State v. Breton
Decision Date | 24 June 2003 |
Docket Number | (SC 15876). |
Citation | 824 A.2d 778,264 Conn. 327 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT J. BRETON, SR. |
Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Foti, Schaller and Mihalakos, Js. Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was David B. Bachman, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant) on the proportionality review.
Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were John A. Connelly, state's attorney, and, on the brief, Maureen M. Keegan, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, Robert J. Breton, Sr., appeals from a sentence of death imposed after his conviction of capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 53a-54b (8).1 The defendant was charged with one count of capital felony and two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a)2 for the intentional killings of his former wife, JoAnn Breton, and his son, Robert J. Breton, Jr. After a jury convicted the defendant of all counts, a separate sentencing hearing was conducted pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-46a,3 at which the same jury considered further evidence. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found an aggravating factor and no mitigating factor. In accordance with the jury's findings, the trial court rendered judgment of guilty of capital felony and imposed the death penalty on the defendant. The defendant then appealed to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-46b.4 We concluded that there were ambiguities in the special verdict form and in the trial court's jury instructions in the sentencing phase of the trial and, accordingly, we reversed the judgment imposing the death penalty and remanded the case for a new penalty phase hearing. State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 260, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995) (Breton II).
On remand, the defendant elected to hold his new penalty phase hearing before a three judge panel pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-46a (b) and General Statutes §§ 53a-45 (b)5 and 54-82 (b).6 The chief court administrator appointed a panel, consisting of Judges Fasano, Damiani and Vertefeuille (panel), to hear the case. At the hearing, the state claimed as an aggravating factor that the defendant had committed the offense in an especially cruel manner within the meaning of § 53a-46a (h) (4). The defendant claimed two statutory and twenty-five nonstatutory mitigating factors.7
The panel found that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed both murders in an especially cruel manner. The panel also found that the defendant had proved by a preponderance of the evidence the factual underpinnings of certain claimed nonstatutory mitigating factors,8 but that none of the proved facts alone or in combination constituted mitigation considering all of the facts and circumstances of the case. In accordance with those findings, the panel rendered judgment sentencing the defendant to death. The defendant then appealed to this court.
On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) after the close of evidence, the panel improperly refused to grant a continuance to investigate newly discovered evidence that the defendant claims would have established a new mitigating factor, namely, that he was suffering from a mental impairment at the time that he killed his father in 1966;9 (2) the state improperly failed to disclose, prior to the penalty phase hearing, evidence that the defendant could have used to prove a mitigating factor involving his mental and volitional impairment;10 (3) the panel arbitrarily concluded that the defendant's proved factual claims pertaining to mitigation were not mitigating under the facts and circumstances of this case; (4) the panel improperly found that the defendant's mental and volitional impairment was not a mitigating factor;11 (5) the panel improperly failed to consider the cumulative effect of the defendant's mitigating evidence; (6) the panel improperly considered mitigating evidence produced by the defendant as proof of the aggravating factor; (7) the panel's failure to articulate the basis of its verdict violated the eighth amendment to the United States constitution12 and the defendant's constitutional right to due process; (8) the trial court improperly failed to hold a hearing to determine whether the existence of racial disparities in the administration of the death penalty in Connecticut violated the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights; (9) there was insufficient evidence that the defendant committed the capital felony in an especially cruel manner; (10) the cruel, heinous and depraved aggravating factor is unconstitutional; (11) § 53a-46a is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it provides no meaningful limits on the sentencer's consideration of mitigating factors; and (12) Connecticut's capital sentencing scheme violates the eighth amendment and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution.13 In this appeal, we also conduct mandatory proportionality review of the defendant's sentence pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-46b.
As set forth in Breton II, supra, 235 Conn. 212-14, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts at the guilt phase of the defendant's trial. "The defendant and JoAnn Breton were married in 1967, and had one child, Robert Breton, Jr. [Robert, Jr.]. In January, 1987, JoAnn Breton was divorced from the defendant. Shortly after the divorce, JoAnn and Robert, Jr., then fifteen years old, moved to a two-story apartment located in Waterbury.
The following additional evidence was presented at the second penalty phase hearing. Walter Borden, a psychiatrist, testified that he initially had been retained by the office of the chief public defender to perform a forensic psychiatric evaluation of the defendant in connection with the defendant's first penalty phase hearing. In connection with his evaluation, Borden interviewed the defendant and certain of the defendant's family members, including his sister, Catherine Bunker, and his aunt, Ruth Breton, and reviewed certain psychological reports and public records pertaining to the defendant. Borden testified at the second penalty phase hearing that, during the course of his review, he learned the following relevant facts.
Public welfare records dating from the time of the defendant's early childhood indicated that the defendant's mother, then named Hazel Duffney, was...
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