State v. Braun
| Court | Superior Court of Delaware |
| Writing for the Court | CHRISTIE |
| Citation | 378 A.2d 640 |
| Parties | 8 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,072 STATE of Delaware v. Melvin L. BRAUN, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 01 August 1977 |
Page 640
v.
Melvin L. BRAUN, Defendant.
Decided Aug. 1, 1977.
Page 641
June D. MacArtor, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State of Delaware.
Roy S. Shiels, of Brown, Shiels & Barros, Dover, for defendant.
CHRISTIE, Judge.
The defendant Melvin L. Braun, owner of Dover Products, Inc., was charged with violating 7 Del.C. § 6003(b)(1) in that he is alleged to have used equipment which causes or contributes to the discharge of an air contaminant without first having obtained a permit from the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control of the State of Delaware. Defendant was also charged with violating 7 Del.C. § 6013(a) by wilfully failing to obey an order to cease and desist issued by the Secretary.
These charges arise from a determination by the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control that Dover Products Company, Inc., a rendering plant, "emitted odorous air contaminants" on June
Page 642
7, 8, 9 and 10, 1976. Pursuant to the authority vested in him by 7 Del.C. § 6018, the Secretary of the Department on June 10, 1976, issued an order that "Dover Products Company, Inc. cease and desist from the operation of any and all combustion and process equipment and facilities for the storage and transport of raw and processed materials and condensate which discharge or may discharge odorous air contaminants to the atmosphere at its rendering plant on County Road 100, just outside the city limits of Dover, Delaware, until such time as the permits required by the Department have been obtained. (Order to cease and desist No. 76-A-4)Neither the defendant nor his company obtained a permit as required by 7 Del.C. § 6003(b)(1), and they continued to operate the equipment alleged to be discharging odorous air contaminants.
Defendant seeks the dismissal of the indictment, challenging the statute as: (a) being so vague as to be unconstitutional, (b) providing for an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, and (c) being improperly retroactive in its application. He also asserts that essential allegations are missing from the indictment.
The defendant first contends that 7 Del.C. § 6003(b)(1) is vague, indefinite and uncertain and, therefore, unconstitutional. The statute reads:
"No person shall, without having first obtained a permit from the Secretary, construct, install, replace, modify or use any equipment or device or other article:
(1) which may cause or contribute to the discharge of any air contaminant."
"Air contaminant" is defined in a parallel provision as "particulate matter, dust, fumes, gas, mist, smoke or vapor or any combination thereof, exclusive of uncombined water." 7 Del.C. § 6002(2). It is contended that there is an ambiguity in this phrase which poses constitutional problems.
Due process requires that a criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal. for "no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." Clark v. State, Del.Supr., 287 A.2d 660 (1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954).
Where the constitutional requirement of definiteness is in issue, the Court has the obligation to construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislative intention, to avoid the infirmity of vagueness. State v. 0.0673 Acres of Land, etc., Del.Supr., 224 A.2d 598 (1966). Du Pont v. Mills, Del.Supr., 9 W.W.Harr. 42, 196 A. 168 (1937).
The Water and Air Resources Act, 7 Delaware Code, Chapter 60 was designed to allow the State to "control the development and use of the land, water, underwater and air resources of the State so as to effectuate full utilization, conservation, and protection of the water and air resources of the State." 7 Del.C. § 6001(b)(2). "The land, water, underwater and air resources of the State must be protected from pollution in the interest of the health and safety of the public." 7 Del.C. § 6001(a)(5). The General Assembly provided that: "This chapter, being necessary for the welfare of the State and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed in order to preserve the land, air and water resources of the State." 7 Del.C. § 6020. In short, "Protection of the environment is the paramount consideration." State v. Getty Oil Company (Eastern Operations) Inc., Del.Super., 305 A.2d 327, 329 (1973).
The Court's task, then, is to consider whether or not it is reasonably possible to construe 7 Del.C. § 6003(b)(1) in a manner that precisely furthers this goal. "It is to be presumed that the Legislature did not intend an unreasonable, absurd or unworkable result." Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 295 A.2d 718, 722 (1972); E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Clark, Del.Supr., 32 Del.Ch. 527, 88 A.2d 436 (1952). A literal reading of § 6003 in a vacuum without
Page 643
reference to the reasonable purposes of the statute could result in both an absurdity as to meaning of the statute and a doubt as to validity. The legislature surely did not intend to proscribe the discharge of all "air contaminants" however insignificant in quantity, short in duration or innocuous in character. In order to assure compliance with the constitutional requirement that statutes where possible are to be interpreted so as to be viable and workable, it is reasonable to read 7 Del.C. § 6003(b)(1) as if it were worded as follows:"(b) No person shall, without first having obtained a permit from the Secretary, construct, install, replace, modify or use any equipment or device or other article:
(1) which may cause or contribute to the discharge of an air contaminant. " (Such as to cause a condition of air pollution) 1
The term "air pollution", in turn, is adequately defined in 7 Del.C. § 6002(3) as follows:
"(3) 'Air pollution' means the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of 1 or more air...
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State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc.
...and adaptability are required in meeting factual situations which could not possibly be foreseen by the legislature. State v. Braun, 378 A.2d 640 (Del.1977). Thus, we are satisfied that statutes in the area of environmental law need not address each and every factual situation in which air ......
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State v. Union Tank Car Co., No. 82-WA-1008
...and adaptability are required in meeting factual situations which could not possibly be foreseen by the legislature. State v. Braun, 378 A.2d 640 (Del.1977). Thus, we are satisfied that statutes in the area of environmental law need not address each and every factual situation in which air ......
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State v. General Chemical Corp.
...is not so notified, that person will be powerless to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct. Wright, supra; State v. Braun, Del.Supr., 378 A.2d 640 (1977). Enforcement of such a statute would violate an essential precept of due This Court has an obligation in a case where a statute is b......
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Hindt v. State
...whether there are standards and if they are sufficient.' 191 A.2d, at 649-650 (emphasis added); accord, State v. Braun, Del.Super., 378 A.2d 640 "Where it is not feasible for the General Assembly to supply precise statutory standards without frustrating the purposes of the legislation, the ......
-
State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc.
...and adaptability are required in meeting factual situations which could not possibly be foreseen by the legislature. State v. Braun, 378 A.2d 640 (Del.1977). Thus, we are satisfied that statutes in the area of environmental law need not address each and every factual situation in which air ......
-
State v. Union Tank Car Co., No. 82-WA-1008
...and adaptability are required in meeting factual situations which could not possibly be foreseen by the legislature. State v. Braun, 378 A.2d 640 (Del.1977). Thus, we are satisfied that statutes in the area of environmental law need not address each and every factual situation in which air ......
-
State v. General Chemical Corp.
...is not so notified, that person will be powerless to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct. Wright, supra; State v. Braun, Del.Supr., 378 A.2d 640 (1977). Enforcement of such a statute would violate an essential precept of due This Court has an obligation in a case where a statute is b......
-
Hindt v. State
...whether there are standards and if they are sufficient.' 191 A.2d, at 649-650 (emphasis added); accord, State v. Braun, Del.Super., 378 A.2d 640 "Where it is not feasible for the General Assembly to supply precise statutory standards without frustrating the purposes of the legislation, the ......