State v. Breedlove
| Decision Date | 25 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 16907-0-II,16907-0-II |
| Citation | 900 P.2d 586,79 Wn.App. 101 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Rufus BREEDLOVE, a/k/a Lawrence Lee Breedlove, Appellant. |
Thomas Edward Doyle, Olympia, Robert Mason Quillian, Olympia, for appellant.
Thomas Charles Roberts, Pierce Co. Deputy Pros. Atty., Tacoma, for respondent.
Lawrence Breedlove appeals his conviction for second degree murder, arguing, most significantly, that the conviction should be reversed because the trial court erroneously denied his request to proceed pro se. Because Breedlove's assertion of his right to self-representation was unequivocal, timely, and not interposed for improper purposes, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Breedlove's request to represent himself and we therefore reverse Breedlove's conviction and order a new trial.
Breedlove was accused of murdering Gregory Atkins by stabbing him to death on or about July 21, 1992. Two eye-witnesses and the dying Atkins identified Breedlove as the murderer.
On July 24, 1992, Breedlove was charged with first degree murder. The trial date was originally set for September 28, 1992, but was continued to November 30, 1992, upon Breedlove's motion for continuance. On November 25, 1992, the trial date was again continued, this time to December 7, 1992.
Breedlove contends that he first asserted his right to self-representation in October 1992 in a motion wherein he "respectfully request[ed] that he be assigned as pro se co-counsel and allowed to actively participate in his own defense...." In his pro se brief to this court, Breedlove asserts that he submitted his handwritten pro se motion on October 15 or 16, 1992, but that the court failed to address the issues in the motion, stating that it would only consider issues presented by assigned counsel. There is no evidence in the record regarding any court proceedings on either October 15 or 16, 1992. Moreover, although a copy of this motion is included in the clerk's papers, the motion does not have a date stamp indicating that it was filed with the court. Thus, there is no proof in the record that the lower court even received this motion.
At a November 18 hearing, twelve days before the then-scheduled trial, Breedlove filed an additional hand-written pro se motion in which he again asserted his right to proceed pro se. In his motion, after asserting that his defense counsel was not preparing a defense, Breedlove stated, Breedlove also stated, "the accused strenuously urge[s] the Court to grant his motion dismissing defense counsel and allowing the accused to act as pro-se counsel with pro-counsel...." The motion concluded: "The Petitioner/Accused ... do[es] hereby serve notice that he will be proceeding in his own defense in this matter hereinafter before the Court and request[s] the Court allow defense counsel to respectfully withdraw and appoint one as pro-counsel to assist the accused." The trial judge declined to hear any of Breedlove's motions that day, but agreed to hear argument on such motions on November 25.
At the November 25 hearing, Breedlove filed more motions, requesting that his appointed counsel be permitted to withdraw; that he be permitted "to proceed as pro se counsel" and to have "standby-counsel" appointed to assist him in his defense; and that he be granted an extension of time to prepare his own defense. November 25, 1992, the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, was the last court day before the then-scheduled trial of Monday, November 30, 1992. When called upon by the court, Breedlove stated, "I would ask that I be able to handle my own defense." Additionally, Breedlove's defense attorney requested that he be permitted to withdraw, stating that there had been a complete breakdown in the communications between himself and Breedlove; that Breedlove indicated that he did not trust counsel's professional judgment; and that Breedlove refused to cooperate with defense counsel. Defense counsel also noted that Breedlove had filed a number of motions with the court, that he had filed a lawsuit in federal district court and that he was very knowledgeable with the workings of the judicial system.
The trial court denied Breedlove's motion to proceed pro se and ruled that the parties would proceed to trial with present counsel. By order filed November 25, 1992, the court formally granted a one-week continuance to December 7, 1992, and denied Breedlove's motions (1) for a longer continuance, (2) to dismiss defense counsel, and (3) to proceed pro se, with or without standby counsel.
The jury trial commenced on December 9, 1992. During trial Breedlove renewed his motion to proceed pro se. The trial judge declined to reconsider the motion. Ultimately, the jury convicted Breedlove of murder in the second degree.
The Washington State Constitution expressly guarantees one's right to self-representation: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel...." Wash. Const. art. I, § 22. 1
In State v. Fritz, 2 the Court of Appeals delineated the following principles relevant to a defendant's request to proceed pro se: A criminal defendant has an independent constitutional right to represent himself or herself without the assistance of legal counsel. The exercise of this right must be requested by the defendant, and the court is not initially required to advise a defendant of the existence of the right. The request or demand to defend pro se must be knowingly and intelligently made, it must be unequivocal and it must be timely, i.e., it may not be used to delay one's trial or obstruct justice. The right of self-representation cannot be permitted to justify a defendant's disrupting a hearing or trial, or as a license to a pro se defendant not to comply with rules of procedural and substantive law. Finally, standby counsel may be appointed, even over the objection of the defendant, to assist the accused if and when he or she requests help, and to represent the accused in the event that the defendant's self-representation is terminated.
We review a lower court's disposition of a request to proceed pro se for abuse of discretion. In our review, we are mindful of the guidelines for ruling on motions to proceed pro se enunciated by the Fritz court:
The cases which have considered the timeliness of a proper demand for self-representation have generally held: (a) if made well before the trial ... and unaccompanied by a motion for continuance, the right of self-representation exists as a matter of law; (b) if made as the trial ... is about to commence, or shortly before, the existence of the right depends on the facts of the particular case with a measure of discretion reposing in the trial court in the matter; and (c) if made during the trial ... the right to proceed pro se rests largely in the informed discretion of the trial court. 3
The trial court's discretion lies along a continuum that corresponds with the timeliness of the request to proceed pro se. Breedlove's motion to proceed pro se falls in the second category of cases discussed by Fritz because it was made shortly before the trial was to commence and because it was accompanied by a motion for continuance.
We interpret Fritz and other Washington cases to mean that if the request is made shortly before the trial, at the beginning of trial or mid-trial, the trial court must exercise its discretion by balancing the important interests implicated by the decision: the defendant's interest in self-representation and society's interest in the orderly administration of justice. 4 Because these meaningful interests may be in direct competition, their value has an inverse relationship during the course of the proceedings: before trial the defendant's interest in self-representation is paramount but as the trial gets closer and once it begins, the interest in the orderly administration of justice becomes weightier. 5
Washington case law indicates only two types of circumstances that warrant the denial of a motion to proceed pro se that is made shortly before trial or as the trial is about to begin. The trial court can deny the request if it finds either (1) that the motion is made for improper purposes, i.e., for the purpose of unjustifiably delaying a trial or hearing, 6 or (2) that granting the request would obstruct the orderly administration of justice. 7
We hold that the same analysis governs a pre-trial motion to proceed pro se when it is accompanied by a motion for continuance. We therefore review the lower court's denial of Breedlove's motion to determine whether it can be based on a finding that Breedlove interposed his request for improper reasons or that to grant the motion would obstruct the orderly administration of justice.
We conclude that Breedlove made an unequivocal, timely motion to proceed pro se and, although Breedlove simultaneously requested a continuance, there is no evidence in the record that the motion was interposed for the purpose of delay or harassment. Nor does the record reflect that granting the motion would likely have impaired the efficient judicial administration in the present case. As the trial court neither engaged in a colloquy with Breedlove regarding the pro se motion nor stated on the record the reasons for its denial of Breedlove's motion, we find no basis to conclude otherwise.
Although Breedlove at first did not clearly and unequivocally ask to proceed pro se, by November 25 he had refined his petition into an unequivocal request that the court allow him to "proceed as pro se counsel and [that the court] appoint standby-counsel assistance...." Also, during the hearing on November 25, 1992, Breedlove stated...
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...Bebb, 108 Wash.2d 515, 524, 740 P.2d 829 (1987). Indeed, the unjustified denial of this right requires reversal. State v. Breedlove, 79 Wash.App. 101, 111, 900 P.2d 586 (1995). We have previously noted, however, that the right to self-representation is not self-executing. State v. DeWeese, ......
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