State v. Brian Rice State
| Decision Date | 20 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 99,No. 98,No. 96,No. 97,96,97,98,99 |
| Parties | STATE OF MARYLAND v. BRIAN RICE STATE OF MARYLAND v. EDWARD NERO STATE OF MARYLAND v. GARRETT MILLER ALICIA WHITE & CAESAR GOODSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
CRIMINAL LAW — PROPER PARTIES TO AN APPEAL — The proper parties to an appeal are those who are "so closely and directly connected with the subject matter" of the litigation that they "will either gain or lose" by the court's decision. In the context of a trial court's decision to compel a witness to give immunized testimony, the witness is the proper party to the appeal, not the defendant in whose trial the witness will testify. As a result, only Officer Porter has standing to challenge the trial court's decision to compel his testimony, not Lieutenant Rice, Officer Nero, or Officer Miller.
CRIMINAL LAW — STATE'S RIGHT TO APPEAL — An order issued by a court exercising criminal jurisdiction may nevertheless constitute an appealable final judgment if the relief sought is collateral to the criminal case against the defendant and settles the matter between the parties to whom the order applies. Because a motion to compel a witness to testify in a criminal case is collateral to the underlying prosecution and concerns only the State and the witness, resolution of the motion constitutes a final judgment that is immediately appealable.
COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS — MOTION TO COMPEL IMMUNIZED TESTIMONY — Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article § 9-123 requires a trial court to order compelled immunized testimony once the court has verified that the State satisfied the statutory pleading requirements. The court lacks the discretion to deny a properly pled motion to compel on the ground that the compelled testimony is not in the public interest.
COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION — FIFTH AMENDMENT — Compelling a witness to testify under a grant of use and derivative use immunity satisfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment even if that witness may later face trial regarding the same subject matter. If the witness is later prosecuted, the State bears a "heavy burden" to prove that the evidence offered was not derived from the witness's immunized testimony. Any concern that the State will not satisfy its burden is premature until the witness's trial.
COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION — ARTICLE 22 — For purposes of a witness's entitlement to invoke the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is interpreted as in pari materia with the Fifth Amendment. Because use and derivative use immunity sufficiently protects a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege, it likewise protects a witness's privilege under the State constitution.
No. 96 - Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 115141035
No. 97 - Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 115141033
No. 98 - Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 115141034
No. 99 - Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case Nos. 115141036 & 115141032
Barbera, C.J. *Battaglia Greene Adkins McDonald Watts Hotten, JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, C.J.
*Battaglia, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of the case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
On April 12, 2015, Freddie Gray suffered an injury while in police custody; one week later, he died from those injuries. The State charged six Baltimore City police officers with crimes in connection with the events leading up to Mr. Gray's death—Officer William Porter, Officer Caesar Goodson, Sergeant Alicia White, Lieutenant Brian Rice, Officer Edward Nero, and Officer Garrett Miller. The first of those officers to face trial was Officer Porter. His trial began on November 30, 2015, and, after the jurors could not reach a verdict, it ended in a mistrial on December 16, 2015. At the heart of this appeal is whether Officer Porter, who the State has indicated it will retry, can now be compelled by the State, before his retrial, to provide immunized testimony against the remaining officers. In the cases of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White, the trial court granted the State's motion to compel Officer Porter's testimony. In the cases of Lieutenant Rice, Officer Nero, and Officer Miller, the trial court denied that same motion.
On March 8, 2016, we issued two Per Curiam Orders affirming the judgments of the Circuit Court in Officer Goodson's and Sergeant White's cases; reversing the judgments of the Circuit Court in the cases of Lieutenant Rice, Officer Nero, and Officer Miller; and lifting the stays in each case to allow the trials to move forward. We now explain our reasons for those Orders. We hold that the State's compelling Officer Porter to testify in the trials of his fellow officers, under the grant of use and derivative use immunity, does not violate Officer Porter's privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. We further hold that the trial court lacks the discretion to deny a properly pled motion to compel immunized testimony and that the denial of such amotion constitutes a final judgment from which the State can appeal immediately.
Most lawyers and lay people alike learn from law school, television, or movies that all persons in this country enjoy a privilege to be free from compelled self-incrimination. What many may not know is that the prosecutor may supplant that privilege through the grant of immunity to one whose testimony is sought in a criminal trial. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the power of the State to compel a witness to testify is at the core of the proper functioning of our criminal justice system. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-44 (1972). A witness's constitutional privilege, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is preserved through application of immunity statutes, which balance the witness's privilege against compelled self-incrimination with the legitimate power of government to compel persons to testify. U.S. Const. amend. V (); Md. Decl. of Rts. art. 22 (). Because "many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime," immunity statutes have been referred to as "part of our constitutional fabric." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446-47 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)).
Three varieties of immunity have developed in Anglo-American jurisprudence, each offering varied levels of protection to the witness. "Use" immunity offers the leastprotection—although the State is barred from using any immunized testimony against the witness in a later criminal prosecution, the State is not precluded from using evidence derived from that testimony. See id. at 454 (). On the other end of the spectrum is "transactional immunity," which precludes the State from prosecuting the witness for any conduct arising out of the substance of the witness's testimony. In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 684 (1986). Between those two ends is "use and derivative use" immunity, where the State is precluded from using in a later prosecution both the witness's compelled testimony and any information directly or indirectly derived from that testimony. Id.
The Supreme Court held in Counselman that use immunity does not afford a witness sufficient protection to supplant the Fifth Amendment privilege. 142 U.S. at 564. The Court concluded that use immunity does not protect the witness to the same extent that a claim of the privilege would protect him because it does not "prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him." Id. at 564-65. Because the Court also stated that a valid immunity statute "must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates," that decision was long interpreted to mean that transactional immunity was required to preserve a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege. See id. at 586 (emphasis added); see also Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 275 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ().
The Supreme Court clarified in Kastigar, however, that use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with the scope of a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege and transactional immunity is not required to pass constitutional muster. See 406 U.S. at 453 (). The Court explained that a grant of immunity need only provide that level of protection that the exercise of the privilege itself would offer. Id. at 453-54. Because the Fifth Amendment privilege is designed to prevent the witness from "being forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of penalties affixed to criminal acts," immunizing the witness's "compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection." Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The Kastigar Court cautioned,...
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