State v. Brantley

• Decision Date: 25 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 22635.,22635.
• Parties: STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee/Respondent-Appellee, v. Mark A. BRANTLEY, Defendant-Appellant/Movant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

56 P.3d 1252

99 Haw. 463

STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee/Respondent-Appellee, v. Mark A. BRANTLEY, Defendant-Appellant/Movant-Appellant.

No. 22635.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

October 25, 2002.

As Amended October , 2002.

Kyle B. Coffman, on the briefs, Wailuku, for defendant-appellant/movant-appellant.

Richard K. Minatoya, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellee/respondent-appellee.

Opinion by MOON, C.J.

Defendant-appellant/movant-appellant Mark A. Brantley appeals from the second circuit court's May 25, 1999 order, entered by the Honorable Shackley Raffetto, presiding, denying his Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 35 "Motion to Reverse Conviction and Correct Illegal Sentence" for his 1994 conviction of carrying or use of firearm in the commission of a separate felony, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 134-6(a) (1993).¹ Brantley's motion was brought pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i 1, 950 P.2d 1201 (1998), wherein we held that a defendant could not be convicted of both the HRS § 134-6(a) violation and the separate, underlying felony. See id. at 3, 950 P.2d at 1203. According to Jumila, the remedy for the inappropriate conviction of both of these offenses, which Brantley sought, is to reverse the conviction for the offense which was of the lesser grade—in this case, the firearms offense. See id. at 4, 950 P.2d at 1204.

In his appeal, Brantley argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion because the court incorrectly determined that Jumila does not apply retroactively to him. Plaintiff-appellee/respondent-appellee State of Hawai`i (State) answers that the circuit court correctly determined that Jumila does not apply retroactively to Brantley. Alternatively, the State contends that our holding in Jumila, barring conviction of both HRS § 134-6(a) and the separate felony, should be overruled. We affirm the circuit court's order because we agree with the State's alternative argument and overrule our holding in Jumila that a defendant cannot be convicted of both HRS § 134-6(a) and its separate felony.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 4, 1994, Brantley was convicted of, inter alia, carrying or use of firearm in the commission of a separate felony and second degree murder, the separate felony in the former offense. On January 12, 1999, Brantley filed an HRPP Rule 35 motion seeking to reverse his conviction for the firearms offense. In opposition, the State argued that Jumila, a 1998 decision, should not be applied retroactively to Brantley's 1994 conviction. Among the arguments cited by the State was the fact that the legislature was considering passage of a bill that would "vitiate" Jumila. At the February 4, 1999 initial hearing on the motion, the circuit court continued the matter and requested supplemental briefing regarding the pending legislation and what, if any, impact the legislation would have on the court's determination regarding the question of retroactivity. On April 13, 1999, the Governor signed into law Act 12, which amended HRS § 134-6 to explicitly state that an individual could be convicted of both HRS § 134-6(a) and the separate felony. See 1999 Haw. Sess. L. Act 12, at 12.² Subsequently, the circuit court denied Brantley's motion, indicating that the 1999 amendment to HRS § 134-6 was an important factor in its decision not to apply Jumila retroactively. Brantley timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Statutory Interpretation

The question whether a defendant can be convicted of both carrying or use of firearm in the commission of a separate felony and the separate felony is a question of statutory interpretation. We interpret statutes de novo. See State v. Cornelio, 84 Hawai`i 476, 483, 935 P.2d 1021, 1028 (1997)

(citations omitted).

When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists....

In construing an ambiguous statute, "[t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." HRS § 1-15(1) [(1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.

Gray [v. Administrative Director of the Court, 84 Hawai`i 138, 148, 931 P.2d 580, (1997)] (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995)) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). This court may also consider "[t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it . . . to discover its true meaning." HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). "Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another." HRS § 1-16 (1993).

State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai`i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawai`i 262, 266, 978 P.2d 700, 704 (1999) (quoting State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai`i 85, 90-91, 976 P.2d 399, 404-05 (1999) (quoting Ho v. Leftwich, 88 Hawai`i 251, 256-57, 965 P.2d 793, 798-99 (1998) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai`i 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28 (1998))))) (some brackets and ellipses points added and some in original).

State v. Rauch, 94 Hawai`i 315, 322-23, 13 P.3d 324, 331-32 (2000).

B. Stare decisis

With regards to overruling a previous decision of this court,

we do not lightly disregard precedent; we subscribe to the view that great consideration should always be accorded precedent, especially one of long standing and general acceptance. Yet, it does not necessarily follow that a rule established by precedent is infallible. If unintended injury would result by following the previous decision, corrective action is in order; for we cannot be unmindful of the lessons furnished by our own consciousness, as well as by judicial history, of the liability to error and the advantages of review. As this court has long recognized, we not only have the right but are entrusted with a duty to examine the former decisions of this court and, when reconciliation is impossible, to discard our former errors.

Francis v. Lee Enters., Inc., 89 Hawai`i 234, 236, 971 P.2d 707, 709 (1999) (internal citations, quotations, and bracket omitted); see also State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai`i 87, 111-12, 997 P.2d 13, 37-38 (2000)

(citing Francis, supra); Parke v. Parke, 25 Haw. 397, 401 (1920) ("It is generally better to establish a new rule than to follow a bad precedent.").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jumila and HRS § 134-6(a)

The State makes two primary arguments in support of its request that we overrule our previous holding in Jumila that a defendant cannot be convicted of both HRS § 134-6(a) and the separate felony. The State asserts that the legislative history of a subsequent amendment to HRS § 134-6(a) clarifies that the legislature indeed intended to permit convictions of both offenses when it enacted HRS § 134-6(a). The State also claims that, in Jumila, this court considered only a portion of the legislative history of HRS § 134-6(a) when we concluded that the statute did not clearly indicate legislative intent to allow for conviction of both offenses.

Having considered the State's arguments, we agree that a defendant can be convicted of both HRS § 134-6(a) and the separate felony. We begin by reviewing our reasoning in Jumila.

This court's holding in Jumila was premised upon our conclusion that the separate felony was an included offense of HRS § 134-6(a). See Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 3,

950 P.2d at 1203. An included offense is defined as one that is "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the [greater] offense[.]" HRS § 701-109(4)(a).³ We pointed out in Jumila that, "by virtue of the statutory definition of HRS § 134-6(a), the felony underlying an HRS § 134-6(a) charge will always be `established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the' HRS § 134-6(a) offense." Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 3,

950 P.2d at 1203. Consequently, we reasoned that "the felony underlying an HRS § 134-6(a) offense is, as a matter of law, an included offense of the HRS § 134-6(a) offense." Id.

After establishing that the separate felony was an included offense of HRS § 134-6(a), we noted that, pursuant to HRS § 701-109(1)(a),⁴ a defendant may not be convicted of more than one offense if one of those offenses is included within another. Id. We acknowledged that "the legislature could, if it desired, create an exception to the statutory prohibition set forth in HRS § 701-109[,]" but concluded the legislature had not clearly done so when it enacted HRS § 134-6(a). Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 4-5, 950 P.2d at 1204-05. Therefore, in order to resolve the apparent conflict between HRS § 701-109(1)(a) and Jumila's conviction for both HRS § 134-6(a) and the separate felony, we held that the lesser grade offense should be reversed. See Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 4,

950 P.2d at 1204.

The basis for our conclusion that the legislature had not clearly expressed its intent to allow a conviction for both offenses was that we "found no indication[] in the language of HRS § 134-6(a) or the legislative history preceding its original enactment in 1990 to suggest" such intent. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 5, 950 P.2d at 1205. In this appeal, the State points to legislative history of a 1993 amendment to the...