State v. Braman

• Decision Date: 27 December 1983
• Citation: 191 Conn. 670,469 A.2d 760
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Lloyd BRAMAN.

Page 760

469 A.2d 760

191 Conn. 670

STATE of Connecticut v. Lloyd BRAMAN.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 14, 1983.

Decision Released Dec. 27, 1983.

Jon C. Blue, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Lawrence J. Tytla, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom were Thomas P. Miano Asst. State's Atty., and, on brief, John M. Bailey, State's Atty., and Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY, SPONZO and COVELLO, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Justice.

The defendant, Lloyd Braman, was convicted by a jury of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(4), which crime occurred on March 4, 1979, at the Brass Hammer Cafe in Manchester. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning (1) a prior uncharged act of robbery and (2) the conduct and state of mind of the defendant's girl friend subsequent to the robbery of which he was found guilty. We find no error.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: The Brass Hammer Cafe in Manchester was a small establishment approximately forty feet long. On Sunday, March 4, the date of the Brass Hammer robbery, the state's witness, David Marsh, stopped at the Brass Hammer twice, with his second visit occurring at about 10:30 p.m. His girl friend, Susan MacComber, was with him at that time, but she refused to go inside and waited for him in his van. After being inside for ten to fifteen minutes, Marsh came outside to enter his van and he met the defendant in the parking lot. The defendant asked Marsh what was going on inside and he replied that it was "dead." At that time, the defendant, according to Marsh, was alone, unmasked and unarmed. The robbery occurred shortly thereafter at approximately 11 p.m. as the bar was closing, at which time there were six people inside. ¹

As Paul Mahoney, one of the bartenders, was emerging from the rear storage room with the money bag containing the day's receipts tucked under his arm and a six-pack of beer, a man wearing a ski mask that completely covered his face came in the front entrance of the bar. He carried a single-barrel pump-action shotgun on which the stock and part of the barrel had been cut off. He said: "This is a holdup," and he asked Daniel Faber, a customer, where the money was. After Faber indicated that it was at the other end of the bar, the masked man started in that direction. As he did so, a woman entered. She wore a hat and scarf across her face so that only her eyes were visible. She carried a small automatic handgun. She stood by the front door, covering the people in the vicinity, and said, "[n]o one move."

Mahoney heard Faber yell "Paul" and saw the masked man running toward him. He approached to within one foot of Mahoney and pointed the barrel of the shotgun at him so that it was "no more than an inch" from his nose. At that point, they were face to face "for fifteen or thirty seconds." Mahoney then dropped the money bag and the six-pack of beer, grabbed the barrel of the shotgun and pushed the man into a jukebox. They struggled and fell to the floor. Mahoney heard the woman yell, "[s]top or I'll start shooting." During the struggle, the man's mask fell off. Mahoney faced the unmasked robber for twenty or thirty seconds and he recognized him as a customer who had come into the Brass Hammer "just about every time [he] worked." ² Mahoney said that when the man came he always came in with a friend of his whose name was Dave. ³ He observed the robber to be a caucasian male with black hair and a goatee and mustache. The six persons in the bar were then ordered into the rear storage room where they remained approximately five minutes until a driver, who came to transport the two dancers arrived and released them. Mahoney called the Manchester police and reported the robbery. Later that night Mahoney selected the defendant's photograph from a book of mug shots at the police station. ⁴ No other person in the Brass Hammer during the robbery was able to make an identification of either of the robbers. Marsh, the defendant, and their girl friends, Susan MacComber and Kathleen Jourdenais, spent that night in MacComber's apartment. On the afternoon of the following day, the four of them left Connecticut in Marsh's van.

After the photographic identification by Mahoney, the Manchester police, failing to locate the defendant, issued a nationwide teletype for him on March 5, 1979. Four days later a response was received from authorities in Colorado who had stopped a step van owned by Marsh in which Marsh, the defendant, and their girl friends were traveling. Marsh gave them permission to search the van. On March 26, 1979, two Manchester detectives picked up the defendant in Colorado and brought him back to Connecticut. The Colorado authorities also turned over to the Connecticut officers a cut-down Remington Wingmaster pump-action shotgun, a twenty-five caliber automatic pistol, ammunition for both weapons and a case for the shotgun, all of which the Colorado authorities had taken from the Marsh van.

During the trial and after a hearing in the absence of the jury, the trial court, over the defendant's objection, admitted evidence concerning a prior uncharged robbery that occurred on February 15, 1979, at the Silver Spur bar in South Windsor. This evidence came in through David Marsh who had already pleaded guilty to first degree robbery and was awaiting sentencing for the Silver Spur incident. ⁵

From Marsh's testimony, the jury could reasonably have found the following facts: In 1978, Marsh "sold" ⁶ to the defendant an intact Remington Wingmaster single-barrel pump-action, twelve-gauge shotgun. The shotgun that the Connecticut police had obtained from the Colorado authorities was the same gun he had "sold" to the defendant "in its original condition" in 1978. ⁷ Although the shotgun was in a different case when he "sold" it to the defendant, Marsh saw Braman load a brown rifle case into Marsh's van as they prepared to leave Connecticut for Colorado.

On the afternoon of February 15, 1979, Marsh and the defendant went to the Silver Spur bar for a beer. The defendant noticed a deposit bag underneath the cash register. The two "briefly discussed" going for the deposit bag. The defendant passed Marsh an automatic pistol and left, returning shortly thereafter with a cut-down shotgun. Marsh went behind the bar and told the barmaid to open the register. The patrons were ordered into a back room behind the bar by the defendant. Thereafter, Marsh and the defendant left.

"As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him. State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399 [1960]." State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); McCormick on Evidence (2d Ed.1972) § 190; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) § 170. The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show an evil disposition of an accused, and especially the predisposition to commit the crime with which he is now charged. See State v. Williams, 190 Conn. 104, 108, 459 A.2d 510 (1982); State v. Howard, 187 Conn. 681, 684, 447 A.2d 1167 (1982); State v. Ibraimov, 187 Conn. 348, 352, 446 A.2d 382 (1982); State v. Barlow, 177 Conn. 391, 393, 418 A.2d 46 (1979); 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) §§ 215-18. Evidence of other misconduct, however, "may be allowed for the purpose of proving many different things, such as intent, identity, malice, motive or a system of criminal activity"; State v. Ibraimov, supra; or an element of the crime. State v. Falby, 187 Conn. 6, 23, 444 A.2d 213 (1982). ⁸

Our analysis on this issue is two-pronged. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. Second, the probative value of such evidence must outweigh the prejudicial effect of the other crime evidence. State v. Howard, supra, 187 Conn. 685, 447 A.2d 1167; State v. Ibraimov, supra, 187 Conn. 352, 446 A.2d 382; State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 28-29, 425 A.2d 560 (1979). The fact that such evidence tends to prove the commission of other crimes by an accused does not render it inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant and material. State v. Ibraimov, supra, 187 Conn. 352, 446 A.2d 382; State v. Hauck, 172 Conn. 140, 144, 374 A.2d 150 (1976); State v. Marshall, 166 Conn. 593, 600, 353 A.2d 756 (1974). When evidence of this type is offered, "the trial court must still consider whether its prejudicial tendency outweighs its probative value before ruling upon its admissibility." State v. Ibraimov, supra. "Because of the difficulties inherent in this balancing process, the trial court's decision will be reversed only where abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done. E.g., State v. Tucker, [181 Conn. 406, 416, 435 A.2d 986 (1980) ]; State v. Turcio, [178 Conn. 116, 129, 422 A.2d 749 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 642 (1980) ]; State v. Hauck, [172 Conn. 140, 144, 374 A.2d 150 (1976) ]. On review by this court, therefore, 'every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court's ruling.' State v. Ryan, [182 Conn. 335, 337, 438 A.2d 107 (1980) ]." State v. Howard, supra, 187 Conn. 685, 447 A.2d 1167. In this case the trial court, in its discretion, determined that the evidence offered was relevant and material and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. See State v. Williams, supra, 190 Conn. 108, 459 A.2d 510; State v. Howard, supra, 187 Conn. 685, 447 A.2d 1167; State v. Ibraimov, supra.

Turning to the proof of the relevancy prong, we have recently said that " '[t]he device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.' McCormick, Evidence § 157." State v. Ibraimov, supra, 354. In discussing his "signature theory," McCormick...