State v. Britton

• Decision Date: 21 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17412.,17412.
• Citation: State v. Britton, 929 A.2d 312, 283 Conn. 598 (Conn. 2007)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Abin BRITTON.

929 A.2d 312

283 Conn. 598

STATE of Connecticut v.Abin BRITTON.

No. 17412.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 11, 2007.

Decided August 21, 2007.

Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, and Peter A. McShane, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE,

ZARELLA and SULLIVAN, Js.^*

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The defendant, Abin Britton, appeals directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3)¹ from his judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)(1), two counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A) and (B), and one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a)(1).The defendant was acquitted of charges of capital felony, murder and felony murder.

The defendant raises two issues on appeal.First, he contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made to police based on the court's conclusion that the defendant was not in custody and therefore could give police a statement regarding his involvement in the murder of the victim, James Connor, without having been given Miranda warnings.²Second, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly deprived him of a fair trial and an impartial jury by explaining to the jury that if the defendant were found guilty of capital felony, during the penalty phase, the jury would hear evidence regarding the aggravating factor set forth in General Statutes § 53a-46a (i)(1), that is, that the offense charged had occurred during the commission of a felony and that the defendant previously had been convicted of the same felony.We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts.The victim visited his parents at their boat located in the Essex Marina at approximately 11 p.m. on August 22, 1998, the night he later was killed.He was accompanied by two female friends, and after a short visit, the victim told his parents that he and his friends were going to a nearby bar called the Black Seal.The victim drove his father's grey Saab 9000 four door sedan to the Black Seal and left sometime before 1:30 a.m.The victim then drove alone to Lucky's Café (Lucky's), looking to purchase crack cocaine.The victim met the defendant, Gregory Pierre and Jeffrey Smith at Lucky's, and, after the defendant stated that he could get the victim some cocaine, they all left the bar in order to complete the drug transaction.

The victim bought two small bags of crack cocaine in exchange for $20, and he and the defendant, with Pierre and Smith following in a separate vehicle, drove to Pierre's apartment complex in New London so that the victim could use the drugs he had just purchased.Once they arrived at the apartment complex, Pierre Smith and the defendant pulled the victim out of the Saab and beat him.When this attack ceased, the victim was badly injured but still alive.The three men then put the victim into the backseat of the Saab and brought him to a nearby parking lot abutting Bates Woods, a park in New London.They pulled the victim out of the car once more, and this time beat him to death.Pierre, Smith and the defendant then dragged the victim's body into Bates Woods, where they covered the body with dirt and plastic bags.The defendant disposed of the victim's Saab by pushing it into a small pond behind the Waterford police department.

According to Harrison Fortier, a sergeant with the Waterford police department, the police were alerted at approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 23, 1998, that a car had been abandoned with its front tires submerged in the duck pond near the police station.Upon looking inside the car, Fortier noticed red stains, which led him to believe that someone may have been injured inside.Fortier cross-referenced the license plate of the vehicle with the department of motor vehicles and discovered that the car was registered to Donald Connor, the victim's father.Police also found two palm prints on the outside of the vehicle, which were later identified as matching the defendant's palms.

In January, 1999, a badly decomposed body was found in Bates Woods.Harold Wayne Carver II, chief medical examiner for the state, examined the remains and identified them as belonging to the victim.Carver classified the manner of death as a homicide.

In the course of their investigation, the police developed a list of three suspects — Pierre, Smith and the defendant—who they believed were responsible for the victim's death.Detectives Thomas Murray of the Connecticut state police and Rod Gaynor of the New London police department visited one of these suspects the defendant, in order to obtain his palm prints.Murray and Gaynor went to the defendant's home and asked him to accompany them to the police station, where they took his palm prints and then turned him over to Detectives James McGlynn of the Connecticut state police and David Gigliotti of the New London police department for questioning.McGlynn and Gigliotti informed the defendant repeatedly that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at any time.The door to the office where the detectives interviewed the defendant was not locked, and the defendant was not handcuffed.The defendant gave a statement while at the police station describing his involvement in the victim's death and also drew a diagram of where he said the victim's body was located.McGlynn and Gigliotti drove the defendant home at the conclusion of the interview.

The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged in connection with the victim's death.The defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress both his statements and the diagram he had drawn for the police.The defendant claimed that the statements and the map had been procured in the course of a custodial interrogation, but without the necessary Miranda warnings having been given to him.After a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress.After the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree manslaughter, first degree kidnapping and first degree robbery.The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of eighty-five years imprisonment.This appeal followed.Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the statements he had made to police regarding the murder, wherein he claimed that the police had subjected him to custodial interrogation without apprising him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694(1966).The defendant also claims that the trial court determined that the defendant was not in custody without properly taking into account the totality of the circumstances.We conclude that the trial court properly determined that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have believed that he was in custody at the time he made his statements to police and, therefore, his Miranda rights had not yet attached.Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress.

"Two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by Miranda:(1)the defendant must have been in custody; and (2)the defendant must have been subjected to police interrogation.[Id., at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602]....As stated by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Beheler,[463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275(1983)], [a]lthough the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.[Oregon v. Mathiason,429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714(1977)]....Further, the United States Supreme Court has adopted an objective, reasonable person test for determining whether a defendant is in custody....Thus, in determining whether Miranda rights are required, the only relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest."(Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Tomasko,238 Conn. 253, 267-68, 681 A.2d 922(1996).

"The defendant bears the burden of proving that he was in custody for Miranda purposes. . . .Two discrete inquiries are essential to determine custody: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. . . .The first inquiry is factual, and we will not overturn the trial court's determination of the historical circumstances surrounding the defendant's interrogation unless it is clearly erroneous....The second inquiry, however, calls for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts....The ultimate determination of whether a defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation, therefore, presents a mixed question of law and fact, over which our review is de novo."(Internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Kirby,280 Conn. 361, 393-94, 908 A.2d 506(2006).

In the present case, the defendant does not challenge the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but, rather, challenges the trial court's determination that the defendant was not in...