depend on facts which no record can reflect.

Without more appearing in the record than is shown here, only the trial judge can authoritatively determine the answers. That he was justified in concluding that the defendant suffered no prejudice amply appears from his admonition to the jury:

'Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have already been instructed not to let sympathy, bias or prejudice enter into your consideration of the guilt or innocence of this defendant. About the time Mr. Spellacy concluded his final argument you witnessed an emotional outburst on the part of a spectator seated in the back of the courtroom. This outburst obviously came from someone who had great affection for the deceased. The court is positive that this outburst came unexpectedly and is certain that counsel on both sides of the table neither knew that this was going to happen or had anything to do with this event. You are instructed to totally disregard what you heard or saw this morning in the courtroom and decide this case only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the course of this trial.'

The foregoing was contained in the general charge which followed immediately the recess during which the trial judge discussed the incident with counsel, learned for the first time himself that the spectator was the widow of the deceased, and denied the motion for mistrial. He might well have concluded that the effect of the demonstration upon the jurors was as likely as not 'to have stirred up their indignation, and not to have gained support for [the widow's] views.' ¹ If so, this result could have been turned...