State v. Brady

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: DEEMER
• Citation: 100 Iowa 191,69 N.W. 290
• Decision Date: 10 December 1896
• Parties: STATE v. BRADY.

100 Iowa 191
69 N.W. 290

STATE
v.
BRADY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 10, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Wapello county; F. W. Eichelberger, Judge.

Defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of cheating by false pretenses, and appeals to this court. Affirmed.

[69 N.W. 290]

Steck & Smith, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., Sumner Siberell, Co. Atty., J. C. Mitchell, and W. A. Work, for the State.

DEEMER, J.

During the year 1893 the defendant was the duly–appointed and acting overseer of the poor in and for the city of Ottumwa. He was authorized by the board of supervisors to furnish transportation to indigent poor persons found within his jurisdiction, in order that they might be carried to the places of their respective legal settlements, in order that they might not become a charge upon the county of Wapello. For the amounts paid in procuring this transportation, he would file an account against the county, and the county auditor was authorized by the board to issue warrants from time to time for the amount of the claims so filed. During the year for which he was appointed, the defendant filed more than 580 claims for transportation alleged to have been furnished to paupers, aggregating more than $1,400. The indictment alleges that on or about the 11th day of July, 1893, the defendant filed with the auditor of the county a claim for $3 for transportation furnished a woman and three little children to Chillicothe, Mo.; that this woman gave her name as Eliza Young, and said she wanted to get to Leavenworth, Kan.; that the defendant, when he filed the claim, knew that he had not furnished any transportation to Chillicothe, Mo., to any woman claiming her name as Eliza Young, and three little children, and that he knew that no woman claiming her name was Eliza Young had applied to him for transportation to Leavenworth, Kan., or to Chillicothe, Mo., and that he well knew that every recital or statement in his said claim was false; and that he filed the claim designedly, willfully, and falsely, with intent to defraud, and by such false pretense did obtain from the auditor a warrant for the amount of the claim. There was evidence tending to support each allegation of the indictment, and upon such evidence the defendant was convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the term of two years.

1. The first error assigned relates to the overruling of a challenge interposed by defendant to a trial juror. This juror testified that he had read an account of the crime charged against the defendant in all the papers which made mention of it; that he had heard the matter talked about, and that he had formed some opinion with reference to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, which he still retained; that it would require some showing on the part of the defendant to remove this opinion. The juror further said: “I say I have heard and read of this case. I think I could put aside what I have heard and read, and go into the trial of this case, and render a true and impartial verdict upon the evidence and instructions of the court, and upon that alone, without regard to what I may have heard and read. I think I could do that, the same as if I had never

[69 N.W. 291]

heard of it, but I had rather not sit on the jury. By the Court: The opinion I formed, I suppose, is an unqualified opinion. I would try to hear the evidence in this case, and the instruction by the court, and render a true verdict, without reference to the opinion, and without reference to what I have read and heard, and I believe I could.” The statements elicited from this juror were very similar to those appearing in the case of State v. Munchrath, 78 Iowa, 268, 43 N. W. 211; and, following that case, we hold that there was no error in overruling the challenge.

2. The court permitted the state to introduce in evidence all the claims filed with the auditor by the defendant for transportation claimed to have been furnished by him to poor persons during the year 1893, and down to the 12th day of January, 1894. It also permitted the state to introduce the records of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad, the Wabash Railroad, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, and the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, showing, or purporting to show, the ticket sales in their respective offices at the city of Ottumwa during the year 1893. The admission of this evidence is complained of. It is said in argument that it is not competent for the state to give in evidence facts tending to prove other distinct offenses, for the purpose of raising an inference that the defendant has committed the crime in question; nor is it competent to show that he has a tendency to commit the offense with which he is charged. That such is the general rule must be conceded. But to this rule there are at least two well–defined exceptions, which are well stated by Justice Stephen in his work on Evidence (articles 10–12), as follows: “A fact which renders the existence or nonexistence of any fact in issue, probably by reason of its general resemblance thereto, and not by reason of its being connected therewith in any of the ways specified in articles 3–10, both inclusive, is deemed not to be relevant to such fact, except in the cases specially excepted in this chapter. (11) Acts Showing Intention, Good Faith, etc. When there is a question whether a person said or did something, the fact that he said or did something of the same sort on a different occasion may be proved, if it shows the existence on the occasion in question of any intention, knowledge, good or bad faith, malice, or other state of mind, or of any state of body or bodily feeling, the existence of which is in issue, or is deemed to be relevant to the issue; but such acts or words may not be proved merely in order to show that the person so acting or speaking was likely, on the occasion in question, to act in a similar manner. (12) Facts Showing System. When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is deemed to be relevant.” The first of these exceptions we have frequently recognized and applied to cases of this character. See State v. Jamison, 74 Iowa, 613, 38 N. W. 509;State v. Walters, 45 Iowa, 389;State v. Saunders, 68 Iowa, 370, 27 N. W. 455;State v. Stice (Iowa) 55 N. W. 17;State v. Lewis (Iowa) 65 N. W. 295;State v. Kline, 54 Iowa, 183, 6 N. W. 184. The evidence we have referred to was clearly admissible under the first of these exceptions stated above, for the purpose of showing the knowledge, intention, and bad faith of the defendant. It seems to us that the evidence was also admissible for the purpose of proving a systematic scheme or plan on the part of the defendant to cheat and defraud the county, thus negativing the idea that the presentation of the claim in question was accidental, or through oversight or mistake. 1 Greenl. Ev. (15th Ed.) § 53, note, and cases cited; Com. v. Robinson (Mass.) 16 N. E. 452. The jury may well have found, from the evidence complained of, that the filing of the claim and the receipt of the warrant charged in the indictment was a part of a plan or...