State v. Brodnax

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Fox
• Citation: 228 Mo. 25,128 S.W. 177
• Decision Date: 24 May 1910
• Parties: STATE v. BRODNAX et al.

128 S.W. 177 228 Mo. 25 STATE
v.
BRODNAX et al. Supreme Court of Missouri. May 24, 1910.

1. LICENSES (§ 7)—REGULATION OF EXCHANGES—STAMP TAX.

Act March 8, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 392), regulating the places of business where stocks, bonds, provisions, etc., are bought and sold on margins or otherwise where they are not at the time actually paid for and delivered, by requiring in the transaction of such business that a complete record of the thing sold, the name of the purchaser, and the time of delivery be made in a book kept for that purpose, and that the seller shall deliver to the purchaser a written or printed memoranda of sale, on which he shall place or cause to be placed a stamp of the value of 25 cents, has no application to ordinary and usual business transactions, but applies only to persons and corporations keeping and furnishing a meeting place for those engaged in the purchase and sale of commodities on margins or otherwise, whether called boards of exchange or boards of trade, and is sustainable as a regulatory measure, and is not a revenue measure to be tested by the rules applicable to the taxing power in the imposition of taxes directly on property or the value thereof.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 230)—EXCHANGES —STAMP ACT—CLASSIFICATION.

Stamp Act March 8, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 392), imposing a stamp tax on purchases and sales of stocks and bonds, provisions, etc., at exchanges where the purchase price is not paid at the time or goods delivered, embraces every class of persons engaged in such business, whether it be a corporation, association, partnership, or person furnishing a place for dealing in stocks and bonds, etc., on margins or otherwise, where the same is not at the time actually paid for and delivered, and all classes who may deal at places so furnished, and hence is not objectionable, in that it singles out a part of a legal class on which to impose a license or stamp tax, and exempts others of the same class, nor is the attempted classification of transactions either arbitrary, discriminating, or unreasonable.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 209) — EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.

The equal protection of the law only requires that the same means and methods be applied impartially to all the constituents of each class, so that the laws shall operate equally and uniformly on all persons under all circumstances, or that all persons must be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.

4. LICENSES (§ 7)—REGULATIONS—STATUTES —DISCRIMINATION.

Since Act March 8, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 392), regulating exchanges and imposing a stamp tax on dealings for future delivery, etc., held at such places, is a mere license or a tax on the right or privilege of participating in dealings and transactions in a business calling and at places prescribed by the act, it is not objectionable as discriminating, because the tax is not apportioned in accordance with the value of the property sold, etc.

5. COMMERCE (§ 65)—INTERSTATE COMMERCE —SALES AND EXCHANGES—TAXATION.

The stamp act of March 8, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 392), imposing a stamp tax on sales at exchanges, etc., is not invalid as an illegal interference with interstate commerce, the tax not being on property, but on the privilege of transacting the particular business in a particular place; it being immaterial whether the contract is between residents of different states or with reference to property situated in other states.

6. STATUTES (§ 107)—ENACTMENT—TITLE.

The purpose of Const. art. 4, § 28 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 185), providing that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, is to prevent incongruous disconnected matters which have no relation to each other from being joined in one bill, and such provision does not prevent the joinder of all matters that are germane to the principal subject, and have a natural connection with it.

7. STATUTES (§ 107)—TITLE—SUFFICIENCY.

The stamp act of March 8, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 392), is entitled an act making it unlawful for any corporation, copartnership, or person to buy or sell for future delivery stocks or bonds of any corporation, or petroleum, cotton, grain, provisions, or other commodities, without at the time delivering or receiving a written memoranda with a stamp purchased of the State Auditor, and providing a road fund and prescribing the manner of its distribution, and providing penalties for the violation thereof. Held, that a provision in the body of the act making it unlawful to keep or cause to be kept any office, store, or other place wherein is permitted the buying and selling of such articles or commodities, in violation of the act and imposing a penalty therefor, was germane to the subject of the act, and did not therefore render it invalid as containing more than one subject not expressed in its title.

In Banc. Appeal from Criminal Court, Jackson County; Ralph S. Latshaw, Judge.

Thomas J. Brodnax and another were convicted of violating Act March 8, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 392), requiring stamps on memoranda of sales of goods for future delivery, etc., and they appeal. Affirmed.

The following is the opinion of the court in division (Fox, J.):

"This is a prosecution of the defendants begun in the criminal court of Jackson county, Mo., for a violation of an act of the Legislature passed in 1907, and commonly known as the `Stamp Act.' This act was approved March 8, 1907 [Laws 1907, p. 392].

"The indictment upon which the judgment in this cause rests, omitting formal parts, is as follows: `The grand jurors for the county of Jackson, state of Missouri, being duly impaneled, upon their oath, present and charge that at the county of Jackson, state of Missouri, on the ____ day of January, 1908, Thomas J. Brodnax and Frank E. Essex, officers

[128 S.W. 178]

and agents of the Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, a voluntary association, did then and there willfully and unlawfully keep and cause to be kept a place commonly called the trading floor of the Board of Trade of Kansas City, wherein was then and there permitted the buying and selling of grain, provisions, and other commodities, on margins and otherwise, and where at the time of such sales, so permitted as aforesaid, the grain, provisions, and other commodities so sold, as aforesaid, were not then and there actually paid for and delivered, and at such time and place the sellers, or any of them, whose names are to the grand jury unknown, of the grain, provisions, and other commodities so sold on margins and otherwise, as aforesaid, did not then and there cause to be made a complete record of the grain, provisions, and other commodities sold the purchasers and the time of delivery in a book kept for that purpose, and at said time and place the sellers, or any of them, whose names are to the grand jury unknown, did not then and there deliver to the purchasers of said grain, provisions, and other commodities so sold, as aforesaid, a written or printed memoranda of said sales, on which they, the said sellers, or any of them, had placed or caused to be placed a stamp of the value of twenty-five cents, which they, the sellers, had purchased of the State Auditor and had on hand before making such sales; contrary to the statutes in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state.' To this indictment the defendants interposed a demurrer, in which the constitutionality of the act upon which the indictment is predicated is challenged. Such demurrer, in substance, alleged that said indictment does not state facts which constitute an offense against the state of Missouri, and that the statute, the violation of which is alleged in said indictment, is null and void, being in violation of sections 20 and 30 of article 2, and sections 28 and 53 of article 4, and of sections 3 and 4 of article 10 of the Constitution of the state of Missouri [Ann. St. 1906, pp. 146, 166, 185, 197, 275, 278], and of the interstate commerce provisions of section 8 of article 1 and of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The defendants were duly arraigned and entered each for himself a plea of not guilty.

"By consent of the parties to this proceeding a jury was waived and the cause was submitted to the court for trial. Before the introduction of any evidence defendants objected to the introduction of any evidence on the following grounds, to wit:

"`(1) The statute under which this proceeding is instituted is discriminatory, abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, deprives defendants of their property without due process of law, and denies to them the equal protection of the law, contrary to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

"`(2) The statute under which the proceeding is instituted is an unwarranted attempt to regulate interstate commerce, and is violative of section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States.

"`(3) The statute under which this proceeding is instituted is invalid as a tax not levied in proportion to value, in violation of section 4 of article 10 of the Constitution of Missouri.

"`(4) The statute under which the proceeding is instituted is invalid as providing for a tax which is not uniform upon the same class of subjects, in violation of section 3 of article 10 of the Constitution of Missouri.

"`(5) The statute under which the proceeding is instituted is void, being a special law, in violation of section 53 of article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri.

"`(6) The statute under which the proceeding is instituted is void, being passed in a bill which contained more than one subject, and which subjects were not clearly expressed in the title thereof, in violation of section 28 of article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri.

"`(7) The statute under which the proceeding is instituted is...