State v. Briggs

Decision Date31 October 2008
Docket NumberNo. 20070186.,20070186.
Citation197 P.3d 628,2008 UT 75
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ashlee Marie BRIGGS, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Kenneth A. Bronston, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, Craig C. Halls, Monticello, for plaintiff.

William L. Schultz, Monticello, for defendant.

AMENDED OPINION*

On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

¶ 1 The trial court, after a bench trial, convicted defendant Ashlee Briggs of possession with intent to distribute, a tax stamp violation, and possession of drug paraphernalia. She challenges the convictions, arguing insufficiency of the evidence. Because we do not find that the trial court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In October 2006, Ashlee Briggs was arrested while returning from a trip to Phoenix with Antonio Martinez. Briggs and Martinez had met each other through a mutual friend, and Martinez had offered to pay Briggs $200 to drive him to Phoenix in a rental car because he did not have a driver's license. Martinez testified at trial that he told Briggs that the trip was to visit his mother and to "pick up some weed." Briggs denied this at trial; she testified that Martinez never told her about the drugs, and she did not think that the purpose of the trip was to obtain drugs.1 However, Briggs testified that she knew before the trip that Martinez had drug connections, and she admitted that she knew she would only be paid for driving if they were able to pick up the drugs.2

¶ 3 After driving to Phoenix, the two stayed in a hotel room paid for by Martinez. During this time, Martinez came and went from the hotel, but Briggs did not leave the hotel for their entire stay. Briggs spoke frequently with her boyfriend, Johnathon Simpson, while she was at the hotel, and she asked Simpson to come get her because she had grown uncomfortable with Martinez.3 Simpson denied her request, and Briggs' cell phone service was cut off while she was in Phoenix. Briggs decided to make the trip home with Martinez.

¶ 4 On the morning of October 23, before they left Phoenix, Briggs and Martinez met Martinez's friend, Courtney, and Martinez purchased a package of marijuana. The parties' recollections differ as to where the purchase took place and what the circumstances of the purchase were, but Martinez testified that Briggs was not involved in the purchase. Nonetheless, both Martinez and Briggs testified that a sample of the marijuana was passed around while they were still in Phoenix, and the trial court found that Briggs knew at this time that the item to be transported was a brick of marijuana.

¶ 5 On their return trip to Grand Junction, Officer Workman pulled Briggs and Martinez over near Blanding, Utah, because he did not see any license plates on their vehicle. After routine questioning and inspection of the rental agreement for the vehicle, Officer Workman discovered that neither Briggs nor Martinez was listed as a driver on the rental agreement. Officer Workman questioned Briggs about the vehicle and eventually told Briggs and Martinez that they were free to go. However, before they left, Officer Workman asked if he could ask them some more questions and inquired if they had "Any marijuana? Any cocaine? Any methamphetamine?" Briggs and Martinez responded that they did not and consented to a search of their vehicle.

¶ 6 Officer Workman's search uncovered a small green pipe that belonged to Martinez inside of Briggs' bag. The pipe had evidence of having been used to smoke marijuana. Officer Workman also discovered 2.2 pounds of marijuana in a drawer underneath the front passenger seat and $2,640 in a ziplock bag in the sunglass holder of the vehicle. Following these discoveries, Briggs and Martinez were placed under arrest and taken to the police station for questioning.

¶ 7 At trial, Officer Workman testified that when questioned, Briggs admitted that she assumed the trip to Phoenix was being made for drugs and that Martinez had paid for their hotel room with money that was for drugs.4 In her own testimony, Briggs admitted that she knew that the pipe in her bag was used for smoking marijuana, that Martinez had been smoking marijuana on the trip, and that she was trying to hide the pipe when she put it in her bag. Briggs also testified that she had used marijuana in the past, although she had not smoked it for six months. When the officers questioned Martinez about the marijuana, he told them that he had intended to deliver half of the marijuana to a friend in Grand Junction. Martinez also testified at trial that he told the officers that Briggs had nothing to do with the marijuana but that she did know it was in the vehicle.

¶ 8 The trial court found that given the circumstances surrounding the trip, it was unreasonable that Briggs did not know that the purpose of the trip was to get drugs. The court also found that Briggs knew in Phoenix about the marijuana and, based on her experience with marijuana, she knew that the quantity of marijuana was suitable for commercial sale and not just personal use. Given these findings, the trial court found that Briggs knowingly and intentionally helped Martinez and found her guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a tax stamp violation, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

¶ 9 Briggs now appeals her conviction on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to convict her on any of the three counts against her. Briggs filed a timely notice of appeal with the court of appeals. The court of appeals subsequently certified the case for transfer to this court pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b) (2008).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 Because we are asked to review the results of a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we will only reverse if the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is `against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[ ] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, ¶ 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (quoting State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987))).

¶ 11 Additionally, "in those instances in which the trial court's findings include inferences drawn from the evidence, we will not take issue with those inferences unless the logic upon which their extrapolation from the evidence is based is so flawed as to render the inference clearly erroneous." Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, ¶ 18, 181 P.3d 791 (citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 At trial, the State based its case against Briggs in part on the theory of accomplice liability, and the trial court relied on this theory in convicting Briggs of all three counts.

I. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
A. Intent Requirement Under Accomplice Liability

¶ 13 To show that a defendant is guilty under accomplice liability, the State must show that an individual acted with both the intent that the underlying offense be committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the offense. "Every person acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2003); see also State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Utah 1986) ("Prior knowledge does not make a person an accomplice when that person does not have the mental state required and does not solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid in perpetration of the crime."). The criminal intent of a party may be inferred from circumstances such as "`presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense....'" Am. Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ¶ 7, 12 P.3d 108 (quoting Watson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 645, 448 S.E.2d 752, 753 (1994)).

¶ 14 An accomplice must therefore have the intent that the underlying offense be committed. See State v. Comish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977) ("[A]n `accomplice' is one who participates in a crime in such a way that he could be charged and tried for the same offense."). However, it is not necessary for the accomplice to have the same intent that the principal actor possessed as long as the accomplice intended that an offense be committed. See State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994) ("Party liability under section 76-2-202 does not require that the persons involved in the criminal conduct have the same mental state."). An accomplice will be held criminally responsible to the degree of his own mental state, not that of the principal. See State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983). This prevents an individual who is charged as an accomplice from escaping criminal liability by arguing that the principal actor had a lower intent or diminished capacity when the crime was committed. Id. Therefore, the first step in applying accomplice liability is to determine whether the individual charged as an accomplice had the intent that an underlying offense be committed.

¶ 15 Additionally, when prosecuting an accomplice for aiding in the commission of a crime, the State must show that the accomplice had the intent to aid. See State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, ¶ 46, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We conclude that the placement of the word `intentionally' directly before the word `aids' evinces a clear legislative intent that `intentionally' modify only that word."). An accomplice must intentionally aid in the commission of a crime to be held criminally liable. See Schreuder, 726 P.2d...

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