State v. Brinkley

• Decision Date: 21 December 1909
• Citation: 105 P. 708,55 Or. 134
• Parties: STATE v. BRINKLEY.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

105 P. 708

55 Or. 134

STATE v. BRINKLEY.

Supreme Court of Oregon

December 21, 1909

Action by the State of Oregon against Ira Brinkley. On motion for rehearing. Rehearing denied.

For former opinion, see 104 P. 893.

EAKIN, J.

The attorneys for the defendant have presented a very lengthy and forcible argument, urging a rehearing in this case upon the theory that the verdict of guilty against the defendant is based on an inference deduced from an inference, and that otherwise the corpus delicti is not proven. But this whole argument is dependent upon the assumption that the corpus delicti must be established by proof aliunde the confessions or admissions of the defendant. This assumption is erroneous. A confession by a defendant may be a naked statement that he is guilty of a crime, or it may be a full statement of the circumstances of its commission, including his part in it and the rule is that his statement of extraneous facts, not involving guilt, even when the confession is not admissible because not voluntary, or for other reasons, may be received against a defendant as evidence of such facts. 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 678, says: "Although confessions made by threats or promises are not evidence, yet if they are attended by extraneous facts which show that they are true, any such facts which may be thus developed, and which go to prove the existence of the crime of which the defendant was suspected, will be received as testimony; e.g where the party thus confessing points out or tells where the stolen property is. *** But when the search is successful and the inculpatory thing is thus identified, this necessarily brings with it the reception in evidence of the defendant's statements giving the clue." To the same effect is 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, §§ 170, 231; and also 3 Enc. of Evidence, 341. This rule was followed in State v Reinhart, 26 Or. 477, 38 P. 822, where it was insisted that the entries by the defendant in the books of the firm are in the nature of a confession and insufficient to convict, unless there is other evidence that the firm actually lost some money. Chief Justice Bean says in the case above cited: "We cannot concur in this position. A 'confession,' in a legal sense, is restricted to an acknowledgment of guilt made by a person after an offense has been committed, and does not apply to a mere statement or declaration of an independent fact from which such guilt may be inferred. The entries of the defendant in the books of account which he was required to keep are not confessions or admissions of guilt, but are perfectly innocent in themselves. *** We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that the books of account kept by the defendant are sufficient to prove the corpus delicti." In State v. Rogoway, 45 Or. 610, 78 P. 987, 81 P. 234, defendant's statements, independent of the confessions, were recognized as part of the proof of the corpus delicti, as tending to show criminal agency. The same holding is found in State v. Mims, 26 Minn. 186, 2 N.W. 494, 683. In State v. Crowder, 41 Kan. 101, 21 P. 208, it is held that "admissions by persons accused of crime suggesting the inference that such crime was in fact committed as alleged are always admissible against the person making the admission." See cases there cited. "It [the statement of the defendant] is a most satisfactory establishment of the fact that money was offered Wilson not to testify, and that is the limit of the legal effect that can be given it."

To the same effect are People v. Miller, 122...