State v. Brandon, 2415
| Decision Date | 22 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2415,2415 |
| Parties | STATE OF MARYLAND v. DONTAZ BRANDON |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 117079001
UNREPORTED
Woodward, C. J., Friedman, Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Salmon, J.
*This is an unreported opinion and therefore may not be cited either as precedent or as persuasive authority in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland court. Md. Rule 1-104.
Appellant, the State of Maryland, challenges the Circuit Court for Baltimore City's dismissal of first-degree murder and related charges against appellee Dontaz Brandon. The State noted a timely appeal and presents two questions, which we rephrase slightly:
For the reasons to be discussed, we reverse.
This case arises out of a February 2017 verbal disagreement that escalated to a homicide. Baltimore City police detectives interviewed several eyewitnesses who reported that William Neely and Donald Sympton argued and then "squared off to fist fight," but, according to a later filed application for statement of charges, Neely said: "I don't fight, I shoot." The two men then went their separate ways. A short time later, however, Neely and Sympton encountered one another at the intersection of Harford Road and Southern Avenue where appellee, allegedly, handed Neely a handgun and, according to a witness, reminded Neely that he needed to cock the gun to fire it. Neely then used the firearm tofatally shoot Sympton. After witnesses positively identified appellee and Neely from photographic arrays, warrants were issued for their arrest.
Appellee turned himself in to police on February 21, 2017, and Neely was arrested on March 17, 2017.2 Appellee was subsequently charged by indictment with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. His privately retained defense attorney entered his appearance for appellee on March 31, 2017. This meant that unless good cause was demonstrated, the State was required to try appellee within 180 days of March 31, 2017, i.e., by September 27, 2017. See Section 6-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Annotated Code (2001, 2008 Rep. Vol.) and Maryland Rule 4-271. On April 27, 2017, Catherine Flynn, Esquire, a public defender panel attorney, entered her appearance for Brandon, even though Brandon already had a privately retained attorney. Separate trials for both defendants were scheduled for August 18, 2017. The State filed a motion to consolidate the trials of Neely and Brandon on May 1, 2017.
On August 1, 2017, both defendants and their counsel appeared before the Honorable Charles Peters, the designee of the Administrative Judge for Baltimore City Circuit Court. At that point, it was discovered that Ms. Flynn had entered her appearance by mistake. Neely's attorney requested a postponement because she had a scheduling conflict on the trial date and needed more time to review discovery. The prosecutor agreedto the request but asked the administrative judge to also postpone appellee's trial "to consolidate the cases," because the State planned to try both defendants on "[t]he same evidence." Neely's attorney and the prosecutor proposed December 7, 2017 for trial, explaining that they had conferred and that this was the first date that they were both available. Brandon's privately retained attorney objected, arguing that his client should not be required to remain incarcerated for an additional four months to accommodate Neely. The administrative judge noted the objection but found good cause to postpone. Both trials were then rescheduled for December 7, 2017. Thereafter, on November 29, 2017, Brandon's attorney filed an opposition to the State's joinder motion.
On December 7, 2017, both Neely and Brandon appeared in court with their counsel. Neely resolved his case by entering a guilty plea. This made the State's joinder motion moot.
The circuit court then heard appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial and violation of his right to be tried within 180 days. The attorneys discussed the pretrial posture of the case at length,3 and the court noted that although the administrative judge had found that consolidation of the cases was good cause to postpone, that "legally, they were not joined." After counsel concluded their arguments, the court described in detail the procedural issues that had plagued the case, explaining:
The court noted that the administrative judge did not reference "judicial economy" or otherwise explain its reasons for finding good cause to postpone the trial. The court, addressing in part the four-factor test for analyzing speedy trial claims established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), then stated that the nine-month delay in the case was "ridiculous" and noted that appellee had clearly asserted his right to a speedy trial. Although the court recognized that the reason for the delay was to allow the State to consolidate the cases, it did not state on the record how heavily it weighed the delay againstthe State. With respect to whether appellee was prejudiced by the delay, the court noted that he had experienced "severe" anxiety during his pretrial incarceration.4 Ruling that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and his right to be tried within 180 days in accordance with State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 (1979) had been violated, the court granted the motion and dismissed the charges.
The State contends that the trial court erred in finding a violation of appellee's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, because the delay from August 18, 2017 to December 7, 2017 "to accommodate judicial economy, as well as Neely's need to prepare adequately for trial" should not have weighed heavily against it. We agree with the State.
The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as well as by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The appellate court, when reviewing the judgment on a motion to dismiss, must make its own independent examination of the record to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied. Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220 (2002); accord Howard v. State, 440 Md. 427, 446-47 (2014); Henry v. State, 204 Md. App 509, 549 (2012). In conducting our independent review of the record, we accept the circuit court's first levelfindings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but "[w]e perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand." Glover, 368 Md. at 221.
Claims that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee has been violated are assessed under the balancing test the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 530. See State v. Kanneh, 403 Md. 678, 687 (2008). In Barker, the Supreme Court "rejected a bright-line rule to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial had been violated, and instead adopted 'a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.'" Kanneh, 403 Md. at 687-88 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). Hence, we consider four factors to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated: "'[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.'" Id. at 688 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). No single Barker factor, considered in isolation, is sufficient to establish that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. "'Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.'" Id. (quoting State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 413-14 (1990), in turn quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
"This Court has noted that the first factor, the length of the delay, is a 'double enquiry,' because a delay of sufficient length is first required to trigger a speedy trial analysis, and the length of the delay is then considered as one of...
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