State v. Brennan
| Decision Date | 02 July 1987 |
| Citation | 527 A.2d 654 |
| Parties | STATE v. Thomas BRENNAN. 86-100-C.A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The Brennan brothers, Thomas and Michael, were arrested and tried separately for the brutal slaying of eighty-one-year-old Lawrence Bello. Each was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. We recently affirmed Michael's conviction in State v. Brennan, 526 A.2d 483 (R.I.1987), where the facts relating to the murder can be found. This is Thomas's appeal. 1
His initial argument relates to the testimony of Raymond Furtado (Furtado). Furtado testified that when he, Thomas, and Michael were being detained at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), Thomas told him that he, Thomas, was responsible for the death of the eighty-one-year-old landlord. The state concedes that it did not reveal this information to Thomas or his counsel until sometime after Thomas's trial had begun. Thomas argues that the trial justice should have precluded the use of this testimony because it violates the spirit and letter of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly, Rule 16(i) provides a variety of sanctions that can be applied in cases in which the state violates its continuous duty to provide pertinent information to an accused. State v. Concannon, 457 A.2d 1350, 1353 (R.I.1983).
At a hearing on Thomas's motion to preclude, the state explained that originally it had listed Furtado as a witness who was to testify in Michael's case. It was the state's belief that Furtado's testimony about Michael's participation might be used as an "adoptive admission" against Thomas when Thomas came to trial. 2 Just prior to the hearing on the motion to preclude, the state had informed Thomas and his counsel that Furtado would identify Thomas, not Michael, as the individual who actually confessed to murdering Bello. Consequently, the trial justice, in view of the events, denied Thomas's motion for preclusion.
Thomas now argues that the trial justice erred because the denial worked to Thomas's disadvantage. He points out that the disclosure came subsequent to the time when his counsel had made his opening statement to the jury. Thomas claims that if the defense had been aware of the precise nature and content of Furtado's appearance, his counsel might have adopted a different strategy when he addressed the jury.
Despite Thomas's assertion to the contrary, we fail to see any prejudice to Thomas that would warrant the preclusion of Furtado's testimony. Furtado's proposed testimony was disclosed to Thomas eight days prior to the time Furtado appeared in court as a witness. Thus Thomas had ample time to prepare a cross-examination of Furtado. Moreover, the trial justice had offered Thomas's counsel additional time to prepare if so requested. The rejection of such an opportunity is further evidence that the defense needed no additional time to prepare for crossexamination, nor was there any necessity for a change of strategy. State v. Rossi, 520 A.2d 582 (R.I.1987).
Thomas next contends that the trial justice erred in permitting Furtado to testify that notes were passed between Thomas and Michael Brennan while they were in prison and that Furtado acted as a courier between the brothers. Thomas argues that the prejudicial impact of this testimony far outweighed its probative value because the "unmistakable image" given to the jury is that the note-passing "constituted nefarious conduct replete with criminal overtones."
Again we must disagree with Thomas relative to the exchange of notes. This testimony was relevant to establish the fact that Furtado, Thomas, and Michael had developed a trusting relationship with one another, thus lending credence to Furtado's testimony about Thomas's jail house admission. Furthermore, a trial justice's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence on relevancy grounds will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Abbey Medical/Abbey Rents, Inc. v. Mignacca, 471 A.2d 189 (R.I.1984).
The last claim relative to Thomas concerning Furtado's testimony is that the trial justice improperly limited extensive cross-examination of this witness. Thomas asserts that the goal of the cross-examination was to establish in the jury's mind that Furtado was a "professional" witness for the state. However, a review of the questions asked of Furtado reveals that at no time could a trial justice have determined such a purpose from inquiries that were overly broad and vague. Consequently, we cannot fault the trial justice for actions taken in permitting Furtado to testify and inform the jury of the substance of the conversations he and Thomas had at the ACI.
Thomas also faults the trial justice for his refusal to pass the case and declare a mistrial when certain information reached the jury. This information, in Thomas's eyes, implied that he had a criminal record. The first instance complained of occurred during...
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State v. Brown
...constitutional confrontation rights, the trial justice possesses the discretion to limit further cross-examination. State v. Brennan, 527 A.2d 654, 657 (R.I.1987). We shall not disturb such a limitation absent a clear abuse of discretion "and then only when such abuse constitutes prejudicia......
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State v. Mastracchio
...instruction does not necessarily preclude appellate review. Generally, however, counsel must request such an instruction. State v. Brennan, 527 A.2d 654, 656 (R.I.1987); State v. LaPointe, 525 A.2d 913, 914-15 (R.I.1987). The trial justice will caution the jury or order a new trial sua spon......
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State v. Brennan
...In State v. Michael Brennan, 526 A.2d 483 (R.I.1987), this court addressed the issues common to both appeals. In State v. Thomas Brennan, 527 A.2d 654 (R.I.1987), we addressed only those issues pertaining to Thomas's appeal. The convictions were both Subsequently Thomas filed an application......
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State v. Doctor
...on cross-examination may properly be brought to a halt when it becomes obvious that the pond is devoid of fish." State v. Brennan, 527 A.2d 654, 657 (R.I.1987). When Strong answered defense counsel's inquiries in the negative, the pond was deemed empty and defense counsel had opportunity to......
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Table of Cases
...Form 3-D Smith v. Maryland , 442 U.S. 735 (1979), Form 3-D Spinelli v. United States , 393 U.S. 410 (1969), Form 3-D State v. Brennan , 527 A.2d 654 (R.I. 1987), §1:02 State v. Cox , 325 N.W.2d 181 (N.D. 1982), §1:05 State v. Dahood , 148 N.H. 723 (2002), §9:20 State v. Holm , 478 P.2d 284 ......
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Governing Principles and Strategies
...fishing expedition, which “may properly be brought to a halt when it becomes obvious that the pond is devoid of fish.” State v. Brennan , 527 A.2d 654, 657 (R.I. 1987). The defendant has a right to cross-examine the witness on a pending indictment to suggest that he has a reason to please t......