State v. Breton

Citation663 A.2d 1026,235 Conn. 206
Decision Date22 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 13845,13845
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Robert J. BRETON, Sr.

G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, with whom were Richard Kelly, Public Defender, and Kent Drager, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Elizabeth A. Gallagher, with whom was William F. Gallagher, New Haven, for appellant (defendant) on the issue of proportionality.

Harry Weller, Asst. State's Atty., with whom were John Connelly, State's Atty., Judith Rossi and Maureen Keegan, Asst. State's Attys., and, on the brief, Stephanie Lane, Legal Intern, for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, PALMER and FOTI, JJ.

PALMER, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Robert J. Breton, Sr., appeals from a sentence of death imposed after his conviction of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b(8). 1 The defendant was charged with one count of capital felony and two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a 2 for the The jury reasonably could have found that the following facts were adduced at the guilt phase of the trial. The defendant and JoAnn Breton were married in 1967, and had one child, Robert Breton, Jr. In January, 1987, JoAnn Breton was divorced from the defendant. Shortly after the divorce, JoAnn and Robert Jr., then fifteen years old, moved to a two-story apartment located in Waterbury.

intentional killings of his former wife, JoAnn Breton, and his son, Robert Breton, Jr. After a jury convicted the defendant of all counts, a separate sentencing hearing was conducted pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-46a, 3 at which the same jury considered [235 Conn. 210] further evidence. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found an aggravating factor and no mitigating factor. In accordance with the jury's findings, the trial court, Heiman, J., rendered judgment of guilty of capital felony and imposed the death penalty [235 Conn. 211] on the defendant. The defendant appealed to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 4 and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) 53a-46b. 5 Because of ambiguities in the special verdict form and the trial court's jury instructions, the record does not establish definitively that the jury verdict purporting to reject the mitigating [235 Conn. 212] factors was the result of the jury's unanimous vote. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment with respect to the imposition of the death penalty and remand for a new sentencing hearing. 6

On Saturday, December 12, 1987, at approximately 10 p.m., the defendant went to the Sears Castaway Lounge in Waterbury, where he had several drinks. At the lounge, the defendant introduced himself to Mary-Jane Modeen, and the two talked and danced for several hours until the bar closed. At around 2 a.m. on Sunday, December 13, the defendant and Modeen left the bar together and drove in the defendant's truck to his apartment. They remained in the defendant's apartment for only a few minutes, however, because the defendant told Modeen that he had to go some place else. The defendant thereupon drove Modeen home.

After dropping Modeen off at her home at around 2:45 a.m., the defendant drove to the apartment complex in which his former wife and son resided. The defendant entered their apartment and proceeded to the upstairs bedroom where JoAnn Breton was sleeping. The defendant, wielding a sharp, five inch knife, proceeded to beat and stab her viciously. Struggling to escape from the defendant's attack, JoAnn Breton managed to move across the room and away from the defendant. The defendant caught her, however, and continued his assault, inflicting multiple bruises, scrapes and knife wounds on her face, chest and neck. The defendant finally killed his former wife by thrusting the knife into and through her neck, transsecting the carotid artery, a wound from which she bled to death.

Robert, Jr., was asleep in his bedroom when he was awakened by his mother's cries for help. At some point prior to his mother's death, Robert, Jr., entered her bedroom, where he, too, was attacked by the defendant. Although bleeding from a gash on his right forearm and severe cuts on his hands and fingers, Robert, Jr., escaped from the bedroom to a nearby landing area between the first and second floors, and then proceeded down the stairway to the first floor. The defendant pursued Robert, Jr., down the stairs, overtaking him at the bottom of the staircase. The defendant then resumed his attack on Robert, Jr., repeatedly stabbing him in the face, chest, shoulder and neck. Robert, Jr., as did his mother, bled to death from a knife wound that severed his carotid artery.

After the killings, the defendant left the apartment. Later that Sunday evening, he went to work at the Somers Thin Strip Company. On Monday morning, December 14, the defendant met a friend and coworker, Domenic Aurigemma and the two men drove to JoAnn Breton's apartment. The defendant went to the front door of the apartment while Aurigemma remained in the defendant's truck. The defendant quickly returned to his truck and told Aurigemma that the door to the apartment was locked and that the doorknob appeared to be stained with blood. After Aurigemma had also inspected the doorknob, the police were called. The police, with the assistance of the building superintendent, entered the apartment. There the police found the body of Robert, Jr., clad only in his underwear and covered with blood, lying at the foot of the stairs leading to the second floor with his head propped up against the wall. They also found the body of JoAnn Breton, similarly clad and covered with blood, lying face up on the floor of the upstairs bedroom.

After the jury convicted the defendant of all counts, a separate sentencing hearing was held pursuant to § 53a-46a before the same jury that convicted the defendant. In that hearing, the trial court instructed the jury, without objection from the state, that its findings were to be based solely on the evidence adduced at the sentencing phase of the trial, and not on the evidence adduced at the guilt phase. The state claimed as an aggravating factor that the defendant had committed the murders of JoAnn Breton and Robert Breton, Jr., in an "especially cruel manner" within the meaning of § 53a-43a(h)(4). 7 The defendant claimed thirteen separate mitigating factors. See footnote 42. At the conclusion of the penalty hearing, which we will discuss as it becomes relevant, the jury returned a special verdict pursuant to § 53a-46a(e) reporting its finding of an aggravating factor and no mitigating factor. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment imposing the death penalty on the defendant in accordance with the jury's verdict on the capital felony count. 8 On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. 9 He raises numerous claims, however, contesting the validity of the death sentence imposed. The defendant first claims that our death penalty scheme violates the federal and state constitutions. He also contends that the trial court improperly: (1) refused to set aside the jury's finding that the state had proved the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) refused to set aside the jury's finding that the defendant had not established one or more mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. He further maintains that the trial court's jury instructions were incorrect because the court improperly: (1) failed to require a unanimous verdict on the mitigating factors; (2) failed to apprise the jury that its findings on the aggravating and mitigating factors would determine whether the defendant would receive the death penalty; (3) rejected the defendant's request for an instruction that extreme emotional disturbance constituted a statutory mitigating factor; (4) refused to instruct the jury on each of the nonstatutory mitigating factors argued by the defendant and refused to submit a list of those mitigating factors to the jury; and (5) instructed the jury on the definition of mitigating factors. 10 Finally, the defendant challenges the trial court's evidentiary ruling permitting the jury to consider testimony presented by the defendant in mitigation of the death penalty as evidence of an aggravating factor. 11

We conclude both that the state's evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of an aggravating factor and that the jury reasonably could have rejected all the mitigating factors claimed by the defendant. We also conclude, however, that the jury's finding of "no mitigating factor" cannot stand because, as a result of certain ambiguities in the special verdict form and in the trial court's jury instructions, the record does not demonstrate definitively that the jury's verdict rejecting mitigating factors was unanimous. The defendant, therefore, is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.

I CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTE

The defendant challenges the facial validity of the provisions of our death penalty statutes. 12 Specifically, he claims that the capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Although the defendant acknowledges that we have already considered and rejected each of these constitutional claims in State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1133, 130 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1995), he nonetheless asks us to reexamine and reconsider the conclusions reached therein. Upon review of the merits of the defendant's claims, we are persuaded that our constitutional holdings in Ross should be affirmed. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Ross, we reject the defendant's challenges to our capital sentencing scheme that he makes under both the federal and the state constitutions because: (1) the judicial gloss that we placed upon the term "especially cruel" in ...

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  • State v. Breton
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 24 Junio 2003
    ...we reversed the judgment imposing the death penalty and remanded the case for a new penalty phase hearing. State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 260, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995) (Breton II). On remand, the defendant elected to hold his new penalty phase hearing before a three judge panel pursuant to Gen......
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    ...U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 526, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995); State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 250, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995); State v. Jones, 234 Conn. 324, 346-47, 662 A.2d 1199 (1995); State v. Garcia, 233 Conn. 44, 91, 658 A.2d 947 (1995); Ka......
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    ...U.S. 841, 121 S. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000); State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 402-405, 680 A.2d 147 (1996);42 State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 217-18, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995). Accordingly, it was not until 2011, in Rizzo II, that we first seriously explored the scope of the state constitutio......
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4 books & journal articles
  • State constitutional law in the land of steady habits: Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters and the Connecticut Supreme Court.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 60 No. 5, August 1997
    • 6 Agosto 1997
    ...State v. Pratt, 669 A.2d 562 (Conn. 1995). State v. Brown [Brown II], 668 A.2d 128% (Conn. 1995) (supercedes Brown I). State v. Breton, 663 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1995). Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317 (Conn. 1995). Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995). Bauer v. Was......
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    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 71, 1996
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