State v. Brooks
| Decision Date | 05 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D03-5309.,2D03-5309. |
| Citation | 890 So.2d 503 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jennifer Joy BROOKS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Timothy A. Freeland, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant. Thomas H. Ostrander, Bradenton, for Appellee.
The State appeals an order that grants Jennifer Brooks' motion to reduce or modify her sentences and that substantially reduces the sentences imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea with the State. We reverse.
The State charged Brooks in case number 01-882CF with lewd or lascivious battery and in case number 01-889CF with unlawful sexual activity with a minor, both second-degree felonies. See §§ 794.05, 800.04(4), Fla. Stat. (2000). The charges involved two victims. Eventually, Brooks and the State negotiated a plea. Although Brooks' Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet reflects that her lowest permissible prison sentence is 79.5 months, or 6.625 years, and that her maximum sentence is 30 years, the State agreed to concurrent downward departure sentences of 3 years in prison followed by 7 years of sex offender probation. The State also agreed to reduce the charge of lewd or lascivious battery to lewd or lascivious conduct. At the plea hearing, defense counsel explained that the State reduced the battery charge at Brooks' request. Because the lewd or lascivious conduct charge is a level 6 offense while the battery charge is a level 8 offense, the reduced charge scores fewer points on Brooks' scoresheet. See §§ 800.04(4), (6); 921.0022(3), Fla. Stat. (2000).
In accordance with the negotiated plea agreement, Judge Winesett, the original sentencing judge, imposed concurrent, downward departure sentences of 36 months in prison followed by 7 years of sex offender probation. The court noted on the scoresheet that the reasons for departure were a "legitimate uncoerced plea bargain"; "the victim's desire"; and the fact that "[t]he victim was an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident."
Brooks later filed a timely motion to reduce or modify her sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). In response, the State asserted that Brooks was not entitled to mitigation of her sentences because the trial court imposed the sentences pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. After a hearing, Judge Anderson granted Brooks' motion, ordering that the balance of Brooks'"remaining term of incarceration shall be converted to sex offender probation followed by an additional seven (7) years of sex offender probation" and that the balance of her "incarcerative sentence is hereby converted to a suspended sentence."
Brooks first challenges our jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal from the order mitigating her sentences, relying upon State v. Jordan, 783 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). There, the trial court did not sentence Jordan in accordance with a plea agreement between Jordan and the State. The State filed a petition for certiorari, challenging the sentence, and Jordan argued that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction. The Third District noted that the State is authorized by statute "to appeal two types of sentences: 1) a sentence that is illegal, and 2) a sentence imposed `below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921.'" Id. at 1181 (quoting § 924.07(1)(e), (i), Fla. Stat. (1999)). Because Jordan's sentence was neither illegal nor a departure sentence, the court concluded that the State could not obtain review of the sentence either by direct appeal or by certiorari. Id. at 1182.
Here, the mitigated sentences of probation constituted a downward departure from the minimum permissible sentence of 6.625 years in prison. Thus, pursuant to section 924.07(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2003), the State is authorized to appeal the sentences because they are "below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code." See State v. Swett, 772 So.2d 48, 51(Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (); State v. Allen, 553 So.2d 176 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) ().
On the merits, the State relies upon, and we agree with, the reasoning in Swett to support a reversal of the mitigated sentences. As in Swett, the State and Brooks entered into a negotiated plea. In Swett, the court stated that Swett, 772 So.2d at 52. To allow a defendant to use a rule...
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