State v. Bridges

Decision Date02 December 1991
Citation252 N.J.Super. 286,599 A.2d 919
PartiesSTATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Dwight Robert BRIDGES, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Merrill N. Rubin, Weehawken, for defendant-appellant.

Robert J. Del Tufo, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (Nancy Peremes Barton, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the letter brief).

Schachter, Trombadore, Offen, Stanton & Pavics, Somerville, for The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, filed an amicus curiae brief (Thomas A. Pavics on the brief).

Before Judges J.H. COLEMAN, BILDER and STERN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

COLEMAN, J.H., P.J.A.D.

The novel issue raised in this appeal is whether a split sentence permitted by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b(2) involves a "term of imprisonment ... or other disposition" within the contemplation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12. The answer is dispositive of whether a judge has discretion to sentence below the agreed upon "term of imprisonment." We hold that a split sentence constitutes a "term of imprisonment" within contemplation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.

Defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree distribution of cocaine within 1,000 feet of school property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, to recommend a probationary sentence conditioned upon defendant serving 364 days in the Hunterdon County Jail. On June 15, 1990, the sentencing judge concluded that based on N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 he did not "have discretion to deviate from that agreement unless the agreement were to be, of course, rejected in its entirety." He sentenced defendant to two years of probation and as a condition of probation, required defendant to serve 364 days in the county jail. Defendant was assessed a $1,000 Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction penalty, a $50 laboratory fee and a penalty of $30 payable to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board. The sentence was stayed pending disposition of this appeal.

On this appeal, defendant contends that " N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 sets out limits upon the discretion of the Court under a negotiated plea" and that "such limits on the Court's discretion are not intended to encompass decisions relating to conditions of probation." Thus defendant argues that the sentencing judge had the discretionary authority "to impose a term of probation without conditions or with less onerous conditions than those recommended by the State." In an amicus brief, The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey argues that the judge had discretion under the plea agreement based on N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, to impose a probationary sentence with less than 364 days of incarceration in the county jail.

I

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 directs that a person found guilty of third-degree distribution of cocaine within 1,000 feet of school property, "shall, except as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment ... [and] the term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term which shall be fixed at ... three years...." An exception to the mandatory imprisonment and mandatory minimum term of parole ineligibility is contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12. That statute, in pertinent part, provides:

Whenever an offense defined in this chapter specifies a mandatory sentence of imprisonment which includes a minimum term during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole ... the court upon conviction shall impose the mandatory sentence unless the defendant has pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement ... which provides for a lesser sentence or period of parole ineligibility. The negotiated plea ... may provide for a specified term of imprisonment within the range of ordinary or extended sentences authorized by law, ... a specified fine, or other disposition. In that event, the court at sentencing shall not impose a lesser term of imprisonment, period of parole ineligibility or fine than that expressly provided for under the terms of the plea ... agreement. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (emphasis added).]

The legislative scheme embodied in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 places a limitation upon judicial sentencing discretion by requiring that a mandatory minimum sentence be imposed for certain offenses. See State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 80, 455 A.2d 1074 (1983). Recognizing the harshness of that statute, the Legislature opted to permit some leeway to the prosecutor to negotiate a lesser sentence. See State v. Todd, 238 N.J.Super. 445, 461, 570 A.2d 20 (App.Div.1990). Hence, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986 (Drug Reform Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 et seq. When enacting this statute, the Legislature was aware that under a traditional plea agreement, a sentencing judge is free to sentence up to and below the maximum prescribed by the plea agreement, provided the judge adheres to the proper sentencing guidelines. See State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 558 A.2d 1312 (1989). Stated another way, a sentencing judge ordinarily has a wide range of sentencing discretion within a plea agreement so long as the sentence does not exceed the maximum provided by the agreement. By inserting the last sentence in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, the Legislature wanted to restrict the sentencing judge's discretion. See Official Commentary to the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, 9 Crim.Just.Q. 149, 161 (1987). The constitutional boundary of the Legislature's limitation upon the judge's discretion has been thoroughly analyzed in State v. Todd, supra, 238 N.J.Super. at 450-462, 570 A.2d 20, and is not implicated in this appeal.

Defendant argues that a probationary sentence with or without a term of incarceration is an "other disposition" under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 for which, because of the absence of that phrase in the last sentence of the statute, the judge has discretion to sentence below the negotiated agreement. The Legislature's intended meaning of the words "or other disposition" must be gleaned from the context in which the words were used. See State v. Jones, 197 N.J.Super. 604, 609, 485 A.2d 1063 (App.Div.1984), overruled on other grounds in State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 408, 522 A.2d 423 (1987). Here, the words "or other disposition" were used when outlining the permissible content of a negotiated agreement. Such an agreement "may provide for a specified term of imprisonment within the range of ordinary or extended sentences authorized by law, ... a specified fine, or other disposition." Analyzed in that context, the words "or other disposition" denote that the agreement could also provide for dispositions other than imprisonment, with or without parole ineligibility, and fines. Viewed in that manner, we must determine what the "other disposition[s]" are.

II

We repeat that the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 is to permit the prosecutor to make an agreement "which provides for a sentence or [lesser] period of parole ineligibility" within the "range of ordinary or extended sentences authorized by law" for violating the Drug Reform Act. The range of an ordinary sentence for violation of the Drug Reform Act is specified in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6. As for extended terms, the range of sentence is found in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, 5, 7, 9; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f; and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7. Similarly, the periods of parole ineligibility which may be part of a negotiated agreement for drug offenses are described in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3; N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b; N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6b; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7b; and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7c.

In addition, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 permits the negotiated agreement to reduce the fines for drug offenses. Those fines are denominated in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11. Up to this point we have simply cataloged the statutory provisions which specify terms of imprisonment, ordinary and extended, and the fines authorized by the Legislature for drug offenses for which N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 permits a negotiated agreement. There may be further possibilities.

The focus must now shift to the additional sentencing dispositions available to a judge when imposing sentence pursuant to an N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 agreement or otherwise. The controlling statute is N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2 which directs that all persons convicted of an offense shall be sentenced in accordance with Chapter 43 of The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Criminal Code) unless otherwise provided under the Criminal Code. The classification of drug offenses by degree of crime or as a disorderly persons offense under Chapters 35 and 36 of the Drug Reform Act has made the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code applicable to violations of the Drug Reform Act. See L. 1987, c. 106, § 8; State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 286-287, 526 A.2d 1015 (1987); State v. Matthews, 233 N.J.Super. 291 296, 298, 558 A.2d 1329 (App.Div.1989); State v. Flippen, 208 N.J.Super. 573, 576, 506 A.2d 768 (App.Div.1986); State v. Sobel, 183 N.J.Super. 473, 478-479, 444 A.2d 598 (App.Div.1982). Indeed, it was the Drug Reform Act, of which N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 is a part, which classified drug offenses by degree of crime, thereby removing the only obstacle to making all of the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code applicable to drug offenses. In doing so, sentencing for drug offenses has become a part of "[A]n elaborate and integrated scheme [which] correlates crime to sentencing options." State v. Sainz, supra, 107 N.J. at 287, 526 A.2d 1015.

III

It is important to bear in mind that so far we have been discussing a negotiated agreement which provides for ordinary and/or extended terms of imprisonment, parole ineligibility and/or fines. In such matters, the potential sentencing dispositions are authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2b. Subsection 2b(3) permits a sentence to a term of imprisonment, ordinary or extended, with or without a term of parole...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • State v. Bridges
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1993
    ...once it had accepted the plea agreement, to sentence below the "term of imprisonment" recommended by the State. 252 N.J.Super. 286, 295, 599 A.2d 919 (1991). The court reasoned that because imprisonment as a condition of probation is a "term of imprisonment," section 12 precludes the senten......
  • Watkins v. Davis
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • August 31, 1992
    ... ... 39:6A-1, et seq., and therefore plaintiffs (sic) have failed to state (a) cause of action against defendants (sic) ...         The defendant has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the basis that ... ...
  • State v. Thompson
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • August 13, 2021
    ... ... reject it in the interest of justice. The judge has no ... discretion, if the judge accepts the agreement, to sentence ... below the terms of the agreement which do not call for some ... "other disposition." ... [State v. Bridges, 252 N.J.Super. 286, 295 (App ... Div. 1991)] ... Before ... us, defendant argues his sentence equates to an extended term ... because it includes a parole disqualifier, which is not ... required under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-(b)(3). He maintains his ... ...
  • State v. McPhall
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • January 24, 1994
    ...for the possession of cocaine. He, too, applied for admission to ISP and was admitted on a trial basis. In State v. Bridges, 252 N.J.Super. 286, 293-94, 599 A.2d 919 (App.Div.1991), aff'd 131 N.J. 402, 414, 621 A.2d 1 (1993), we held the sentencing court may not deviate from a split sentenc......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT