State v. Brady

• Citation: 2 So. 556,39 La.Ann. 687
• Decision Date: 01 May 1887
• Docket Number: 10,003
• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana
• Parties: THE STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LUKE BRADY ET AL

2 So. 556

39 La.Ann. 687

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LUKE BRADY ET AL

No. 10,003

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 1, 1887

APPEAL from the Twelfth District Court, Parish of Rapides. Blackman, J.

M. J Cunningham, Attorney General, and John C. Wickliffe, District Attorney, for the State, Appellee.

Robt P. Hunter, for Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION

POCHE J.

Luke Brady appeals from a conviction and a sentence to hard labor for one year, under an indictment which charged that Luke Brady and Peter Paul "did willfully, maliciously and feloniously assault one F. O. Nugent by willfully shooting at him," * * *

His complaint embraces four bills of exception, the substance of which, as suggested by his counsel, turns upon a proper construction of Section 792 of the Revised Statutes, under which the indictment rests and which reads as follows:

"Whoever shall assault another by willfully shooting at him, or with intent to commit murder, rape or robbery, shall on conviction thereof, be imprisoned at hard labor not exceeding two years."

In his bill, reserved to the refusal of his motion in arrest of judgment, the defendant urges in substance that the indictment charges no offense known to the laws of the State, that it fails to qualify the intent with which the offense is said to have been committed, and that, if the crime sought to be charged is shooting with intent to murder, the charge is defective because malice aforethought is not averred.

The fallacy of the argument is due to an erroneous construction of the plain language of the statute, and in requiring the qualification of the "willful shooting at" by the word intent, which has no reference thereto.

The leading idea or expression in the statute is in the words "whoever shall assault another," and not in the words "willfully shooting."

The statute denounces the offense of an assault by "willfully shooting at," which by itself is a complete and distinct offense without any other qualification than that of intent; it denounces the offenses of assault with intent to commit murder, rape or robbery -- which are in themselves and each separately, distinct and complete offenses; and the statute finally prescribes the same penalty for each of the offenses thus denounced. State vs. Williams, 38 Ann. 372; State vs. Simien, 36 Ann. 924.

Now, as the indictment propounds the charge of a felonious, malicious and willful assault "by willfully shooting at," * * * it is clear that it does contain a charge of an offense known to our laws, since the same is specially denounced in the statute under discussion. And as the language used in the indictment is already redundant by the qualifications of the assault, which were not necessary under the terms of the statute, it is hardly in order for the defendant to suggest an improvement in its confection by adding the description of an intent, which is absolutely unnecessary.

Under these views, it becomes unnecessary to indulge with defendant's counsel in the idle discussion of the words or charges which the pleader should have...