State v. Brooke, 75SO3-9101-CR-52
| Decision Date | 23 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 75SO3-9101-CR-52,75SO3-9101-CR-52 |
| Citation | 565 N.E.2d 754 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Petitioner (Appellee-Plaintiff below), v. Lonnie BROOKE, Respondent, (Appellant-Defendant below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
This cause comes to us pursuant to a petition to transfer filed by the State of Indiana. Lonnie Brooke was convicted in April, 1986, on two counts of Burglary and two counts of Theft and was found to be an Habitual Offender. His convictions were affirmed by this Court in Brooke v. State (1987), Ind., 516 N.E.2d 9. A Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence, alleging insufficient evidence to support the habitual offender determination, was denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals reversed. Brooke v. State (1990), Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 89. The Court of Appeals found that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to prove that the second offense supporting the habitual offender status had been committed after conviction and sentencing on the first. The Court of Appeals did not address an additional issue raised by Brooke concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the principal offense was committed after conviction and sentencing on the second prior offense.
The State's petition to transfer addresses only the sufficiency of evidence to support the commission date of the second prior offense. However, because we vacate the Court of Appeals on that issue, we will also address the second issue raised before that court.
The record shows that the first offense was committed on June 1, 1982, and that Brooke was convicted and sentenced on October 13, 1982. Brooke's second offenses were committed on March 25 and July 15, 1984, and he was convicted and sentenced for those offenses on September 6, 1985. These facts were all shown through State's Exhibits 1 and 2, admitted into evidence. However, pursuant to a defense objection concerning Exhibit 2, which was used to prove the second prior offense, the State agreed to have its witness read relevant portions to assure that the jury would not see objectionable information contained within that document. Officer Frederick Hignite, who testified in regard to the second prior offense, testified that Brooke committed the second offense after being convicted and sentenced on the first, but he did not state the exact date of commission. The Court of Appeals held that, although the commission dates were contained within the exhibit, the habitual offender determination could not be supported because Hignite had not read the commission dates aloud to the jury.
We disagree. Hignite testified that he had personal knowledge of the proceeding of the second prior offense and that the second offense was committed after conviction and sentencing on the first. We...
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