State v. Braswell
| Citation | 123 A.3d 835,318 Conn. 815 |
| Decision Date | 29 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 19230.,19230. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Velmon Danny BRASWELL. |
Sarah Hanna, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, and Michelle Manning, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.
In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court's denial of the request by the defendant, Velmon Danny Braswell, to represent himself was improper, and, if so, whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that the impropriety constitutes structural error. The defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–94 (a), and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a–167a (a). He appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had denied him his right to self-representation. The Appellate Court agreed and reversed the judgment of conviction.
We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal.
On appeal, the state claims that the trial court properly denied the defendant's April 28, 2010 request to represent himself because the defendant's behavior during the court's canvass provided sufficient grounds for the court to deny the motion. It further claims that, even if the trial court did improperly deny the defendant's request, the judgment of conviction should nonetheless have been affirmed because the defendant subsequently waived his right to self-representation and the denial, even if improper, was harmless. The defendant responds that the trial court's denial was improper because it was based on incorrect grounds—the adequacy of defense counsel—and the impropriety is structural error. We agree with the defendant and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts. Attorney Benjamin Aponte of the Division of Public Defender Services, was appointed to represent the defendant. On April 6, 2010, the defendant filed a pro se, handwritten motion with the trial court entitled, “Motion for [Removal of] Attorney And Motion [T]o [G]o Pro–Se in Case.” This was one of a number of pro se motions the defendant filed.1 In the motion, the defendant requested that the court allow him to proceed pro se due to Aponte's alleged inaction and his alleged failure to provide the defendant with discovery and other legal materials he had requested. The defendant's first appearance before the court after filing this motion was on April 28, 2010, on which date jury selection was scheduled to begin.
At the opening of the April 28 hearing, the defendant was not present in the courtroom. Aponte conveyed to the court:
Additionally, Aponte informed the court that the defendant had said he would be disruptive if the court forced him to appear and proceed with the trial. The court instructed that the defendant be brought out, after which the court stated: In response, the defendant explained: The defendant stated that he felt that Aponte had not been responsive to his requests for discovery materials and that Aponte was overworked and therefore not dedicating enough time to the defendant's case. The court responded by informing the defendant that it had spoken with Aponte about a trial schedule, jury selection was to begin that day, the trial was scheduled to begin in four weeks, Aponte had spoken with the state about discovery compliance, and the court would take up any discovery motions to ensure the defendant received the discovery to which he was entitled and had time to prepare for trial. Finding the court's response unsatisfactory, the defendant replied: Continuing, the defendant stated:
After this last declaration that the defendant did not wish to continue to be represented by Aponte, the court asked whether the defendant had substitute counsel who was ready to proceed. The defendant did not have substitute counsel and asked how he could be ready to proceed when he had not received the requested discovery. The court then addressed Aponte and the assistant state's attorney regarding discovery issues. After hearing from the attorneys, the court returned to the defendant: The court indicated that it would keep an open mind with respect to the discovery issues and address any specific problems as they arose. The court concluded by stating: The defendant replied:
Following this third request to represent himself, the court began to ask the defendant about his background. At first, the defendant's answers were nonresponsive. He began by again bringing up his discovery concerns and then referenced the various motions for a speedy trial that he had filed pro se. At this point, the court expressed its view that the defendant had a generalized complaint about Aponte and the time the defendant perceived Aponte had put into the defendant's case. The court continued:
After the court's second request for background information, the defendant informed the court that he had fourteen years of education, he had spent two years working for the campus police at Western Connecticut State University, he had testified in “[s]ay three” trials while working for the campus police, and he had once successfully represented himself in a criminal trial in Pennsylvania. When questioned about the charges in Pennsylvania, the defendant refused to discuss them. The court then asked the defendant if there were any other credentials, qualifications, or experience the court should know about. It also reiterated that the defendant was facing serious charges. The defendant responded that he understood and that he was asking for the discovery and some time to prepare his case “without the help of Mr. Aponte.”2
Following the colloquy between the court and the defendant regarding the defendant's background, the court concluded:
“If, in the next four weeks, I see some additional support for those, I'm happy to reconsider them, okay?”
The court turned to jury selection after it denied the defendant's motion....
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