State v. Brist

• Decision Date: 22 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. A10–0979.,A10–0979.
• Citation: 812 N.W.2d 51
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Amy Lynn BRIST, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

812 N.W.2d 51

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Amy Lynn BRIST, Appellant.

No. A10–0979.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 22, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

The admission at trial of a coconspirator's statement, made unwittingly to a government informant in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not violate the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Joan M. Eichhorst, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and David Hauser, Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, MN, for respondent.

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

STRAS, Justice.

Appellant Amy Lynn Brist appeals from her convictions on six controlled substance crimes. Brist argues that the admission of an audio recording of a statement made by her nontestifying coconspirator to a confidential government informant during a drug transaction violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because we are bound by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), which is identical to this case in all material respects, we affirm Brist's convictions.

I.

A confidential informant (“CI”) working with the West Central Minnesota Drug Task Force made five separate controlled buys of methamphetamine from Brist's boyfriend, Johnny Garcia. After the fifth controlled buy, the police arrested Brist and Garcia. The State charged Brist with six counts of aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit controlled substance crimes.

At trial, the district court allowed the State to introduce, over Brist's objection, an audio recording of a conversation between Garcia and the CI during the first controlled buy. The CI captured the conversation with Garcia through a hidden, on-body audio recorder. The district court ruled that Garcia's statements in the recording were admissible against Brist under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) because the State had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Garcia made the statements in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy between Brist and Garcia.¹

The recording begins with the following exchange:

CI: Got any (inaudible) or what.

Garcia: (inaudible words)

CI: All I can get together is two bills now.

Garcia: Yeah?

CI: (inaudible words)

Garcia: A quarter that she owes ya. I don't know ... I don't know what you want. I got (inaudible words) probably a gram inside.

Garcia's statement, “[a] quarter that she owes ya,” was an important piece of evidence connecting Brist to the conspiracy. The CI testified at trial that Garcia made the statement while handing the CI two packages containing a total of .9 grams of methamphetamine and the statement referenced a prior transaction in which Brist had sold subpar methamphetamine to the CI. The State then used Garcia's statement in its closing argument to argue that Brist and Garcia were members of a conspiracy to sell controlled substances. Garcia did not testify at trial, and Brist had no prior opportunity to cross-examine him.

A jury found Brist guilty of each of the six counts with which she was charged. The district court convicted Brist of all six counts and sentenced her to 68 months in prison. The court also ordered Brist to participate in chemical-dependency treatment during her incarceration and to reside in a halfway house after her release from prison.

The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. State v. Brist, 799 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.App.2011). The court concluded that the admission at trial of the statement in question, “[a] quarter that she owes ya,” did not violate Brist's Confrontation Clause rights because the statement was nontestimonial. Id. at 242 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). The court therefore affirmed Brist's convictions. Id. However, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to modify Brist's sentence because the district court lacked authority “to impose conditions on incarceration or supervised release.” Id. at 242–43 (concluding that such authority “resides with the Commissioner of Corrections”). We granted Brist's petition for review on the question of whether admission into evidence of Garcia's recordedstatement violated the Confrontation Clause.

II.

When the State seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement by the defendant's coconspirator under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), a two-part test applies to determine admissibility. First, the statement “must satisfy the requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).” State v. Larson, 788 N.W.2d 25, 36 (Minn.2010). Second, the introduction of the statement “must not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Brist does not challenge the admissibility of Garcia's statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), nor does Brist argue that the Minnesota Constitution's Confrontation Clause, Minn. Const. art. I, § 6, presents a separate bar to the admissibility of Garcia's statement. Therefore, the sole issue before us is whether the admission of the statement, “[a] quarter that she owes ya,” violated Brist's Sixth Amendment rights.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 400–08, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (incorporating the protections of the Confrontation Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

The Supreme Court of the United States is the “final arbiter of the meaning and application of” the United States Constitution. Glover v. Minneapolis Bldg. Trades Council, 215 Minn. 533, 535, 10 N.W.2d 481, 482 (1943) (emphasis added); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (stating the Court has “final authority” over interpretation of the United States Constitution). As a result, Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law, including the interpretation and application of the United States Constitution, is binding on this court. Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Floor Decorators' Union, 229 Minn. 87, 100, 39 N.W.2d 183, 190–91 (1949). We have therefore recognized that, when we consider matters arising under the United States Constitution, we are bound to apply Supreme Court decisions that are on point and are good law. See Meadowbrook Manor, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Park, 258 Minn. 266, 273, 104 N.W.2d 540, 545 (1960); City of Waseca v. Braun, 206 Minn. 154, 165, 288 N.W. 229, 234 (1939); State v. Weyerhauser, 72 Minn. 519, 519–20, 75 N.W. 718, 718 (1898).

A.

A Supreme Court decision is on point when it resolves the federal question presented for our review. Two factors guide our analysis in determining whether a decision is on point. The most important consideration is whether the Supreme Court decision resolved the same, disputed question of federal law. See Meadowbrook Manor, 258 Minn. at 272, 104 N.W.2d at 545 (concluding that notice by newspaper publication of a special assessment on real property did not comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on three Supreme Court decisions, even though this court had previously upheld notice by publication in similar circumstances); Glover, 215 Minn. at 535–38, 10 N.W.2d at 482–83 (holding that peaceful picketing is protected through the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the basis of five Supreme Court decisions examining the question). That is because the Supreme Court has the final word on the meaning of federal law. Glover, 215 Minn. at 535, 10 N.W.2d at 482. We also consider the degree of similarity between the facts of the Supreme Court case and the facts of the case before us. See id. at 535–36, 10 N.W.2d at 482–84 (reasoning that a Supreme Court decision was “binding and conclusive” on this court because it involved materially identical facts). That is because the Supreme Court is also the “final arbiter” on the application of federal law. Id. at 535, 10 N.W.2d at 482.

Based on the factual and legal identity of Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), and this case, the State argues that the admissibility of Garcia's recorded statement in this case is controlled by Bourjaily. In Bourjaily, Bourjaily's coconspirator agreed to purchase cocaine from a confidential government informant in a hotel parking lot. Id. at 173–74, 107 S.Ct. 2775. During the tape-recorded conversation arranging the drug buy, the coconspirator explained to the informant that he would retrieve the cocaine from the informant's car and then transfer the drugs to Bourjaily, who would be waiting in a parked car nearby. Id. After the coconspirator transferred the cocaine to Bourjaily, FBI agents arrested them both. Id.

Bourjaily argued that the government's use at trial of his nontestifying coconspirator's tape-recorded statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Id. at 181–82, 107 S.Ct. 2775. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 183–84, 107 S.Ct. 2775. The Court first held that the district court had properly admitted the statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).²Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181, 107 S.Ct. 2775. The Court then held that admission of the statements into evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the requirements for admissibility of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) are “identical” to the requirements for admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182–84, 107 S.Ct. 2775. As the Court stated:

[C]o-conspirators' statements, when made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, have a long tradition of being outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion. A...