State v. Branham

• Decision Date: 03 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. DA 10–0614.,DA 10–0614.
• Citation: 269 P.3d 891,363 Mont. 281,2012 MT 1
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Charles Ivan BRANHAM, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

2012 MT 1

269 P.3d 891

363 Mont. 281

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Charles Ivan BRANHAM, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 10–0614.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Nov. 9, 2011.Decided Jan. 3, 2012.

For Appellant: David Avery, Avery Law Office, Missoula, Montana.

For Appellee: Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Kristen LaCroix, Suzy Boylan, Deputy County Attorneys, Missoula, Montana.

Chief Justice MIKE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[363 Mont. 282] ¶ 1 Charles Ivan Branham appeals from the October 22, 2010 judgment and conviction of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, entered after a jury trial, adjudging him guilty of mitigated deliberate homicide, § 45–5–103, MCA, and sentencing him to forty years at the Montana State Prison without the possibility of parole.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 During the night of December 10–11, 2009, Branham fatally stabbed Michael Kinross–Wright during a fight. The fight arose from the fact that Brittany Wells, the mother of one of Branham's children, had a romantic and drug-using relationship with Kinross–Wright. After discovering text messages from Kinross–Wright to Wells, Branham went to Kinross–Wright's apartment. The two fought and during the fight Branham obtained a knife from the floor and stabbed Kinross–Wright.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 3 The applicable standards of review will be discussed with the individual issues.

DISCUSSION

¶ 4 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in refusing to admit evidence offered by Branham to show Kinross–Wright's propensity for violence.

¶ 5 At trial, Branham acknowledged that he stabbed Kinross–Wright, but argued that the stabbing was a justifiable use of force. The State and Branham disputed who was the initial aggressor as well as some of the details of the fight. Branham contended that Kinross–Wright attacked him when he got to the apartment, punching him multiple times until he fell to the ground. Branham testified that Kinross–Wright continued to beat him, and that he picked up a knife he saw on the floor, stabbing backward toward Kinross–Wright. Branham testified that he managed to then break free but that Kinross–Wright ran at him and Branham stabbed him again. Kinross–Wright suffered multiple stab wounds, including one to the stomach which was the fatal wound. Branham testified that he left the apartment and threw the knife in the river. Upon arrest, Branham had bruises, scratches and a cut lip.

¶ 6 The State's theory of the case was that the stab wound to Kinross–Wright's stomach was the fatal wound, and was inflicted early in the fight. The State contended that the stomach wound caused Kinross–Wright to fall across Branham's back, and that the stomach wound was inflicted before Branham's life was threatened. The State presented evidence of Branham's statements the night of the fight that if he had not found the knife, he and Kinross–Wright “probably would have duked it out” and he would have ended up running away.

¶ 7 Branham presented evidence, admitted by the District Court, to support his defense of justifiable use of force. Wells testified that when she called Kinross–Wright to tell him that Branham was coming to the apartment, Kinross–Wright said that Branham would get what he deserved. Branham testified that Kinross–Wright was aggressive, used threatening language, and attacked him with punches to the face. Branham testified that after Kinross–Wright knocked him to the ground punching and kicking him, he feared severe injury or death. Branham testified that he grabbed the knife because he was scared that he was going to die. Branham testified that he knew that Kinross–Wright was in a gang and had a violent past, and that this influenced his fearfulness and his use of force.

¶ 8 In addition to this evidence, Branham sought to introduce evidence that some months prior to the fight, Kinross–Wright had threatened Jamie Landsness and her mother with a knife. He also sought to introduce evidence of other specific instances of Kinross–Wright's aggressive personality and threatening behavior toward others. After extended discussion out of the presence of the jury, the District Court disallowed this evidence because Branham was not aware of these facts at the time of the fight with Kinross–Wright and because the probative value was “outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion and misleading to the jury.”

¶ 9 District courts have broad discretion to determine what evidence is relevant and admissible, and this Court reviews evidentiary issues for abuse of discretion. State v. Damon, 2005 MT 218, ¶ 12, 328 Mont. 276, 119 P.3d 1194.

¶ 10 At trial Branham relied upon the defense of justifiable use of force. Section 45–3–102, MCA, provides:

A person is justified in the use of force or threat to use force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary for self-defense or the defense of another against the other person's imminent use of unlawful force. However, the person is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm only if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm to the person or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

The primary issue in the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force is the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the use of force is necessary. Therefore, only facts known to the defendant at the time of the incident are relevant. State v. Montgomery, 2005 MT 120, ¶ 19, 327 Mont. 138, 112 P.3d 1014; State v. Henson, 2010 MT 136, ¶ 27, 356 Mont. 458, 235 P.3d 1274. While Branham acknowledges that evidence pertaining to whether his use of force was reasonable must be limited to facts that he knew about Kinross–Wright at the time of the fight, he contends that the other evidence of Kinross–Wright's character, unknown to him at the time, was admissible to show that Kinross–Wright was likely the aggressor. At trial Branham sought to introduce evidence of other incidents where Kinross–Wright allegedly acted in a violent manner.

¶ 11 Rule 405, M. R. Evid., allows admission of evidence of character when the character of a person “is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense” or where the “character of the victim relates to the reasonableness of force used by the accused in self defense.” Character may be proven through reputation evidence or through specific instances of conduct. M. R. Evid. 405; State v. Sattler, 1998 MT 57, ¶ 44, 288 Mont. 79, 956 P.2d 54. In this case Branham sought to introduce evidence of specific instances in which Kinross–Wright acted in an aggressive or violent manner. However, neither the identity of the aggressor nor proof of the victim's violent character is an element of the defense of justifiable use of force under § 45–3–102, MCA. And, evidence of specific instances of a victim's prior acts, unknown to the defendant, is not admissible under M. R. Evid. 405. Sattler, ¶ 45 (identity of the aggressor); DeSchon v. State, 2008 MT 380, ¶ 24, 347 Mont. 30, 197 P.3d 476 (evidence of victim's violent character).¹

¶ 12 While evidence of the victim's character was relevant to Branham's defense that he reasonably believed that he needed to use force to defend himself, that evidence is limited to facts known to Branham at the time. Branham introduced evidence of multiple instances of Kinross–Wright's violent and threatening tendencies which were at least arguably known to him at the time of the fight. This evidence was properly admitted under settled law on the issue of whether Branham's actions were reasonable, but evidence of facts unknown to Branham was not relevant to whether he acted reasonably and was therefore properly excluded. The District Court did not abuse its discretion.

¶ 13 There is language in some prior cases, such as State v. Harville, 2006 MT 292, ¶ 15, 334 Mont. 380, 147 P.3d 222, stating that a defendant must establish that he was not the aggressor as an element of the defense of justifiable use of force. Harville relied upon State v. Russell, 2001 MT 278, ¶ 24, 307 Mont. 322, 37 P.3d 678 as authority for the proposition that identity of the aggressor is an essential element of justifiable use of force. Russell, in turn, relied upon Sattler, ¶ 55, as authority for that same proposition. While there is such language in Sattler, ¶ 55, that opinion also cites the correct rule that “ [n]othing in the statutorily-defined defense [§ 45–3–102, MCA] relates directly to the question of the identity of the aggressor and Sattler cites to no authority under which the identity of the aggressor is an ‘essential element’ of the justifiable use of force defense.” This is a correct statement of the law and a proper application of the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force under § 45–3–102, MCA. Statements, such as those in Harville, ¶ 15 and Russell, ¶ 24, that the identity of the aggressor is an essential element of the defense, are not correct and are therefore overruled.

¶ 14 At the same time, nothing said in this opinion should be construed to categorically exclude evidence of the identity of the aggressor in a case involving the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force. Evidence of the identity of the aggressor may still be relevant and admissible if it tends to prove the reasonableness of a defendant's belief at the time of the incident that the use of force is necessary under § 45–3–102, MCA.

¶ 15 Issue Two: Whether the prosecutor's comments deprived Branham of a fair trial.

¶ 16 Branham first contends that during closing argument the prosecutor made a deliberate misrepresentation concerning testimony about a knife that had been in Kinross–Wright's apartment. At trial, one of Branham's contentions...