State v. Broaddus

• Decision Date: 14 November 1911
• Citation: 142 S.W. 340,238 Mo. 189
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CURTIS v. BROADDUS et al., Judges.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

142 S.W. 340

238 Mo. 189

STATE ex rel. CURTIS v. BROADDUS et al., Judges.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

November 14, 1911.

Rehearing Denied December 16, 1911.

1. COURTS (§ 207)—APPELLATE COURTS—JURISDICTION.

Under Const. Amend. 1884, § 8, giving the Supreme Court superintending control over the Courts of Appeal, and under Const. 1875, art. 6, § 3, giving such control over all inferior courts, that court can correct an error in the final decision of a court of appeals by certiorari, though not requested by the Court of Appeals to review, as authorized by section 6 of article 6 of the amendment, and may quash a judgment of a court of appeals which conflicts with a prior decision of the Supreme Court.

2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1097)—REVIEW— PRIOR APPELLATE DECISION—EFFECT.

A decision of the Supreme Court on a former appeal is conclusive upon the circuit court and upon a court of appeals upon a subsequent trial and appeal.

3. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1097)—REVIEW— SUBSEQUENT APPEAL—RECORD ON FORMER APPEAL—DUTY TO EXAMINE.

The Court of Appeals improperly refused to examine the record on a former trial, to determine whether issues presented on the appeal were determined on a former appeal to the Supreme Court.

4. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1097)—REVIEW— SUBSEQUENT APPEAL—CONFLICT WITH FORMER DECISION.

On certiorari to quash a judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversing a judgment for plaintiff, in a suit to enforce a contract to repurchase land, the decision held in conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court on a former appeal.

Woodson, Ferriss, and Lamm, JJ., dissenting.

In Banc. Certiorari by the State of Missouri, on relation of W. Espy Curtis, to quash a judgment entered by Elbridge J. Broaddus and others, Judges of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. Judgment quashed.

Robert F. Porter, for relator. A. F. Evans, for respondents.

BROWN, J.

This is a proceeding by certiorari in this court to quash a judgment entered by respondents as Judges of the Kansas City Court of Appeals.

In effect, it is a continuation of a suit instituted in the circuit court of Jackson county, wherein the relator, as plaintiff, brought suit against one Samuel E. Sexton, as defendant, to enforce a contract to repurchase certain real estate located in Kansas City, Mo. The first trial was had on January 29, 1903, when the circuit court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence, whereupon the plaintiff, Curtis, appealed to this court. The appeal was heard by us at our October term, 1906, and a decision rendered, reversing the judgment of the trial court, which decision is found in volume 201, p. 217, of the reports of this court, 100 S. W. 17.

This cause being remanded for a new trial, the same was, on May 12, 1908, submitted to a jury in the circuit court of Jackson county, which jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, Curtis. From a judgment on said verdict, defendant, Sexton, appealed to this court. By an order of this court, said appeal was transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals; and upon a hearing of said appeal in that court the judgment of the circuit court was, on January 24, 1910, reversed, on the alleged ground that plaintiff, Curtis, had failed to establish a cause of action against defendant, Sexton. 142 Mo. App. 179, 125 S. W. 806.

After unsuccessful motions on the part of plaintiff, Curtis, to secure a rehearing in said Kansas City Court of Appeals, and to transfer the appeal to this court, he instituted this action to quash the judgment of said Court of Appeals, for the alleged reason that it is in conflict with the former decision of this court in the same case, wherein we held that said plaintiff, Curtis, had by his evidence made out a prima facie case against the defendant, and was entitled to go to the jury. This action was heard by us at our last April term, and an opinion filed by FERRISS, J., but as said opinion was not concurred in by a majority of this court, the case was reassigned to the writer.

The issues herein present several important questions of law. First, it is contended by respondents that this court has no power by certiorari to review or correct a final judgment or decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, because such decision is in conflict with a prior controlling decision of this court. Second, that the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in this case is not in conflict with the prior decision of this court, because the evidence in the second trial was wholly different from the evidence before this court upon the first appeal.

Relator contends that the judgment and decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, which he seeks to quash, is not only in conflict with prior controlling decisions of this court, but is contrary to the law of the case, as announced by this court when the action was previously before us.

A careful reading of the former decision of this court and the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals herein lends some plausibility to respondents' contention that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in conflict with our decision. But relator contends that the evidence on the part of the plaintiff, given at the first trial, and which we held to constitute a prima facie case for plaintiff, is substantially the same as the evidence upon the second trial; and the relator, in his motion for a rehearing in the Kansas City Court of Appeals, filed with the respondents a printed copy of the evidence as presented to this court upon the first appeal, and asked the Court of Appeals to examine the record of the former trial, and determine whether or not the evidence on the part of the plaintiff was the same as upon the second trial, and whether or not the judgment of the Supreme Court was res adjudicata upon the Court of Appeals; but respondents refused to examine the abstract of the record of the first trial, and thereby determine whether or not the facts proven by plaintiff were substantially the same at both trials, but contented themselves with an examination of our opinion, wherein the facts of the case were stated in an abbreviated form, and held that the plaintiff's evidence upon the second trial was different in a substantial manner from that given at the first trial.

We have carefully examined the record upon which the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals is based, and compared it with the record which was before us on the former appeal, and find that the evidence on the part of the plaintiff in both trials was substantially the same, so far as such evidence tends to make out a case against the defendant, Sexton.

At the threshold of this case, our jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for by relator is challenged. One vital issue which confronts us is: Have we the power to correct an error in the final decision of a court of appeals, unless that court invites us to review its conclusions of law under the provisions of section 6 of the amendment to article 6 of our state Constitution?

Section 8 of the constitutional amendment of 1884 provides: "The Supreme Court shall have superintending control over the Courts of Appeals by mandamus, prohibition and certiorari."

Section 3, art. 6, of the Constitution of 1875, provides: "The Supreme Court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts. It shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari and other original remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same."

"Under these constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court is the final repository of judicial power. Designedly and wisely, there is found in these provisions no attempt to define or limit the superintending control which the people have seen fit, through their Constitution, to delegate to the Supreme Court, save only to indicate the instrumentalities or writs through which this control may be exercised. In harmony with the idea of ultimate judicial power in the Supreme Court, section 6 of the amendment of 1884 requires the Courts of Appeals to decide questions in conformity to the previous decisions of the Supreme Court. This to the end that the law throughout the state may be certain and uniform. Section 6 points out the method by which a court of appeals may transfer a cause to the Supreme Court, and in such cases requires this court to `rehear and determine said cause.' The provisions of this section do not, however, in any degree deprive this court of the superintending control given by the Constitution, and which it is the duty of this court to exercise whenever, in its judgment, the occasion demands it."

A power to supervise presupposes that the tribunal which is to do the supervising may act on its own initiative. If we could only exercise our right to correct errors and judgments of appellate courts when such courts voluntarily invite us to do so, then every appellate court in the state could constitute itself a supreme court, and refuse to follow our decisions whenever it might see fit to do so. Under such a condition of affairs, statutes and other laws would mean one thing in one part of the state and something quite different in another appellate district of the same commonwealth; and this court would by supreme in name only.

We have always felt and still feel that the distinguished jurists who preside over the several Courts of Appeals will not intentionally disregard their plain duty under the Constitution to follow the last previous rulings of this court on all questions of law and equity which may arise in said appellate courts, and that, should the time ever come when an appellate court of any district shall undertake to nullify the rulings of this court, the electorate of such district can be depended upon to remedy the evil. Yet we in no sense abdicate our right and power to see that the laws are administered throughout the state in a uniform manner, through the medium of original writs, when we deem their issuance appropriate and necessary.

In...