State v. Brewington, 20246

• Decision Date: 21 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 20246,20246
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Lindbergh BREWINGTON, Jr., Appellant.

Page 249

226 S.E.2d 249

267 S.C. 97

The STATE, Respondent, v. Lindbergh BREWINGTON, Jr., Appellant.

No. 20246.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 21, 1976.

Ray P. McClain, Charleston, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Joseph R. Barker and Staff Atty. Perry M. Buckner, Columbia, and Solicitor J. Dupre Miller, Bennettsville, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Appelalnt was convicted of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature

Appellant was convicted of assault and suspended upon service of seven (7) years, with five (5) years probation. He has appealed, charging that he is entitled to a new trial because of alleged erroneous rulings relative to the admissibility of certain testimony of an accomplice and of the doctor who treated the victim. In the alternative, he asks that the cause be remanded for sentencing under the Youthful Offender Act. While the issues raised require some comment, the clear lack of any meritorious ground of appeal justifies disposition of the matter without oral argument.

On the trial of the case, one Leon Bethea testified in appellant's behalf. Bethea had previously pled guilty to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and had been sentenced in connection with the same incident for which appellant was being tried. It was not disputed that appellant was at the scene with Bethea at the time of the attack in question. The evidence was in conflict as to whether appellant had participated in the assault and the extent of the injuries to the victim. The victim testified that both appellant and Bethea assaulted him. However, Bethea testified that he alone had struck the victim and that, to his knowledge, appellant did not participate in the assault.

During cros-examination of Bethea, the solicitor was permitted, over objection, to elicit the fact that Bethea had previously entered a plea of guilty to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature in connection with the incident in question and was at that time serving the sentence imposed.

Appellant was indicted for assault and battery with intent to kill, but a directed verdict as to that offense was granted at the close of the State's case, leaving the charge of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. The trial judge also submitted the lesser included offense of simple assault and battery.

It is contended that the prior guilty plea of Bethea, the accomplice, was irrelevant to a determination of the guilt of appellant and its admission highly prejudicial since there was a question of the degree of the offense.

Since it is the function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, 'as a general rule, anything having a legitimate tendency to throw light on the accuracy, truthfulness, and sincerity of a witness may be shown and considered in determining the credit to be accorded his testimony,' 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 460; and 'on cross-examination, any fact may be elicited which tends to show interest, bias, or partiality' of the witness, 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 560a.

The testimony showed the Bethea and appellant were present at the time of the assault and, therefore, the extent of participation by each and their relationship became relevant inquiries. As pointed out by the trial judge, Bethea's testimony was for the purpose of exculpating appellant by taking full blame for the assault. Since Bethea was seeking to accept full responsibility, testimony of his previous plea and sentence was properly admitted as it might affect his interest, bias, or motive. Testimony that he had previously pled guilty and had been sentenced might possibly bolster his testimony that he alone committed the crime; or, on the other hand, since he had...