State v. Bray
Decision Date | 31 July 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 25176.,25176. |
Citation | 535 S.E.2d 636,342 S.C. 23 |
Parties | The STATE, Petitioner, v. Gary Douglas BRAY, Respondent. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Walter M. Bailey, Jr., of Summerville, for petitioner.
Peter F. Them, II, of Summerville, for respondent.
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Bray, 335 S.C. 514, 517 S.E.2d 714 (Ct.App.1999). We affirm in result only.
The facts, as set forth in the Court of Appeals' opinion, are as follows:
335 S.C. at 517-18, 517 S.E.2d at 716.
Prior to trial, the State moved to have the victim testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV), out of the presence of Bray and the jury. After a hearing, the trial court ruled this was a "classic case" of why S.C. Ann. § 16-3-1550(E)(Supp.1999)1 was passed and ordered the victim be permitted to testify via live closed-circuit television without Bray or other relatives (except her mother) present. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Were the trial court's factual findings regarding the necessity for the child to testify via CCTV supported by sufficient evidence?
The Court of Appeals ruled "the trial court's factual finding regarding the necessity for the child to testify via CCTV was not supported by sufficient evidence." 335 S.C. at 519, 517 S.E.2d at 717. We disagree.
A trial court's decision to allow videotaped or closed-circuit testimony is reversible "only if it is shown that the trial judge abused his discretion in making such a decision..." State v. Murrell, 302 S.C. 77, 82, 393 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1990). Where there is evidence to support a trial court's ruling, it will not be overturned for an abuse of discretion. State v. Morgan 326 S.C. 503, 485 S.E.2d 112 (Ct.App.1997).
In the present case, the expert testimony came from Kim Charpia who was offered and qualified as an expert in the field of counseling services for victims of child sexual abuse.2 Charpia held a masters degree in social work, and had worked for 8 years at Naval Family Services, during which time she had seen a minimum of 25 cases per year of child victims of sexual abuse. Although Charpia was not currently specializing in child sexual abuse, she felt she could be considered an expert in that area by virtue of her training. Charpia testified she saw the victim 8 times between April 22, 1996 and July 22, 1996 for symptoms of depression. The victim had also suffered nightmares, and insisted upon wearing pants to school underneath her school uniform. When asked whether, in her opinion, the victim would be able to testify in open court in front of the defendant, Charpia replied:
I think in general it would be difficult for her to be in here with all these adults.... But, I think in particular she would be facing her uncle, a family member, and grandparents, and they have not believed her statement. I think she will shut down and not talk at all. I think she would be overwhelmed and intimidated and probably unable to talk with anybody. (emphasis supplied).
When asked if the victim should testify in open court in front of the accused, Charpia stated, "I think if she faces the accused, you may not get any testimony." When asked if testifying in front of the accused would have a positive or negative effect on the victim, Charpia responded, "[i]t would do further negative emotional harm." Although Charpia's testimony was, in part, based upon the impact to the victim by being required to testify in front of family, it was also directed at the harm to victim by testifying in the presence of Bray, and indicated that if forced to do so, the victim would be unable to communicate.
Similarly, the victim's mother testified she did not feel the victim could testify in court and that, if required to testify in front of her uncle Gary, "she's not going to say anything in front of him because she loves him, even though she hates him for what he did to her." The mother also testified that she believed the victim may have been intimidated by Bray, and was glad when her mother told her Bray would not be there when she testified.
Given the above testimony demonstrating the victim would be traumatized by testifying in Bray's presence, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support use of CCTV. See State v. Corn, 224 S.C. 74, 77 S.E.2d 354 (1953)
(. )3
However, although we disagree with the Court of Appeals' assessment of the evidence in this case, we nonetheless affirm in result due to the trial court's failure to make the case-specific findings mandated by our opinion in Murrell, supra, and the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990).
In Murrell, 302 S.C. at 81, 393 S.E.2d at 921, we adopted the following procedure to be used by trial courts in attempting to protect child witnesses:
First, the trial judge must make a case-specific determination of the need for videotaped testimony. In making this determination, the trial court should consider the testimony of an expert witness, parents or other relatives, other concerned and relevant parties, and the child. (emphasis supplied).4
Although conceding the trial court here "did not specifically state there would be harm to the victim if she was required to testify in the presence of the her uncle," the dissent nonetheless asserts the judge found a case-specific necessity in this case, based upon the colloquy of the solicitor prior to the court's ruling. We simply cannot conclude on the present record that this was the basis of the trial court's ruling. The court stated:
I think this is probably a classic case of why that last part of XX-X-XXXX, I think, was passed. We've got a young child who it's alleged has been molested at the age of five and who is seven years of age now.We've got testimony from the mother and the expert which shows that except for the mother, at least as far as I know it right now, the rest of the family don't believe her. And so I think that's classic. That would—to me would be a classic situation as to why it would be passed. (emphasis added).
Although the dissent's assertion that the trial judge found the victim would be harmed by testifying in the presence of her uncle is one reasonable inference to be drawn, the emphasized language of the court's ruling is equally susceptible of the inference that the trial court determined to utilize the CCTV procedure based upon the victim's young age and fear of other family members who did not believe her. The fact that this Court is unable to ascertain precisely the basis of the trial court's ruling simply highlights the need for the case-specific findings mandated in Murrell.5
497 U.S. 836, 856-7,110 S.Ct. 3157, 3169-70,111 L.Ed.2d 666. Here, although there was evidence indicating the victim was afraid of testifying in the presence of Bray, there was also more generalized testimony concerning her fear of the courtroom and her relatives. As the trial court failed to set forth case-specific findings mandated by Murrell, the matter must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. See State v. Hill, 314 S.C. 330, 444 S.E.2d 255 (1994)
(. )
Finally, the Court of Appeals placed great emphasis upon the trial judge's failure to personally interview the victim. I...
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