State v. Braswell
| Decision Date | 28 August 1984 |
| Citation | 481 A.2d 413,194 Conn. 297 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Willie J. BRASWELL. |
Jean E. Blue, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Susann E. Gill, Sp. Asst. State's Atty., with whom were John M. Massameno, Asst. State's Atty., and, on the brief, John M. Bailey, State's Atty., and Warren Maxwell, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).
Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, GRILLO and COVELLO, JJ.
The defendant was convicted by a jury of the crimes of unlawful restraint in the first degree; General Statutes § 53a-95; sexual assault in the first degree; General Statutes § 53a-70; and robbery in the second degree. General Statutes § 53a-135(a)(2). On appeal from the judgment rendered, the defendant raises three claims of error. We find no error.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: On the night of June 30, 1977, the defendant was a patron of a restaurant in Windsor. Also in the restaurant that night was a woman who sat at the bar drinking beer. The woman left the bar about midnight and began to walk toward her home. As she walked along Windsor Avenue the defendant approached her from behind, placed a knife at her back, and ordered her to continue walking.
When they reached the Dickers Brook overpass of Windsor Avenue, the defendant dragged the woman into a culvert, placed the knife at her neck, and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. The defendant then took the victim's wallet, containing fifty-five dollars, and fled.
After discussing the attack with relatives and an off-duty police officer, the victim filed a complaint with the Windsor police department on July 5, 1977. On July 7, 1977, Detective Overstrom of the Windsor police department showed a photographic array of nine suspects to the victim. From that array she selected a photograph of the defendant and identified him as the person who she claimed had raped and robbed her on the night in question.
A warrant was subsequently issued for the defendant's arrest based on the victim's complaint. The defendant was located while serving a prison sentence in Maryland for an offense that he had committed in that state in April, 1978. Connecticut authorities then filed a detainer against him with Maryland prison officials pursuant to General Statutes § 54-186, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter the IAD), and returned the defendant to Connecticut for trial.
After the jury returned its verdict of guilty the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of not less than thirteen years nor more than twenty-eight years. The defendant appealed from that judgment, claiming that the trial court erred: (1) in denying his motion to dismiss the charges based on the state's failure to comply with the IAD; (2) in denying his motion in limine which sought to prohibit the state from mentioning three prior felony convictions as impeachment evidence; and (3) by failing explicitly to instruct the jury during supplemental instructions on the sexual assault charge that it might find the defendant not guilty.
Before trial the defendant moved for dismissal of all charges claiming that the state had failed to abide by the time standards set forth in the IAD for prompt disposition of the underlying charges. The trial court, A. Armentano, J., denied that motion. At the commencement of trial the defendant again moved for dismissal on the same ground. The trial court, Bieluch, J., held an evidentiary hearing, at which the following evidence was adduced: The defendant was arrested by Maryland authorities on April 21, 1978, and charged in connection with a robbery that he had allegedly committed in that state. He remained incarcerated in Maryland pending trial. On August 31, 1978, the defendant was convicted of robbery by a Maryland court and was sentenced to a term of three years imprisonment in the Maryland state penitentiary.
On September 8, 1978, Maryland prison officials notified the defendant that Connecticut authorities had filed a detainer 1 against him based on untried charges in Connecticut. 2 Pursuant to IAD provisions, which are triggered by the filing of the detainer, the defendant then signed what is known as a form 2, 3 notifying Connecticut authorities of his place of incarceration and requesting disposition of all untried charges. He also acknowledged a form 4, wherein Maryland authorities agreed to surrender temporary custody of the defendant to Connecticut. On the same day, September 8, 1978, the defendant delivered these documents to his prison social worker for delivery to Connecticut authorities.
Maryland officials sent both documents, along with a certificate of inmate status, to the Superior Court clerk in Windsor by certified mail. The postmark on the envelope in which the documents were sent was illegible. The Superior Court clerk did not receive the documents until October 3, 1978, twenty-five days after the defendant had turned his request over to Maryland officials for delivery to Connecticut.
William J. Strong, Jr., the superintendent of postal operations for the United States Post Office in Windsor, testified that the documents had probably reached the Windsor Post Office on October 2, 1978. He stated that the normal delivery time from Maryland to Connecticut for certified mail is two days. Strong further testified that the envelope containing the documents bore evidence of having been missent. On the back of the envelope was an illegible post office stamp made by a cancelling machine. This indicated to Strong that the envelope had originally been sent to the wrong post office and had been rerouted.
After receiving the defendant's request for final disposition of the charges, Connecticut authorities took temporary custody of the defendant and brought him to Connecticut for trial. The trial commenced on March 15, 1979, which was 164 days after Connecticut authorities received the defendant's request but 189 days after the defendant had executed the forms and had given them to Maryland prison officials for delivery.
The IAD specifically provides that whenever the state lodges a detainer against one who is imprisoned in another state, that prisoner "shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 54-186 Art. III(a).
The defendant's claim of error centers on the proper interpretation of the phrase "shall have caused to be delivered" as used in the IAD. The defendant argues that that phrase is intended to denote the date that a prisoner requests officials of the custodial state (Maryland) to forward his request for final disposition to the demanding state (Connecticut). He therefore contends that the IAD required Connecticut to bring him to trial within 180 days of the date on which he turned his request for final disposition over to Maryland officials for delivery to Connecticut. He concludes that, because he was not brought to trial by the state of Connecticut until 189 days after the date that he gave his request to Maryland prison officials, the prosecution should have been dismissed for failure to comply with the IAD. We disagree.
We previously have had occasion to interpret the phrase "has caused to be delivered" in a related statutory context. In State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 178 A.2d 525 (1962), the question before the court concerned the requirement in the intrastate detainer statute that one imprisoned in Connecticut against whom there exists an untried indictment or information must be brought to trial "within one hundred twenty days after he has caused to be delivered, to the prosecuting official ... written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition to be made of the indictment or information." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1961) § 54-139. 4 There, the defendants argued that the 120 day period started with the date that the prisoner submitted his or her request for disposition to the warden of the prison. State v. Springer, supra, 248, 178 A.2d 525. We rejected the defendants' argument. Id., 250, 178 A.2d 525; see State v. Antrum, 185 Conn. 118, 120 n. 3, 440 A.2d 839 (1981).
Although the statute at issue in State v. Springer related to intrastate rather than interstate detainers, we find the interpretation of the phrase in question to be entirely consistent with both the terms and the spirit of the IAD. Subsection (b) of Article III sets out the procedure by which a prisoner may request final disposition of the foreign charges. "The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of correction or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested." (Emphasis added.) Id. Given the IAD's use of the word "sent" in subsection (b), we must presume that its use of the word "delivered" in subsection (a) signifies its recognition of the different meanings commonly attributed to each word. Cf. Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183, 187, 438 A.2d 859 (1981); Jones v. Civil Service Commission, 175 Conn. 504, 509, 400 A.2d 721 (1978). It follows that...
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